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Is belief a dispositional state? This thesis looks at what sense, if any, belief is disposi-
tional, and what that claim amounts to. My focus is on the extent to which dispositions
enter into the individuation of belief-content pairs. It has commonly been supposed
that dispositions cannot, by themselves, individuate belief-content pairs for at least
two reasons. First, due to the influence of functionalist accounts of belief, on which
beliefs (despite perhaps bearing dispositional properties) are taken to be the occupants
of causal roles. Second, due to the ‘Twin-Earth’ style counterexamples to internalist
theories of content. In response to the first, I argue against a functionalist account
of belief in favour of a dispositional account. In response to the second, I argue that
whilst content externalism shows that beliefs are not individuated in terms of actu-
ally possessed dispositions, that belief-content pairs are nonetheless dispositionally
individuated, albeit by dispositional ideals, which I take to be a kind of functional
norm.
Preface
This thesis is on the metaphysics of dispositions, and the extent to which belief-content
pairs admit of dispositional individuation. Originally, my aim was to defend the
knowledge norm on belief. Alas, it quickly dawned upon me that I had tackled a
veritable Cerberus. A lesson on monster slaying: When starting out, tackle single-
headed beasts!
Here is a brief summary of the thesis. There are two parts. At the start of each I
have included a short introduction. The first part is on the metaphysics of dispositions,
the second on the relationship between dispositions and the attitude of belief. There
are seven chapters. Each chapter (quite satisfyingly, I might add) has two sections.
The first chapter, The Conditional Analysis, explores the semantics of dispositional
ascriptions. The central aim is to argue against a host of ‘conditional’ accounts and to
support a causal account of dispositional ascriptions, on which to ascribe a disposition
is to ascribe the possibility of a specific sort of causal relation, holding between certain
kinds of stimulus event and certain kinds of manifestation event.
The second chapter, The Identity Theory, looks at the ontological status of dispo-
sitional properties. According to what was once a popular account, dispositions are
identical to their causal bases. Orthodoxy has it that, at most, one may endorse a
token-token rather than a type-type identity theory, due to the problem of multiple real-
isability. I argue this is mistaken: There is multiple realisation at the token level. I then
argue that dispositions are modal properties, more precisely those modal properties
that constitute their analysans.
The third chapter, Functions, explores the relationship between functions and dis-
positions. On a fairly standard view, the canonical endorsement of which is given
by Robert Cummins (1975), functional ascriptions entail dispositional ascriptions: to
function as an F is, in part, to bear a dispositional property. In contrast, Mumford
has argued that not only is this claim false, but its converse is true: dispositions entail
functions, though functions do not entail dispositions. I argue that both Mumford’s and
Cummins’ support for their respective positions rests on equivocation. I then provide
a non-equivocatory argument of my own for Cummins’ position.
In the fourth chapter, Functional Norms, I outline the notion of a normative judge-
ment, and distinguish teleological from what I call ‘rule’ or deontological normativity.
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I argue that they are distinct kinds of normativity, as the relevant judgements bear
distinct causal powers. Whilst rule normative judgements play a motivational role in
cognition, teleo-normative judgements do not. I finish by explicating the notion of
functional norm.
In the fifth chapter, The Attitude of Belief, I outline belief, and the notion of a belief-
content pair. I go on to distinguish several distinct ways in which beliefs may be
said to be ‘dispositional’. On one view, which I call Simple Behaviourism, beliefs are
individuated in dispositional terms. On another, dispositions are employed to distin-
guish kinds of mental state: dispositional states vs occurrent states. I argue that the
distinction between ‘occurrent’ and ‘dispositional’ belief has been misapplied, and has
led to widespread endorsement of an overpermissive account of what agents believe.
I then outline and reject three purported differences between dispositions and beliefs
given by Armstrong (1973).
In the sixth chapter, Belief as Dispositional, I argue that belief is a dispositional
state. First, I outline ‘functional analysis’, and then functionalism in the philosophy of
mind, on which beliefs are individuated in terms of the occupation of causal roles. I
then show how Functionalism is a better theory than Simple Behaviourism, but argue
that a novel dispositional theory, which I call Complex Behaviourism, is preferable to
Functionalism.
In the seventh and final chapter, Dispositional Ideals, I develop what I call a ‘regula-
tory’ theory of content. First, I outline externalism in the philosophy of mind, and the
argument for the inconsistency of externalism and complex behaviourism. Following
that, I outline and reject a number of ways to accommodate externalism. Finally, I
provide my own regulatory theory, on which belief-content pairs are individuated by
functional norms, which are taken to be a kind of dispositional ideal.
Over the last four years, I have had the immense fortune to be surrounded by
numerous highly talented and intelligent individuals. I owe them more than I can ex-
press: to them, I give my thanks. Amongst those who helped me along the way, and in
no particular order, are Geoff Keeling, Leo Graham, Aaron Guthrie, Chris Burr, Oliver
Lean, Shaun Stanley, Nemo D’Qrill, Josh Habgood-Coote, Catrin Campbell-Moore,
Neil Coleman, Mark Pinder, Charles Janson, Havi Carel, Lucienne Spencer, Julien Du-
tant, Jonathan Vogel, James Wilson, Alan Wilson, Leia Hopf, Richard Pettigrew, Andy
Suttie, Vanessa Seifert, Ji-Young Lee, Issac Kean, Ben Springett, Arsham Nejad Kourki,
Anya Farrenikova, Nick Axten, James Ladyman, Nick Cosstick, Anthony Everett, Finn
Spicer, Kit Patrick, Karim Thebault, Ana Cretu, Maria Lasonon-Aarnio, and Samir
Okasha. Incompetently, I am bound to have missed many off the list. To them, I
extend my apologies. The team at Friska, where this thesis was written, also deserve
a mention, for keeping moods high and the caffeine flowing.
I was also extremely lucky to have benefited from excellent supervision, both from
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Alexander Bird, and in the final year by Jason Konek. Their critical comments have
been both insightful and invaluable. To them, I offer special thanks, not only for their
time and hard work, but for their support. My final thanks goes to my father. Without
his help, this thesis would never have been written, and I would have not had the self
indulgent pleasure of writing a Ph.D thesis. Certainly, I would never have had the joy
of reading and thinking about these issues, and I would be worse off for it. I dedicate
this thesis to him.
6
Author’s declaration
I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the
requirements of the University’s Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree
Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except
where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate’s own work.
Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such.
Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.
SIGNED: ............................................................. DATE:..........................
Contents
I Functions & Dispositions 9
1 The Conditional Analysis 13
1.1 Canonical Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Dispositional Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.1 Three conditional analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.2 The causal contingent account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 The Identity Theory 37
2.1 Two Identity Theses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1.1 Dispositions as causal bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1.2 Reformulation: token identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Dispositions as Modal Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.1 Plural realisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.2 Dispositions as modal properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Functions 57
3.1 Four Senses of ‘Function’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1.1 Mathematical and social . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1.2 Causal role functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.1.3 Teleological functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.1.4 Relation between causal and teleological functions . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Functions and Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2.1 Two equivocatory arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.2 Functions entail dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4 Functional Norms 85
4.1 Normativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.1.1 Normative judgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.1.2 Upholding to standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Teleological Normativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.1 Teleological standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7
8 CONTENTS
4.2.2 Norms and conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.3 Functional norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
II Doxastic Dispositions 105
5 The Attitude of Belief 109
5.1 The Propositional Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Belief as Dispositional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2.1 Simple behaviourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2.2 Armstrong’s three differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6 Belief as Dispositional 131
6.1 Functionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1.1 Functional analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1.2 Functionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2 Complex Behaviourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.2.1 Token states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.2.2 Back to plural realisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.2.3 Accommodating holism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7 Dispositional Ideals 153
7.1 The Externalist Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.1.1 Content externalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.1.2 The externalist challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.1.3 Context relativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.2 Dispositional Ideals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.2.1 Classification and regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166







I want to perceive and
understand the hidden powers
and laws of things, in order to
have them in my power.
Salvador Dalı́
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Introduction to Part I
Dispositions form a notoriously puzzling class of property.1 Paradigmatic examples
include fragility, flammability, solubility, and poisonousness. What is primarily puz-
zling is the way in which dispositions ‘lie latent’; to use Goodman’s phrase they are
like ‘threats and promises’. To say that a glass is fragile is not to say it is broken, to say
that a match is flammable is not to say it is on fire. Rather, the glass is fragile if it
threatens to break, the match is flammable if it promises to ignite when drawn across
the striker. Those events that reveal a dispositional property are called its stimulus con-
ditions. Those events a disposition threatens or promises to bring about are called its
manifestations. As Armstrong remarks, dispositional manifestations have an ‘amazing
property, metaphysically speaking’ — they may be non-existent.2 Dispositions may never
manifest; a glass may never smash, a match may never light. Such manifestations may,
then, like the content of some threats and promises, be mere possibilia.
Philosophers often say that belief is dispositional. What does this claim amount
to? The first two chapters of this part are on the nature of dispositional properties. In
the first, I develop and support an account of dispositional ascriptions. The account
developed construes dispositional ascriptions as ascriptions of a certain kind of causal,
modal property. Some metaphysicians may then be tempted to identify the disposition
with its causal basis, that is—the causally efficacious properties it bears, such that in
virtue of its bearing those properties, the modal property obtains. In the second, I
argue this is mistaken: Dispositions are not identical to their causal bases, not even
token-token identical. Re-deploying the problem of multiple realisability at the token
level, I argue that we have reason to not identify dispositions with their token causal
bases.
In the second two chapters, I turn to functional ascriptions. In the third, I distinguish
a number of distinct senses of the term ‘function’, and explicate two kinds of ascription
used to denote what I call the ‘causal role’ sense. I will argue, contra Mumford (2003),
that functional individuation is still a kind of dispositional individuation. I show that
Mumford’s argument, and arguments in favour of its negation, rest on equivocation.
I then provide a non-equivocatory argument of my own. In the fourth, I look at the
relationship between the ‘teleological’ sense of ‘function’ and normative judgements.
The central aim is to explicate the notion of a ‘functional norm’.
1It is worth noting that ‘disposition’ has somewhat of an ‘umbrella sense’. It should most likely be
taken to include, non-exhaustively, tendencies, potentialities, capacities, powers, and propensities.




Long ago, in a philosophy dominated by logical empiricism, dispositions ran amok.
For the empiricist, statements were either analytic, empirically verifiable, or empty.
Dispositional ascriptions are patently not analytic: The presence of fragility does not
follow from the definition of ‘glass’. Moreover, dispositional ascriptions are hardly
meaningless. If the trichotomy holds true, then dispositional ascriptions must be em-
pirically verifiable. But therein lies the problem: Dispositions seem, in a certain way,
to resist observational verification.1 Of course, one can verify a dispositional ascription
through observation of the disposition’s manifestations. But some dispositions lie la-
tent throughout their persistence: They never manifest. It seems to follow that some
dispositional ascriptions are never empirically verifiable.
Mellor (1974) put things rather dramatically: Dispositions were as ‘shameful in many
eyes as pregnant spinsters used to be — ideally to be explained away, or entitled by a shotgun
wedding to take the name of some decently real categorical property’. Mellor’s own attempt
at nominal restoration was largely unsuccessful. But just three years prior, Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity had come into print. And with a new found respect of modality
developing, dispositions promised to appear respectable again. And so it emerged:
what is known as the ‘simple conditional analysis’.
The analysis first appeared in Martin’s ‘Dispositions and Conditionals’, though by that
time it was already a widely held position. As Martin, and subsequently a wide range
of philosophers have shown, the simple conditional analysis fails. Nonetheless, meta-
physicians did not lose hope. Many have thought—and still do—that a conditional
analysis is still possible. It may require a tinker, and the end result may be less simple,
but in principle the analysis is correct. In what follows, I am going to argue that all
conditional analyses, no matter what form they take, are bound to fail. As I shall argue,
1Cf. (Papineau, 1987, p. 79).
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dispositions are not analysable in terms of conditionals of any kind. Dispositions, on the
view to be endorsed, are a certain kind of causal property. The lure of conditional anal-
yses follows only from the close—though extensionally non-equivalent—relationship
that holds between causal relations and conditionals. Loosely following Vetter (2014),
I will then propose an alternative: What I call the causal contingent account.
Now before we get into the thick of it, I wish to say a few brief words on my under-
standing of the term ‘analysis’. It is commonplace for contemporary philosophers—
particularly epistemologists—to eschew talk of ‘analyses’.2 Much of this is due to the
influential work of Timothy Williamson (2000), who argued that (a) there is no reason
to suppose that a conceptual analysis of knowledge in the Fregean/Russellian sense
(i.e., the mereological sense) is possible and that (b) a pessimistic induction may be run
for the providing of non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions on knowledge.
Similar doubts may be raised in the present case. Now, some may say that mere neces-
sary and sufficient conditions do not, strictly speaking, constitute an ‘analysis’. But as
I use the term ‘analysis’, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions will count. Whilst
truth-conditional semantics is irredeemably incomplete, truth-conditions do provide
insights into concepts. That is all I claim.
Here is the plan. There are two sections. In the first, I distinguish two kinds
of disposition: Conventional dispositions and canonical dispositions. I then outline
the view that the former are analysable, or semantically reducible if ‘analyse’ is too
strong, in terms of the latter. I suggest that such a view faces certain challenges, but
assume that such analyses are possible, if epistemically inaccessible. In the second,
I outline the standard way of analysing conventional dispositions, namely in terms
of conditionals, rejecting a variety of attempts. Finally, I outline a recent ‘contingent’
account developed by Barbara Vetter (2014), and support a modified version, what I
call the ‘causal contingent’ account.
Here are the aims:
[1.1] To outline the distinction between canonical and conventional disposi-
tional expressions.
[1.2] To outline and reject three analyses of dispositions: the ‘simple’ anal-
ysis, the ‘causal’ analysis, and the ‘fainthearted’ analysis.
[1.3] To sketch and defend the ‘causal contingent’ account.
The first section deals with [1.1] and [1.2]. The second section deals with [1.3].
2For some vivid examples, see (Greco, 2010) and (Pritchard, 2012).
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1.1 Canonical Reduction
Cigarettes are flammable, puddles of water are not. A rod of steel sufficiently cooled
may become fragile, a match may lose its flammability if drawn across the striker. The
upshot of these remarks is that dispositions apply to some objects but not to others and
that the bearing of dispositions may wax and wane. Under what conditions is it true
that a given object at a given time has some dispositional property? In this section, I
will reject the standard ‘conditional’ answer to this question.
Dispositional ascriptions are typically taken to fall into two classes. There are
conventional dispositions and canonical dispositions. The dispositional properties we
have looked at so far (fragility, flammability, and so on) are conventional. In contrast,
canonical dispositions are denoted by statements of the form:
Canonical Disposition x is disposed to M if S.
Instances include:
1a. Petrol is disposed to set on fire if ignited.
1b. Tim is disposed to get angry if provoked.
1c. Jelly is disposed to wobble if prodded.
The distinguishing mark of canonical dispositional ascriptions is that they make
explicit reference to (i) stimulus conditions (igniting/provoking/prodding) and (ii) man-
ifestations (setting on fire/becoming angry/wobbling). From now on, let ‘Dx’ denote
conventional dispositions, and ‘Dx(s,m)’ denote canonical dispositions.
It has been widely thought that conventionals are analysable into canonicals. On
this view, for a glass to be fragile is simply for it to have certain canonical dispositions:
It would smash if dropped, crack if struck, and so on. Call this the canonical reduction
thesis. Why should we accept the thesis? Surprisingly, the view is rarely offered much
in the way of support. There do, however, appear to be at least two reasons to suppose
it holds. They are as follows.
1. The semantic reason One can grasp a conventional dispositional concept by being
given a set of canonical ascriptions. Suppose, for example, that Jones tells Smith ‘Be
careful, that glass is fragile!’ If Smith were to respond, ‘What do you mean ‘fragile’?’
then Jones could respond ‘Well, if you drop it, then it will smash, and if you strike it,
then it will crack...’. In such a case, Smith may come to grasp the concept of fragility by
being given a set of conventional dispositions. Why is this possible? If the canonical
reduction thesis is true, we have an answer.
2. The epistemic reason One can come to know that certain kinds of object possess
a conventional dispositional property by coming to know that they possess certain
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canonical dispositions. For example, Smith may come to know that matches are
flammable by observing Jones draw several across the striker, and the subsequent
ignitions that follow. In other words, Smith comes to know that matches are flammable
by coming to know that they are disposed to ignite when drawn across the striker.
These reasons are admittedly inconclusive. Nevertheless, they give prima facie
support for the canonical reduction thesis. Unfortunately, however, whilst intuitively
plausible, getting precise on how exactly particular conventionals canonically reduce
is less straightforward than one might like. The task is not so difficult for what Ryle
called ‘single track’ dispositions, which are ones that reduce to a unique stimulus-
manifestation pair. Put schematically, and letting →r denote the relevant notion of
reduction, we could formalise such reductions as:
Single Track Reduction Dx→r Dx(s,m)
Simple though such reductions would be, it is far from clear that there exist any
single track conventional dispositions. For any given conventional disposition, there
appears to be a variety of stimuli which could cause the disposition to manifest, and
a wide variety of reactions may be properly regarded as its manifestation. Fragility
serves as a vivid example. A glass may manifest its fragility upon being dropped,
thrown, twisted, or struck. Its manifestations may differ also; it may crack, smash,
shatter, or splinter.
It might be thought that the various manifestations and stimuli, whilst appear-
ing disparate, may nonetheless be classified. For example, the stimulus condition for
fragility may be taken to be the exertion of a certain degree of force, and the manifes-
tations may be classified in terms of their all being a kind of loss of structural integrity.
But whilst this may work for some dispositions, it won’t work for all. An example
much discussed, originally given by Ryle, is ‘knowing French’. Consider:
A common view is that mental dispositions are often multi-track. To use
Ryle’s example, knowing French seems to be dispositional, but its manifes-
tations may be various—talking French, writing French, obeying an order in
French or even changing mental state when reading or hearing something
in French. (Bird, 2009b)
Where a conventional disposition is multi-track, its canonical reduction will involve
more than one canonical disposition. The problem then becomes specifying how the
various canonical dispositions must be truth-functionally related in order to give rise
to the reduced conventional property. Put schematically, and letting ‘Dx(sn,mn)’ denote
specific canonicals, two possibilities would be as follows:
∧-Reduction Dx→r Dx(s1,m1) ∧ Dx(s2,m2) ∧ Dx(s3,m3) ... ∧ Dx(sn,mn)
1.1. CANONICAL REDUCTION 17
∨-Reduction Dx→r Dx(s1,m1) ∨ Dx(s2,m2) ∨ Dx(s3,m3) ... ∨ Dx(sn,mn)
Both are standardly taken to be too crude: the first too strong, the latter weak.
Consider again Ryle’s example of knowing French. A conjunctional analysis would
require that one is able to respond to every possible French sentence. But this is patently
false; even native speakers of the language may not know the whole French vocabulary.
Similar points apply to more standard dispositional properties. Tempered glass may
not crack into large pieces, despite this being one of the possible manifestations of
fragile objects. But that is insufficient to disqualify it from falling under the concept’s
extension; tempered glass is fragile, less fragile, but fragile nonetheless.
Do similar points apply to the disjunctional analysis? It may be thought that
knowing how to respond to a single sentence of French is insufficient to count as
someone who knows French. On closer reflection, however, this is unclear. After all,
dispositions are gradational. Petrol is more flammable than cotton, and lead less poisonous
than arsenic. It may be that when someone knows only one sentence of French, that
one does know French, albeit very weakly. We would typically not attribute knowledge
of French to such speakers, just as we would typically not attribute flammability to a
plastic bag. But plastic bags are flammable; our choice of attribution in such cases is
plausibly guided by pragmatics and is thus not evidence for the presence or absence
of dispositional properties. So too, it may be, for knowing French.
Unfortunately, an alternative counterexample raised by Stephen Mumford may be
raised in objection. He writes:
In the case of love, for instance, buying some flowers, if passing a florist,
may be one of the disjuncts in the analysis [...] one may buy flowers for a
colleague recuperating in hospital. (Mumford, 1998, p. 80)
Our response to the previous case here is inert. To argue that one loves both one’s
colleague and one’s spouse, the former just more weakly is to misgrasp the concept of
love.
Further problems may remain for the disjunctional analysis. If so, it may be that
conventionals are only analysable into canonicals related by complex blends of differ-
ent truth functional relations. For instance, perhaps there are certain ‘core’ necessary
canonicals, and other ‘peripheral’ unnecessary but sufficient canonicals. In what re-
mains, I will assume that some kind of analysis of conventionals into canonicals is
possible, complex though it may be. But in any case, even that assumption granted,
an analysis of conventionals in terms of canonicals is, at best, incomplete, as it fails to
analyse out of dispositional terms.3 To complete the analysis, we require an analysis
3It might be argued that, like the concepts of modality, dispositional concepts are only definable in
terms of other dispositional concepts. I’ll assume for present purposes that this is false.
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of canonical dispositions in non-dispositional terms. That is the task to which I now
turn.
1.2 Dispositional Semantics
So far, I have dealt with the first aim, namely
[1.1] To outline the distinction between canonical and conventional disposi-
tional expressions.
In this section, I turn to the second and third. I consider and reject three analyses
of dispositions, all united by a common ‘conditional’ theme. I then sketch and defend
a modified version of Vetter’s non-conditional alternative.
1.2.1 Three conditional analyses
The standard view, at least historically speaking, is that canonical dispositions are
analysable into conditional statements that relate events; stimulus conditions for the
antecedent, manifestations for the consequent. This garners support from the gram-
matical, and thereby apparent logical form of statements that contain canonical dispo-
sitional expressions. We say that the glass is disposed to break if struck, or that the
match is disposed to ignite if drawn across the striker. Thus, a priori reflection makes




where ‘→x’ denotes some kind of conditional.4 The trick to making the analysis work,
at least it has been supposed, is getting the right sort of conditional. Early attempts
given by Carnap were hindered by the lack of a sufficiently powerful logic.5 But in the
wake of a Kripkean modal enlightenment,6 modal conditionals became a respectable
analytical tool. Dispositions were an obvious target for modal analysans, in part due to
their connection, noted at the start, to possibilia. As Goodman wrote:
4If we were to be more precise, we would time index both the analysandum and the analysans. Thus,
we would say that something is disposed, at a given time, to M given S, just in case if it were to undergo
M at t, then it would manifest at t*, where t* is later than t.
5See (Carnap, 1936).
6(Kripke, 1980).
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To find non-dispositional, or manifest, predicates of things we must turn
to those describing events [...] To apply such a predicate is to say that
something specific actually happens with respect to the thing in question;
while to apply a dispositional predicate is to speak of what can happen [...]
they seem to be applied to things in virtue of possible, rather than actual
occurrences... (Goodman, 1954, pp. 41-42)
It seems to follow, then, that ‘→x’ must denote some kind of modal conditional.
Which kind? Early attempts were influenced by the fact that explanations of disposi-
tions are often given in the subjunctive mood. Consider:
To say that the lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if
submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. (Storer, 1951)
The peculiarity of all such definitions is the occurrence of the type “If so
and so were to happen, then such and such would be the case.” (Ryle, 1949)
(Italics in original.)
A fairly standard way to interpret these subjunctive expressions is as counterfac-
tual conditionals, where the antecedent need not be false. With the developments in
counterfactual logic, primarily due to Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968), what was
known as the ‘simple conditional analysis’ of canonical dispositions emerged, which




Put in the language of possible worlds, and following the Lewisian semantics, this
reads: In the closest worlds in which the stimulus condition obtains, so too does the
manifestation. For example, a glass is disposed to shatter if struck iff. in the closest
worlds in which the glass is struck, the glass shatters.
Despite the analysis’ formal elegance and initial plausibility, philosophers soon pro-
vided what Bonevac et al call a ‘bestiary’ of counterexamples to the simple conditional
analysis.7 Two famous examples were given by Martin (1994). The first targets the ne-
cessity of the analysis, the second targets the sufficiency. They involve what he called
an ‘electro-fink’. We start with the assumption that the conventional dispositional term
‘live’, as it features in statements such as ‘x is live’, is analysable as follows:
(α) An electrical current is disposed to flow from x to a conductor if touched
by a conductor.
7(Bonevac et al. , 2011).
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on the simple conditional analysis this should be taken as equivalent to the following
counterfactual conditional:
(β) x is touched by a conductor󲨷 an electrical current flows from x to the
conductor.
Martin then gives a case in which the electro-fink makes it the case that (1) (β) is
true, but (α) is false (this gives the lack of sufficiency), and (2) in which (α) is true, but
in which (β) is false (this gives the lack of necessity). Here are the examples:
Insufficient Fink A dead wire is connected to the electro-fink. The fink makes
it the case that if the wire is touched by a conductor, then an electrical current
is passed through the wire, which in turn makes electricity flow from the
wire to the conductor.
Unnecessary Fink A live wire is connected to the electro-fink. The fink makes
it the case that if the wire is touched by a conductor, then no electricity is
allowed to flow through the wire, which in turn makes it the case that no
electricity flows from the wire to the conductor.
In Insufficient Fink, (α) is false (the wire is not live), but (β) is true, for if the wire
were touched by a conductor, it would suddenly become live, and would thereby
allow electricity to flow to the conductor. So the analysandum may be satisfied when
the analysans is not. The analysis is insufficient. In Unnecessary Fink, (α) is true (the
wire is live), but (β) is false, for if the wire were to be touched by a conductor, it would
suddenly become dead, and would thereby not transmit electricity to the conductor. So
the analysans may be satisfied when the analysans is not. The analysis is unnecessary.
It is worth noting that Martin’s counterexamples work by fixing the semantic value
of the counterfactual conditional, whilst changing the intrinsic properties of the wire,
and by doing so its dispositions. This is not a necessary feature of counterexamples to
the simple conditional analysis. Consider the following two from Johnston (1992):
Mimic A gold chalice is not fragile. Nevertheless, an angel takes a disliking
to it, taking it to be sacrilegious, and thus decides to cause the chalice to
shatter if struck or dropped.
Mask A fragile glass is carefully wrapped in bubble wrap, such that the
bubble wrap causes, upon striking or dropping, the glass to be protected
from breaking.
Consider the following canonical disposition:
(γ) x is disposed to shatter when struck.
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on the simple conditional analysis, this should be equivalent to:
(δ) x is struck󲨷 x shatters
However, in Mimic, the gold chalice satisfies (δ). If the chalice were struck, then
it would shatter. But ex hypothesi, the chalice is not so disposed. The analysandum is
false, but the analysans true. So the account is insufficient. Moreover, in Mask, the glass
satisfies (γ). The glass is disposed to shatter if struck. But the bubble wrap falsifies
the analysans — given that the glass is wrapped in bubble wrap, it would not shatter if
struck. The analysans is false, but the analysandum true. So the account is unnecessary.
Importantly, in both cases it is something extrinsic that does the work. Mimics
are extrinsic insufficient finks, masks are extrinsic unnecessary finks. The intrinsic
properties of the chalice and glass remain the same, the manifestations are either
caused to occur or prevented from occurring by extrinsic factors. Similar points apply
to their dispositions. A glass wrapped in bubble wrap retains its fragility, despite
losing its ability to manifest its fragility. Similarly, a gold chalice does not become
fragile upon the Angel’s decision to make it shatter if struck or dropped. So the
efficacy of the counterexamples do not require changes in either the dispositions, nor
the intrinsic properties of the object in question.8
An appealing patch to the analysis, to help it avoid the counterexamples given
above, is to introduce a casual requirement into the conditional. Lewis (1997) takes
this approach, and whilst Armstrong does not attempt to analyse the concept, he takes
causation to be amongst its essential components. A vivid example of this may be
found in A Causal Theory of Mind, where he writes:
An example of a causal concept is the concept of poison. The concept of
poison is the concept of something that when introduced into an organism
causes that organism to sicken and/or die. This is but a rough analysis of
the concept the structure of which is in fact somewhat more complex and
subtle than this. [...] But the essential point about the concept of poison
is that it is the concept of that, whatever it is, which produces certain effects.
(Armstrong, 1973, p. 20)
He does not say so explicitly, but his choice of concept here is dispositional, and it
is precisely because the concept is dispositional that it is causal.9 Whilst I will agree
that the concept is causal, if the remarks below hold true, then the last of Armstrong’s
statements cannot be quite right. Nonetheless, I take it to be very much on the right
track.
Here is Lewis’ account:
8For further counterexamples and discussion, see (Fara, 2005), (Smith, 1977), (Manley & Wasserman,
2008), and (Manley & Wasserman, 2011).
9Cf. (Armstrong, 1969).
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Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, for
some intrinsic property I that x has at t, for some time t’ after t, if x were to
undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property I until t’, s and x’s having
of I would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s giving response r. (Lewis,
1997, p. 157)
As he duly notes, ‘an unlovely mouthful!’ Simplicity is not on the side of the causal
analysis. Letting ‘→c’ denote an x-complete causal relation, and t some time, we may
formalise this as:
Causal Analysis
Dx(s,m) at t iff. there exists some intrinsic property I, and time t*
later than t such that
1. (Sx at t ∧ Ix from t to t*)󲨷 ((Sx ∧ Ix)→c Mx)
Let’s consider a case. Suppose we take a glass that is disposed to shatter if struck.
An ascription of the disposition means: the glass has some intrinsic property, such
that if it were to be struck and were to retain that property, the striking and that
intrinsic property would be an x-complete cause of the glass’s shattering. What is this
unfamiliar phrase: ‘x-complete cause’? Lewis writes:
We have the notion of a complete cause of an effect. (Mill called it the
‘whole cause’. I use a different term to mark that we need not be commit-
ted to Mill’s own analysis.) We can introduce a restriction of that notion:
a cause complete in so far as havings of properties intrinsic to x are con-
cerned, though perhaps omitting some events extrinsic to x. For short, an
‘x-complete cause’. (Lewis, 1997, p. 215)
This passage is not very clear. Mill’s notion is one of the sum of all of those events
and conditions which, taken together, are jointly sufficient for the caused event’s
occurrence. Patent enough. But what is a complete cause ‘in so far as havings of
properties intrinsic to x are concerned’ supposed to be? Lewis’ interpreters appear to
fare no better. Consider the following passages:
I take this to mean [...] (i) s is a cause of x’s giving response r; (ii) x’s
having B is a cause of response r; and (iii) if any of x’s other intrinsic
properties (besides B) had been different, x still would have given response
r. (Hitchcock, 2015, p. 308)
The meaning of ‘x-complete cause’ is as follows. Starting with the idea of
the complete cause of a manifestation event, ‘x-complete cause’ is obtained
by restriction [and] makes the having of the disposition independent of
circumstances that are extrinsic to x. (Molnar, 2003, p. 92)
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These two interpretations are not equivalent. The first cannot be right, for we
could introduce interfering properties that would mask the disposition. Suppose that
a match is flammable, perhaps due to its bearing a certain chemical structure in the tip.
Nonetheless, had one of the other properties differed (perhaps the colouring of the tip
acts in such a way as to starve the local environment of oxygen) then the match would
may well not manifest its flammability, despite the match counting as flammable.
The second is more plausible. I take it that it means something like: That subset
of the complete cause that constitutes either the stimulus, or the relevant intrinsic
properties. So if, for instance, a glass is struck, which results in it gaining some novel
intrinsic property I*, such that I* enters into the cause of the relevant manifestation,
then we would not have x-complete causation. In essence, being an x-complete cause
eliminates dispositions gained between stimulus and manifestation.
With that in mind, we find that the account avoids a number of the counterexamples
outlined above. The finkish cases are avoided, for they involve a change in the intrinsic
properties of the object. If the wire is disposed to pass an electrical current to a
conductor upon being so touched, then it need only conduct in cases in which it
maintains its intrinsic properties, properties which are changed by the presence of
the conductor. Similarly, if the wire is not disposed to do so, then it will not have
intrinsic properties that satisfy the requirement. Given that the finks change the intrinsic
properties, in the first case by giving the wire an intrinsic property, and in the latter by
taking it away, the cases are not counterexamples to the causal analysis.
Mimic is more tricky. After all, the striking of the (not fragile) chalice and some
intrinsic property would constitute an x-complete cause of the shattering. Lewis may,
however, have a trick up his sleeve: he may argue that the similarity relevant to the
evaluation should give less weight to features such as the angel’s presence. After all, it
may be thought, there is a perfectly respectable sense in which the glass could easily not
shatter when struck (we simply need to look at a world that is similar striking-wise, but
not angel-wise). And given that it could easily have failed to shatter, by equivalence,
it is false that it would shatter if it were struck.
So far so good. But the pressure point for the causal analysis lies in its treatment of
Mask. For in such a case, the glass is disposed to shatter when struck, despite it being
the case that if it were struck, then it would not shatter, even though it would retain its
intrinsic properties. So the striking, and one of the glass’ intrinsic properties, would not
be an x-complete cause of the shattering, as there would be no shattering simpliciter.
Lewis is aware of the issue. In response, he suggests that the issue is resolved by
proper stimulus individuation. He writes:
We might offhand define a poison as a substance that is disposed to cause
death if ingested. But that is rough: the specifications both of the response
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and of the stimulus stand in need of various corrections. To take just one of
the latter corrections: we should really say ‘if ingested without its antidote’.
Yet the need for this correction to the analysis of ‘poison’ teaches no lesson
about the analysis of dispositionality in general. (Lewis, 1997, p. 153)
This response is highly dissatisfying. It is certainly right to suppose that the stimulus
conditions require more detailed specification: The glass will not manifest its fragility
if struck by a hammer made of sponge. But exclusions of the kind Lewis has in mind
make the analysis appear circular. After all, to grasp what kind of conditions must
be excluded, one must already grasp the relevant notion of a disposition: to grasp
the concept of antidote one must first grasp the concept of poison. An antidote is
something that counteracts the effects of a poison; the concept cannot therefore be
used as part of the analysis of the disposition to kill when ingested.
Worse still counterexamples remain, for there are cases in which the antidote does
not appear to be part of the stimulus conditions. Bird (1997) gives the following case:
Antidote Smith ingests a poison at t. Sometime later at t*, before his
untimely death, Smith is injected with an antidote, which prevents the
poison’s deadly effects.
In Antidote, the stimulus occurs, and then the masking. Why is this problematic?
He writes:
In this case, the disposition and its causal basis remain throughout. The
object in question receives the appropriate stimulus, but does not give the
expected response. (Bird, 1998, p. 228)
If this is correct, then Lewis’ amendment to include the lack of antidote as part of
the stimulus condition is ineffective, for the disposition can be masked post-stimuli.
It follows, then, that Lewis’ account, even so modified, cannot deal with all cases of
masked dispositions.
Should the modal conditional analysis, then, be committed to the flames? Some
say ‘no’. A number of contemporary metaphysicians have opted for what Goodman
called a ‘fainthearted’ conditional. A fainthearted conditional is one that requires that
the consequent be satisfied only under certain conditions. We could, then, eliminate
masks by requiring that the conditional holds only in cases in which these further
conditions obtain. Where they do, the case would be what Fisher calls an ‘auspicious
circumstance’.10 Notice that these will not be built into the stimulus conditions, contra
Lewis, but will rather be supplementary features held fixed. Denote those further
conditions by ‘ζ’. We could formalise this thus:
10(Fisher, 2013).
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Fainthearted Analysis
Dx(s,m) at t iff. there exists some intrinsic property I, and time t*
later than t such that
1. ((Sx at t ∧ Ix from t to t*) ∧ ζ)󲨷 ((Sx ∧ Ix)→c Mx)
An even more unlovely mouthful!11 The analysis now avoids Antidote, for we may
say that the poison is disposed to kill when ingested, and when no antidote is present
(rather than: disposed to kill when ingested without its antidote).
But there are serious issues with adopting the fainthearted analysis. The first is
that the counterfactual condition becomes redundant. Now that both the consequent
and antecedent have been hyper-specified in order to discount the problematic cases,
it may be thought that the analysis should make use of some kind of strict implication.
But more problematically, and irrespective of which modal conditional we choose, it
is far from obvious how we are to specify the correct value of ‘ζ’, which results in
a painfully nebulous analysis.12 Mumford argues they are the ‘ideal’ conditions for
the disposition, but then the worries raised against Lewis re-emerge. As Fara duly
notes, what counts as ideal ‘can be fully specified only by appeal to the notion of masking
[...] [t]he ideal conditions for a disposition are surely those conditions most conducive to its
being manifested’.13 Since masking is understood only with reference to the analysed
disposition, disclusion of ideal conditions is viciously circular. The ‘ideal’ conditions
for a poison will be those in which an antidote is not administered, but we can know
this only because antidotes mask the dispositions of poisons.14
Another tempting approach would be to specify the conditions in terms of what
‘normally’, ‘ordinarily’ or ‘typically’ occurs. But masks can be perfectly normal or
typical. In a world in which it was normal or typical for glasses to be bubble wrapped,
or for antidotes to be administered (or vaccinations, for an actual case) fragile and
poisonous objects would still bear their dispositions.15 Others have argued that the
11It should be noted that there are a variety of ways to give fainthearted analyses, some of which do
not involve the causal element. The view may also be formalised through the use of a novel conditional.
See (Morreau, 1997) for an excellent example, and (Fara, 2005) for discussion.
12Cf. (Lewis, 1997, pp. 157-8), (Martin, 1994, pp. 4-5).
13(Fara, 2005, p. 52).
14For an argument against the charge of circularity, which is to my mind unsuccessful, see (Choi,
2008).
15A valiant attempt at specifying the conditions has been undertaken by Contessa (2013). The analysis
involves an absence of ‘interfering conditions’, of which there are two kinds, both explicated in non-
dispositional terms. I won’t have too much to say about Contessa’s analysis, other than it suffers from
the following shortcomings. Firstly, it is highly complex. Secondly it requires that different treatment be
given for what Contessa calls ‘intrinsic’ as opposed to ‘extrinsic’ dispositions. To my mind, the notion of
an extrinsic disposition is highly contentious. But even granted that the dichotomy holds, the analysis
is irredeemably disjunctive. In that respect, it lacks unity. It also commits Contessa to implausible
consequences, namely that a match’s flammability is an extrinsic disposition. For more see (Contessa,
2013, p. 415).
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correct value is determined by the context of utterance.16 But appeals to context
sensitivity are generally hindered by lack of a plausible account of how exactly the
context is determined. Whilst context sensitivity is an opaque phenomenon, we should
expect some account of those features that set the context; there appears to be nothing at
all that we can use to determine which features are relevant, for the counterexamples
that must be ruled out are so numerous and rich in variance that they appear to resist
unification, at least without reference to the analysed dispositional concept. If such an
account cannot be provided, then exclusion of problematic cases are irredeemably ad
hoc. If not normality, typicality, ideality, which features are salient? Without a plausible
answer, appeals to context sensitivity should be revoked.
More worryingly, even if such circumstances obtain, the objection retains its force,
for it is not only environmental features that would have to be set as part of the context,
as which circumstances must be excluded is also determined by the object that bears
the disposition. This point is well made by Hardin, when writing on colour concepts.17
He notes that what counts as standard conditions for a given colour concept is often
not colour relative, but object relative. What I mean by this is as follows: The normal
conditions are not simply determined by the object’s colour, but partly by the kind
of object it is. To take his own examples, rainbows and bioluminescent fish simply
cannot be viewed under the ‘standard conditions’ relevant for Munsell chips. For
an analogous case, and to appease those who are anti-dispositionalists about colour
concepts, consider an ordinary kitchen match. What counts as a ‘normal circumstance’
for the kitchen match would most likely include sufficiently dry conditions, but would
not be included when considering a waterproof match. That is to say; the conditions
of masking are not just determined by the context, but also by the object that bears
the disposition. It seems as though one can truly say of two matches, one waterproof
and one not, that they have the disposition to ignite when drawn across the striker,
and such ascriptions are not—not obviously at least—ambiguous. We can attribute the
same disposition in the same context to two different objects, even though the auspicious
circumstances that must obtain for each object differs. So it seems as though ‘ζ’ cannot
be individuated in terms of context alone.
A brief recap is due. So far, I have distinguished between conventional and canon-
ical dispositions, and have outlined three analyses of the latter, the simple conditional
analysis, the causal analysis, and the fainthearted analysis. All three were rejected.
That deals with
[1.2] To outline and reject three analyses of dispositions: the ‘simple’ anal-
ysis, the ‘causal’ analysis, and the ‘fainthearted’ analysis.
16See, for example, (Fisher, 2013), (Hawthorne & Manley, 2005), (Manley & Wasserman, 2011), and
(Bird, 1998).
17See (Hardin, 1988, pp. 68-69).
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1.2.2 The causal contingent account
In what remains, I would like to sketch an alternative. I am in sympathy with Bird
when he writes that the conditional element is a ‘red herring’.18 That is not to deny that
there is an important connection between conditionals and dispositions, but only to
deny that the connection is one of coextension. The account is based upon one recently
given by Barbara Vetter (2014). However, whilst I take the spirit of her account to
be correct, it is less plausibly motivated than one might like, and benefits from some
modifications. In what remains of this section, I outline Vetter’s account, suggest some
modifications, and then support the modified version.




There are a few points to note. The first is that the disposition is now formalised
as a two place relation between manifestation and object. This is because, on her view,
dispositions are individuated solely in terms of manifestations. Why so? Firstly, she is
sceptical on linguistic grounds of the notion of canonical dispositions, and thus restricts
her attention to conventionals. Secondly, she suggests that the stimulus conditions for
a given disposition are too disparate to be satisfactorily unified. She writes:
Fragile parchments break upon being merely touched, and a fragile old
wooden chair may split when transferred into a different temperature. The
various conditions that cause fragile objects to break have little in common,
apart from their being non-extreme causes of object’s breaking. (Vetter,
2014, p. 132)
It is not obvious we should accept this. Two objections can be raised. Firstly, an
objection she considers, is that it fails to accommodate the fact that different dispositions
may result in the same manifestation. Her own examples are claustrophobia (the
disposition to feel anxiety in response to being in an enclosed space) and acrophobia
(the disposition to feel anxiety in response to heights). Both have anxiety as their
manifestation; they differ only in their stimuli. But if dispositions are individuated in
terms of their manifestations alone, then these ought to count as the same disposition.
But they are not. So dispositions must, in some cases at least, be individuated by more
than their manifestations alone.
Her response is dissatisfying. She writes:
18(Bird, 1998, p. 233)
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[T]he manifestation of a disposition [...] may or may not be complex [...] it
may be the property of being caused by flowers to sneeze, of being caused by an
enclosed room to feel anxiety or of being caused by height to feel anxiety. (Vetter,
2014, p. 149) (Italics in original)
This move does not work, for she avoids individuating dispositions in terms of
stimulus conditions by simply building in the stimulus conditions into the manifesta-
tions. The manifestation/stimulus distinction is supposed to distinguish what happens
to an object that results given some event’s occurring which has an effect on the object. By al-
lowing these features as part of the manifestations, Vetter just changes what she means
by ‘manifestation’ to ‘stimulus-manifestation’. This fails to show that dispositions are
individuated in terms of their manifestations alone.
Vetter may reply that whilst the account does sometimes include something akin to
‘stimuli’ as part of the manifestations, that it is nonetheless silent vis-á-vis the specifics
of the relation between stimulus and manifestation. But that can’t be right. Consider
again the disposition to be caused by flowers to sneeze. Suppose that Smith suffers
from a rare condition, such that he is disposed to sneeze upon undergoing a perceptual
experience of flowers. In such a case, Smith is disposed to be ‘caused by flowers to
sneeze’, but the flowers are not the cause of the kind of the dispositional manifestation
she has in mind: Namely being allergic to flowers. The natural solution is, of course, to
build into the clause that it must be caused by the pollen of flowers to sneeze. The prob-
lem with pursuing this line, however, is that we now have what looks suspiciously like
the relevant specifics of the causal relation between manifestation and stimuli. So in the
end, ‘manifestation’ ends up being structurally analogous to ‘stimulus-manifestation’.
The second problem is that exactly the same applies to dispositional manifestations.
Fragility can be manifested, as noted at the start, by cracking, breaking, shattering,
splintering, and so on. So even if her claim holds, we have just as much right to
claim that dispositions are individuated only in terms of their stimulus conditions. In
either case, her defence fails. We should, then, maintain the tradition of individuating
dispositions in terms of stimulus conditions and manifestations, and conventional
dispositions in terms of complex sets of canonicals where required.
The second point to note is that the analysis does not involve a conditional, but
requires only that the manifestation could occur. Some might take this to be over per-
missive: Almost anything could break when struck, but it is not the case that almost
anything is fragile. To accommodate these worries, Vetter classifies dispositions into
two types. The first involves bare possibility and include flammability, irascibility,
breakability, and so on. Something is flammable just in case it could set on fire when
ignited, something is breakable just in case it could break when struck. The second
type, which include the problematic counterexamples, does not involve what merely
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could occur but rather what could easily occur. They are, in that sense, gradational dis-
positions. Something is fragile just in case it could easily break, something is poisonous
if it could easily kill.
To my mind, there is a genuine dichotomy here, but not one of gradationality.
Flammability is gradational; logs are less flammable than kindling. So too for break-
ability; champagne flutes are both more fragile and more breakable than steel flasks.
Whilst it is true that we often have certain strengths of disposition in mind when we
make dispositional ascriptions, this teaches us nothing about the meaning of dispo-
sitional concepts, for similar points apply to predicates of all kinds. When I ask for
a red jumper, a jumper that is just barely red may not be what I had in mind. When
I ask for an alcoholic drink, I would generally not be asking for a drink with an al-
cohol content of less than 1%. What distinguishes the kinds, in contrast, is that the
former class are individuated by a single manifestation (something is breakable just
in case it could break), whereas the latter are not (fragility may manifest through shat-
tering/cracking/splintering and so on). Of course, there are many ways of breaking,
but that is not the point. A term like breakable or flammable specifies a particular
manifestation; terms like fragility do not.
That is not to deny that some dispositional ascriptions bear a built-in stability
requirement. Sometimes, the term ‘flammable’ is contrasted with ‘combustible’, in
that the latter applies to entities that could catch on fire, whilst the former applies
to entities that could easily catch fire. Usage differs; even dictionaries offer distinct
definitions. Lexicography is an imperfect art. But even if some dispositional terms
do bear a stability aspect, that is not to say that the stability is part of the meaning of
dispositional concepts. Rather, we may say that such terms are partly dispositional,
partly gradational. In that sense, they are analogous to other non-dispositional terms.
For instance, the term ‘huge’ may be thought of as expressing a complex concept:
the combination of ‘big’ and ‘very’. Similarly, to be drenched may be thought of
as the complex of ‘wet’ and ‘very’. Stability is not a unique feature of dispositional
expressions: Rather, many terms of English express blends of concepts, some of which
are gradational, some of which are not. In short: Gradationally is no distinctive feature
of dispositional expressions.
I think that Vetter is correct that we should analyse dispositions as contingencies,
rather than as conditionals. But her defence of the contingent analysis is primarily
linguistic; she argues that it best respects the way we talk about dispositions. To my
mind, we should be suspicious of conceptual claims made on the basis of linguistic
evidence. Moreover, I part ways from her in two important respects. Firstly, I take
it that the analysis should incorporate stimuli and manifestations—she has given us
no reason to suppose that it should not. Secondly, and more importantly, we should
re-introduce Armstrong’s insight: Dispositions are causal concepts. I suggest, then, that
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we construe the relation of stimulus to manifestation in causal terms and let the truth-
functional work be done by the modal operator. Thus, on the present account, for an
object to possess the disposition to break when struck is simply for a certain causal




1. ✸ Sx→c Mx
The contingency at issue should most likely be construed nomologically; disposi-
tions are possible causal relations given the actual laws of nature.19 We should also hold
fixed the object’s intrinsic properties at the start of the evaluation. Like before, a more
precise formulation would stipulate that the object undergoes no change in intrinsic
properties other than those caused by the relevant stimulus. Note that these features
are not unique to dispositional ascriptions, but are features of modal ascriptions more
generally construed. When I say that Jones can run a five minute mile, I generally
mean that he can given the laws of nature, and given the properties he currently bears.
It may be that Jones can run a two minute mile if gravity were weaker; that would
not make an utterance of ‘Jones can run a two minute mile’ true. Similarly, it may be
that Jones could run a two minute mile after extensive surgery to increase his speed,
but such a world would not usually be counted as accessible on the relevant modal
evaluation.
In what remains, I offer an alternative non-linguistic defence of the reformulated
account. I then consider and reject some objections.
First, the account best respects the purpose of dispositional ascriptions. The basic
thought is that we characterise objects dispositionally in order to provide information
about how the object may be caused to change or to bring about changes in other
objects, by certain stimuli. We do so in order to modify our behaviour in such a way as
to better satisfy our desires. In that sense, dispositional ascriptions play a central role
in practical rationality. And this is all, I contend, best explained by their being possible
causal relations.
Here is an example. Suppose I tell Jones that the glass is fragile. Why would I do
this? What would the purpose of my doing so be? Well, I contend, I am telling Jones that
the glass could be caused to smash by being dropped. It follows, given Jones’ desire to
keep the glass intact, that he should be careful not to drop the glass. Thus, by pointing
to the causal modal properties of the glass, Jones may modify his behaviour in order to
better satisfy his desires. And once his behaviour has been so-modified, my purpose
19Cf. (Mumford, 1998, p. ch. 10) and (Armstrong, 1968, p. xvi).
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in ascribing the dispositions has been satisfied. Similar points apply to dispositional
ascriptions in the sciences. The discovery of possible causal relations is part and parcel
of scientific inquiry. Its purpose is, often enough, to guide future behaviour, whether
that be the design of new artefacts or of new methods of empirical verification.
Second: The account is theoretically virtuous, in the following three ways:
1. Simplicity The analysis is simpler, or at least as simple as the simple
conditional analysis. There are no ‘unlovely mouthfuls’. Of course, the
subject of simplicity is vexed. But those sympathetic to simplicity as a
theoretical virtue should be sympathetic to the account.20
2. No counterexamples The account is resistant to all of the standard counterex-
amples to the simple conditional analysis. Let there be finks, masks, mimics,
antidotes—populate one’s bestiary! The examples are inert in regards to
the contingent causal analysis.
3. No ad hocery The counterexamples are avoided without ad hoc stipula-
tions that certain cases be removed, and without vague appeals to ‘normal
contexts’.
I contend the reasons above make the contingent analysis preferable to the other
analyses. It is able to avoid the relevant counterexamples simply and without ad
hoc explanations of why certain cases aren’t to be included, and without appeal to
unspecified contexts.
I will now consider some objections. The first I anticipate is as follows: The analysis
is wildly over permissive. There are two ways to argue for this. They are as follows.
The first would be to consider Mimic. The angel has decided to make the chalice shatter
if struck. The chalice is struck, the striking causes the angel to shatter the chalice, so
there is a possible world in which the chalice is struck, and the striking causes the
shattering. So the analysans is true, but ex hypothesi the analysandum false. Too much is
permitted.
In reply, we should note that the notion of ‘cause’ in the relation ‘→c’ cannot be
any kind of causation whatsoever. Rather, it should invoke what we may call direct
causation. In Mimic, there is a weak, transitive sense in which the shattering is caused
by the striking, but really the direct cause of the shattering is not the striking, but the
angel. What do I mean by the ‘direct’ cause? An event e is the direct cause of some
other event e* just in case e causes e* in a more liberal sense, and e* is spatiotemporally
contiguous with e. If I strike a glass and it thereby shatters, the striking is contiguous
with the shattering, but in Mimic it is not, for the shattering is contiguous not with the
20I will discuss simplicity, alongside other theoretical virtues, in more detail in Chapter 2.
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striking, but with that long complex event the Angel ensures occurs, which results in
the shattering of the chalice.
But the amendment faces resistance. Consider, for example, the following passage
from Lewis:
A certain virus is disposed to cause those who become infected with it to
end up dead before their time, but not to undergo the direct and standard
process whereby lethal viruses mostly kill their victims. For this virus does
not itself interfere with any of the processes that constitute life. Rather, it
interferes with the victim’s defences against other pathogens – whereupon
those other pathogens [...] do the dirty work. Do we call this a lethal
virus? Of course we do. After all, my story of the virus is not just another
philosophical fantasy! It is the true story of HIV, slightly simplified. We
should not think, therefore, that dispositional concepts generally have built-
in response-specifications requiring a direct and standard process. (Lewis,
1973, p. 154)
The basic thought, then, is that HIV can be disposed to kill upon infection despite the
virus causing death by setting off of a long complex causal chain, and one that can take
many forms at that. So for something to bear a dispositional property does not require
that there is some direct causal process involved that holds between the stimulus
condition and the manifestation. I doubt, however, that the case is as problematic as
Lewis makes out. True enough, we sometimes say that HIV is deadly. But if we were
to be precise we would not say so. Consider the following claim found in information
about HIV infection:
HIV stands for human immunodeficiency virus and on its own it does not
kill you. The virus can survive and grow only by infecting, and destroying,
the immune system. This continual assault on the immune system makes it
weaker and weaker until it is no longer able to fight off infections. Without
treatment, it takes about 10 years from infection to the development of
AIDS - acquired immune deficiency syndrome. It is then that “opportunistic
infections”, ones a healthy immune system could fight off, become deadly.21
Notice that the following claims are made in this passage: (1) HIV does not kill
you, and (2) it is the infections which normally do not kill that ‘do the dirty work’ by
becoming deadly. I suggest this is correct—upon learning that HIV works as it does,
the natural temptation is to withdraw the dispositional ascription. In fact, the case
appears to be a one of unmasking. Our immune system usually masks the dispositions
21http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-15853743
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of bacteria and viruses to kill upon infection; the HIV removes the mask. HIV, then,
is not a deadly virus; but rather is a virus that allows bacteria and other viruses to
manifest their deadly dispositions.
Nonetheless, further cases bring further worries. One such case would involve bona
fide poisons; cyanide starves the mitochondria of the oxygen they require to produce
energy. Deadly though cyanide may be, its mortal manifestations are highly indirect.
One response would be to invoke levels of description. The death of an individual
poisoned with cyanide, it may be thought, is a long, complex event of which the
purported events that make the deaths seem indirect are mere parts. But further cases
may be constructed at the same level of description. An alarm clock has the disposition
to ring once the minute hand passes a certain threshold, but the mechanism which runs
from the minute hand to the bell striker may be highly indirect, and certainly cannot
be included as part of the manifestation, i.e., the ringing.
Fortunately, proponents of direct causation need not fear. For the purported indi-
rectness occurs in all the purported counterexamples as part of the manifestation. The
manifestation may be a highly indirect process—it does not follow that the stimulus
does not directly cause the manifestation. When I say that a glass is disposed to shatter
if struck, I mean to say that the striking could have some effect on the glass’s properties
which result in its shattering. So, when some x is disposed to M given S, it must be
possible that S is a direct cause of M. With that amendment in place, the account is
saved from the charge. Mimic is now avoided, for it is a case of indirect causation
between stimulus and manifestation.22
One may still worry. Is the notion of a direct cause coherent? My reply: of course
it is! The direct cause just is the event that caused the effect. What’s problematic about
that? Compare Mellor:
We can identify events, in this concrete occurrence sense, simply by their
spatio-temporal regions, well enough to allow one event but not another
roughly contemporaneous event to be the cause of a certain effect. (Mackie,
1974, p. 257)
Like similarity, causal directness is a notion we are adept at employing. There is
nothing illegitimate or ‘spooky’ about it.
A second way to argue that the account is over permissive would be to consider ob-
jects that would be caused by the stimulus to manifest only in abnormal environments.
22It is worth briefly noting that Lewis appears to have missed that the case he gives—HIV—is not
counted as deadly on his own analysis. For HIV does not (in fact: perhaps cannot) act as an x-complete
cause of death. Rather, something extrinsic (a novel infection) must also occur. That is to say: there
are no properties of an individual, such that those properties and HIV are a sufficient cause of the
individual’s death. So, even by his own lights, HIV should not be counted as deadly, just as we should
expect.
34 CHAPTER 1. THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS
A ball of steel wool is not flammable, but when placed in a sufficiently oxygen-rich
environment, the ball would set on fire when ignited. So something can possibly be
caused, given the relevant conditions, to manifest, even if it does not have the relevant
disposition. My response here is to bite the bullet. Intuitively, to me at least, the
discovery that steel wool can set on fire when ignited in certain conditions shows that
it does have the relevant disposition. Steel wool is flammable, not very flammable,
but flammable nonetheless. True enough, we would typically not cite steel wool as a
flammable item when listing the items in one’s house that are flammable. But again,
this is merely pragmatics, when we ask what is flammable, we are interested not in
what is flammable tout court, but what is flammable if, say, a house fire were to break
out. So steel wool is no counterexample, but rather supports the contingent analysis.
The discovery that something could be caused to manifest given the relevant stimuli
comes with the discovery that the object bears a disposition it was previously thought
to lack.
That deals with [3.1]. The causal contingent account has been sketched and de-
fended. Now, before we finish, we should ask: What of the relationship between
dispositions and conditionals? We saw at the start that the conditional analysis arose,
in part, due to the fact that dispositions are often explained with reference to condi-
tionals. If no conditional analysis is possible, why would that be?
We can, I think, explain the temptation away, for at least two reasons. Firstly: Causal
relations and conditionals bear close residence. When possible causal relations hold,
in the absence of cases that interfere with the causal process, the effects of the cause
will typically follow. Put another way: causal relations are typically counterfactual-
supporting. Not always, though. The causal process may be interfered with (think
masks), or deviantly duplicated (think mimics). So we can, admittedly somewhat
heuristically, make use of conditionals when ascribing causal relations. Secondly:
It is commonplace for contingencies to be explained with reference to conditionals.
Suppose, for example, that Smith claims that it is possible to dip one’s hand in molten
lead, without any pain or tissue damage. A contentious claim indeed! Jones, suspicious
as he is, asks how. Smith says that if one dips one’s hand in water prior to dipping
one’s hand in the molten lead, then the water will vaporise upon contact with the
heated metal, which will result in a protective layer of steam that enables one’s hand
to avoid contact with the lead. In this case, a possibility claim is explained with the
use of a conditional. This is no surprise, one can show that something is possible by
showing that it is entailed by possible antecedent events. I contend, then, that this is
why there is such a strong link between conditionals and dispositions. It is not because
dispositions are analysed in terms of conditionals, but rather because a dispositional
ascription, like ascriptions of contingencies of other varieties, can be explained and
supported through the use of conditionals.
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Conclusion
This chapter had the following aims:
[1.1] To outline the distinction between canonical and conventional disposi-
tional expressions.
[1.2] To outline and reject three analyses of dispositions: the ‘simple’ anal-
ysis, the ‘causal’ analysis, and the ‘fainthearted’ analysis.
[1.3] To sketch and defend the ‘causal contingent’ account.
Those aims are now satisfied. Now, recall that at the start of this chapter, we saw
that dispositions were problematic for the empiricists. If what was argued in this
chapter is correct, then their problematic nature derives from the fact that dispositions
must be analysed in modal – though non-conditional – terms. In the next chapter, I
am going to take the argument one step further: I will argue not just that dispositions
may be analysed in terms of causal contingencies: They may be identified with them.




Once upon a time there was a theory. Its name was: The Identity Theory. In its embryonic
stages, the identity theory was surrounded by hope and praise. It promised much: A
solution to the mind-body problem, the problem of psychophysical overdetermination
— philosophical spoils! Alas, as it grew, hope was lost. It faced a problem. The identity
theory fell out of philosophical fashion.
This short story tells a piece of philosophical folklore: The rise and fall of the
identification of body and mind. Now, whilst many suppose the identity theory to be,
by now, a dud hypothesis, not all do. Some have thought that its central problem is
avoidable. What is the problem of which I speak? Answer: The problem of multiple
realisability. Now, some have denied the problem to be fatal for the identity theory. All
that it reveals — so the story goes — is that we must endorse a token-token as opposed
to a type-type identity theory. Once that amendment is made, the spoils are ripe for the
picking!
‘Hold on’, you say, ‘this part is supposed to be on dispositions, but the identity theory
is a position in the philosophy of mind.’
Well true, but the identification of mind and brain ran alongside the identification
of dispositions and their causal bases. For it was thought that states of mind are
dispositions, and it is precisely because dispositions are identical to their causal bases
that mental states are identical to their causal bases — states of the central nervous
system’.
Thus, in this chapter, I will have little to say on the identity theory as a position in
the philosophy of mind, though implications may naturally be drawn. My primary
focus in this chapter will be on the move outlined above, from a type-type identity
theory to a token-token identity theory. I will argue the move is dialectically inert.
I have three central aims. The first is to outline the identity theory. The second
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is to reject it. I will argue that the problem of multiple realisability holds not only at
the type-level, as is well known, but at the token-level also. The third is to support
a modal account of dispositions: I will argue that dispositions are identical to those
causal contingent properties they were analysed in terms of in the previous chapter.
Here are the aims, explicitly put:
[2.1] To outline the identity theory.
[2.2] To argue that the problem of multiple realisability holds at both the
type and the token level.
[2.3] To defend the view that dispositions are modal properties.
Here is the plan. There are two sections, both composed of two subsections. In the
first, I outline the identity theory, which states that dispositions are identical to their
causal bases. I then outline a notorious problem such identifications must face: the
problem of multiple realisability. I then outline a reformulation of the view intended
to overcome the worry, which takes the identification to hold not at the type level, but
at the token level. In the second section, I argue that the reformulation fails. I show
that there exists a class of the multiply realised dispositions which are as threatening
to the token-token identity theory as standard cases of multiple realisation are to the
type-type identity theory. I call these plurally realised dispositions. I then argue that
dispositions are modal properties, defending the view from several objections, two of
which are given by Mellor (1974). Finally, I offer the view some support.
2.1 Two Identity Theses
2.1.1 Dispositions as causal bases
According to
The Identity Theory Dispositional properties are identical to their causal
bases.
What are causal bases? As noted at the start, the causal basis of a given disposition
is simply that intrinsic property, or that conjunction of intrinsic properties if there are
many, that are causally efficacious in the disposition’s manifestations. For instance,
the fragility of a glass is identical to, say, those structural properties of the glass which
are responsible for its shattering once struck. Those non-dispositional properties are
typically called categorical properties.1 I will follow suit.
1There is, in fact, a real trouble with the categorical/dispositional distinction, especially given attempts
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Major proponents include Quine (1960), Armstrong (1968, 1973), Mumford (2003),
Dennett (1989), and Heil (2004). Before I reject the thesis, it is worth outlining its merits.
Why should we accept it? What benefits does the identity theory yield?
Merit 1 The identity theory provides a neat identification of the mind and the
body. The main thrust of Armstrong’s A Materialist Theory of Mind essentially rests on
the identification of dispositions with their causal bases. The basic argument runs as
follows:
Australasian Identity Argument
1. Mental states are dispositions.
2. Dispositions are identical to their causal bases.
3. The causal bases of mental states are bodily states.
therefore
C. Mental states are identical to bodily states.
Nevertheless, as I will try to show, valid though it may be the argument is unsound,
for the second premise is false.
Merit 2 The second reason in its favour concerns the status of scientific concepts.
Recall that at the start of the last chapter, we saw that dispositions are entities that ‘lie
latent’. The latency of dispositions makes us, as Goodman once wrote, ‘moved to inquire
whether we can bring them down to earth; whether, that is, we can explain disposition terms
without reference to occult powers’.2 But this is no simple task: The latency of dispositions
makes them appear to fall outside the scope of observable reality, at least whilst they
persist unmanifested. This is especially clear in the case of scientific concepts, many
of which are taken to be dispositional. Dispositions appear occult, mysterious; such
mystery has no place in naturalistic inquiry.
The natural response to their latency is to take dispositions to be possibilia. But
possibilia, many have maintained, are no less occult than dispositions themselves. To
subsume dispositions under the merely possible is to fail to bring them down to earth.
To identify the dispositional with the modal merely trades the occult for the occult. If
the sciences rest only on mere possibilia, at least so it was maintained by empiricists of the
day, then the sciences appear less scientific. If what follows is correct, then Goodman’s
inquiry is stillborn. Dispositions are modal properties; they cannot be brought down
to earth, unless possibilia may be brought with them. It should be noted that to the
naturalistically minded of contemporary philosophy, scientific concepts are essentially
at identifying the two. For, strictly speaking, ‘categorical’ in this context means ‘non-dispositional’, and
evidently dispositions cannot be identical to non-dispositional properties. Despite the inadequacies of
this terminology, it will be worthwhile to adopt it. For interesting discussion on this issue, see (Crane,
1996).
2(Goodman, 1954, p. 40).
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modal will be less worrying than it was to the likes of Quine and Goodman. Modality
has been legitimised; with it, suspicions have been quelled.3
In summary, the identity theory (a) gives us a neat identification of mind and body
and (b) de-modalises dispositional concepts. The thesis has pleasing consequences.
Are there independent reasons in its favour? According to a number of philosophers,
the answer is ‘yes’. I will consider two.
The first concerns its explanatory virtues. In particular, the view is highly parsi-
monious, and parsimonious in the ‘kind’ sense at that.4 Our best total ontology need
not include both dispositional properties and non-dispositional properties. We must
grant only the latter ontological status. The second is semantic. Suppose that Jones
utters ‘that glass is fragile’. According to Mumford, Armstrong, and Quine, what
Jones means by this is something akin to: ‘the glass has some categorical property C,
such that C would cause the glass to exhibit certain manifestations given certain stim-
uli’. Importantly, the latter part is but a description of the dispositional property—the
property is identical with C. This also appears to be given tacit endorsement by Lewis
for, as we saw in the last chapter, his analysis of dispositional concepts included the
existence of some causally efficacious intrinsic property as part of its analysans.
The semantic reason is not self evidently true. Why should we accept it? In later
work, Armstrong writes:
[I]t is linguistically proper to identify the disposition with this state of the
disposed object. It is linguistically proper, for instance, to say that brittleness
is a certain sort of bonding of the molecules of the brittle object. The ground
for saying this is simply that scientists and others often speak in this way,
and there seems to be no objection to such speech. (Armstrong, 1973, p. 14)
The passage gives two reasons. They are as follows: (1) scientists (and others) often
speak as though the identity theory is true, (2) there is no objection to such speech.
Now, (1) is true, but we don’t always speak this way. After all, we sometimes do
not say that brittleness of a glass is identical to the bonding, but rather that the bonding
is the reason why the glass is brittle. But even if this were false, that scientists and
others often speak a certain way is not strong evidence for its truth. Scientists (and
others) are notoriously liberal in their attribution of identity relations. Plausibly, such
liberality is objectionable on philosophical grounds. We might, then, reasonably object
to such speech, contra (2). For if someone states ‘The fragility is the bonding’, we might
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More seriously, it is far from clear that such speech is guided by purely semantic
motivations. For, it may be thought, it was very much unknown whether science
would discover the bases of dispositional properties. This was no conceptual truth, at
least. It may be thought that a better explanation of our tendency to suppose that we
are characterising objects so, is our semantic grasp of dispositional concepts combined
with our knowledge of scientific discoveries. Now that we know science seems to find
the causal correlates of dispositional manifestations, we may infer that such correlates
exist, whenever a disposition is ascribed. We need not commit to that being part
of the meaning of dispositional ascriptions, we may take it to be an inferential habit,
informed by knowledge gained a posteriori. So Jones may not mean, merely by making a
dispositional ascription, that there exists some categorical property which the relevant
disposition is identical with, though it may be amongst the beliefs that drive his
utterances.
Now, the considerations above are, at best, weak support for the identity theory.
Linguistic considerations and mere parsimony alone are insufficient for outright accep-
tance. Are there other reasons that we should accept the view? According to Stephen
Mumford (2003), there are. For, so he contends, there is a strong argument in its favour.
In essence, the argument is a generalisation of Lewis’ (1966) argument, later developed
by Peacocke (1979), for the physchophysical identity theory.
It runs as follows:
The Argument from Causal Role
1. For any dispositional property D, D is the occupier of some
causal role R.
2. For any such casual role R, R is occupied by some categorical
property C.
3. If x occupies the causal role R, and y occupies R, then x = y.
therefore
C. For any dispositional property D, D is identical to some cate-
gorical property C.5
The argument is valid, but the premises are contentious. Why should we accept
the first? Mumford’s support essentially rests on the semantic reason offered above.
We found that wanting. He does give the following brief further support:
How could the opponent [...] be persuaded? One line of argument is to
point out the conceptual absurdity of dispositions occupying inappropriate
5Talk of properties occupying causal roles is somewhat misleading. Strictly speaking, we should
we speaking of, as Shoemaker puts it, the causal contribution to the object the property provides. See
(Shoemaker, 1980).
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causal roles. If it was claimed that something dissolved in water because
of its fragility, then, unless some explanation could be produced, this claim
would appear not just false but also absurd [...] because of the conceptual
connection between the causal role of causing dissolving when in water and
the causal role of causing breakage when dropped. The idea of a disposition
occupying a different causal role to the one it actually occupies involves a
conceptual, rather than a factual, confusion. (Mumford, 1998, p. 149)
But this gives us no reason to suppose that dispositions occupy causal roles. After
all, we can explain the absurdity, and agree that it arises from conceptual confusion,
without thereby accepting the premise. For suppose that the modal analysis defended
in the previous chapter is correct. We can say that proper grasp of the concept of fragility
involves grasping that something’s being fragile is a matter of it being possibly caused
to break if struck. It would then be a conceptual confusion to claim that something
dissolved because it is fragile; but this does not require that it occupies any causal role
whatsoever.6
What, then, about the second premise? Mumford’s support is that:
There has been a long history of categorical properties or mechanisms being
offered as explanations of disposition manifestations. Their explanatory
value lies in the empirical or theoretical claims that they occupy, as a matter
of fact, those same causal roles which are ‘pre-scientifically’ understood
only in terms of dispositions. (Mumford, 1998, p. 149)
This certainly seems right. We now understand that an object is combustible, for
instance, just in case it contains a substance capable of undergoing rapid oxidation. It
is, of course, an empirical matter whether this will hold for all dispositional properties,
but this does appear well supported by the sciences. I am prepared, then, to grant that
the second premise is true. So too for the third. The premise states that where two
properties occupy one and the same causal role, those two properties are identical.
This is but the standard account of property identity. If water is identical in its causal
role to H2O, then the two properties are identical. The concepts may be distinct, even if
the properties are not.7
A notorious hurdle that the argument must face is the well-known problem of
multiple realisability, famously raised by Prior et al. We can illuminate the problem with
the use of a reductio. First, we suppose that the identity theory is true. Then, we take
two objects that possess the same disposition: Perhaps an elastic band, and an elastic
metal rod. By the identity theory, elasticity is identical to the causal basis of the rubber
6For more discussion, see (Squires 1968, 1970), (Stevenson, 1969), (Armstrong, 1969), and (Kim, 1993).
7Cf. (Shoemaker, 1980) and (Alston, 1971).
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band. So too for the causal basis of the metal rod. Now, the causal basis of elasticity in
the rubber band is its possession of polymer chains, but in the rod the basis is atomic
lattices. So elasticity is identical to (a) polymer chains and (b) atomic lattices. By the
transitivity of identity it follows that polymer chains are identical to atomic lattices.
But polymer chains are non-identical to atomic lattices. The absurdity is now revealed:
We have generated a contradiction.
The argument is powerful, though some have wondered whether it succeeds.
Mumford, for example, questions whether or not the contradiction genuinely arises.
He gives two arguments. The first is as follows. It may be that dispositions are
determinables, whilst categorical bases are determinates. If that is true, dispositional
properties would be analogous to the property of being red. A deep red tunic and
a light red Ferrari may both fall under the extension of ‘red’, despite the categorical
properties that are responsible for giving rise to the redness differing. Just as there is
no contradiction in two objects being red, despite arising from two distinct categorical
properties, there is no contradiction with one and the same disposition arising from
two distinct categorical properties.8 This response is rather puzzling, however. After
all, it seems perfectly respectable to suppose that the relation between determinates
and determinables, at least insofar as there are multiple determinates, is not one of
identity, for exactly the transitivity worries given above. We do not want to identify
red with any particular categorical property, arguably, for precisely the presence of
non-identical determinates.
The second argument is that the purported multiple realisability arises due to the
inclusion of ‘causally irrelevant properties in the identity statement’. The basic thought
is that we should not take the causal bases to be, in the instance given above, the atomic
lattice and the polymer chains, but rather some property that they both share which is
responsible for the disposition to deform reversibly under stress. As he notes:
Once this is done, we find in each case that just a single categorical correlate,
no matter how general, can be found for each disposition. (Mumford, 1998,
p. 431)
Whether this strategy works, of course, must also be settled empirically. But it
should be noted that the kind of properties which would unify the seemingly disparate
properties, on the surface at least, appear to resist the generality Mumford requires. For
often, it appears that we must appeal to properties that are suspiciously dispositional
to unify the causal bases, which would yield unwanted circularity. What is it that all
fragile objects have, in virtue of which they count as fragile, other than the disposition
to shatter if struck? Some would argue that they are unified in terms of their all sharing
a functional role. But functional-role realisation does not obviously denote what may
8See (Mumford, 1998, p. 158).
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be properly called a ‘categorical property’. We cannot rule out such identifications
a priori, but in the absence of empirical verification, we should not accept they hold.
Without the required empirical support, to rest one’s case on this alone seems like an
instance of ad hoc wishful thinking.
Mumford is aware that the arguments are seriously wanting. He claims that ‘[T]his
line is a difficult one to follow and it need not be pursued if variable realisation and a form of
property monism can be reconciled.’
2.1.2 Reformulation: token identity
In order to avoid the problem, Mumford follows Armstrong in modifying the kind
of identity required. The basic thought is that the argument relies on what is called
a ‘type-type’ identification between dispositions and categorical bases. Instead, they
opt for a ‘token-token’ identification.9 Consider:
But I did miss something important, though. If the mental is nothing
but that which plays a certain causal role [...] then there is the possibility,
which may even be an empirical possibility that the causal role of tokens of
the same mental type should be filled by tokens of significantly different
physical types. Instead of type-type identity, one might have no more than
a mental type correlated with an indefinite disjunction of physical types.
[...] Every mental token is a purely physical token. (Armstrong, 1968, p.
xv)
The monist wants to say that there is just one attribute of x, or state that
x is in, that makes it true of x that Dx and that Cx. This requirement can
be satisfied even if the extensions of D and C do not coincide. Thus there
need not be an identity of universals for monism. [...] each instance of a
disposition is identical to some instance of a categorical base [this] amounts
to a token-token identity theory. (Mumford, 1998, p. 159)
Talk of ‘types’ and ‘tokens’ is notoriously obfuscating.10 But the intended distinc-
tion is as follows. As formulated, the argument requires that for any instance of a
dispositional property, there is some unique type of categorical state, the tokens of
which are responsible for the instance’s manifestations. What cases of multiple realis-
ability show is that, for many dispositions at least, there is no such type of categorical
state. Different objects may bear the same disposition, despite the manifestations being
caused by categorical tokens of distinct types.
9Cf. (Davidson, 1970).
10Cf. (Steward, 1997).
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In contrast, a token-token identity theory makes no such demand. All that is
required is that each instance of a dispositional property is identical to some instance of a
categorical property. The rubber band’s elasticity is identical to its polymer chains, the
metal rod’s elasticity is identical to its atomic lattice. But there is no requirement that
the atomic lattice is identical to the polymer chains. We can, then, re-run the argument
as follows:
The Argument from Token Causal Role
1. For any token d of a dispositional property D, d is the occupier
of some token causal role R.
2. For any such token casual role R, R is occupied by a token c of
some categorical property C.
3. If x occupies the causal role R, and y occupies R, then x = y.
therefore
C. For any token d of a dispositional property D, d is identical to
the token c of some categorical property C.
Because the identification is at the token, and not at the type level, the reductio may
no longer be run; our contradiction is avoided. At least, that is how the argument goes.
Not all are convinced that token-token is the way to go. Instead, the relation
between categorical causal bases and dispositions may be thought to be one of reali-
sation. Dispositional properties are said to be ‘higher order’ properties of lower level
categorical properties.
Call this the
Higher Order Theory Dispositional properties are higher order properties
of distinct categorical causal bases.
Why would one opt for the higher order, as opposed to the token identity theory?
One motivation concerns the modal status of the laws of nature. Those who hold that
the laws of nature hold only contingently may be dissatisfied with an identity relation
holding between dispositions and causal bases, for identity holds necessarily, and if
the laws of nature are contingent, then it is plausible that the relationship between
causal bases and dispositions is too.11 A glass may be fragile in one world, not fragile
in another, despite being intrinsically identical across both. Some may object: Does
this not merely show that the identity must be contingent? Many would say ‘no’,
particularly those tempted by Kripke’s (1980) highly plausible view that the notion of
contingent identity is but a philosophical chimera, based only on conflations of the
epistemic with the metaphysical. If there are no contingent identity relations, then
11Cf. (Prior et al. , 1982).
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dispositions cannot be contingently identical to categorical causal bases. The typical
response would be to take the identity to be at the level of non-rigid designators,
thus making the identity hold at the level of reference.12 Those properties that are the
referents of token dispositional and token non-dispositional ascriptions are one and
the same; they differ only in their presentational mode. But other worries remain.
For one, there is serious dispute as to whether the notion of a token property, or a
‘property-instance’, is coherent. In what follows, I won’t attempt to run the standard
objections to the token-token identity theory, for if what follows is correct, there is
a problem that dwarfs them. Namely, token-token identity theories do not avoid the
problem of multiple realisability. Moves from type-type to token-token identities, then,
no matter what else we may say, are dialectically inert.
Further still, I will have little to say about the higher order identity theory. I will
argue that dispositions are modal properties, the view does not entail that they are
higher order properties, but is consistent with it. It may be thought, for example,
that the relevant modal properties are higher order properties. There are certainly
structural similarities between modal properties and dispositions: for one, they are
both multiply realisable. It may be that both Smith and Jones could kill a man with
their bare hands, for instance. But the possibility associated with Smith may be based
in his knowledge of martial arts, whereas in Jones it may be based in his enormous
size and uncompromising strength. Nonetheless, I will jettison this issue. On whether
such properties are best conceived of as higher order properties, I will remain silent.
2.2 Dispositions as Modal Properties
We are due a recap. So far, I have outlined the identity theory, and a reformulation
of the theory in response to the problem of multiple realisability. In what remains of
this section, I argue that the reformulation fails to avoid the problem. I then argue that
dispositions are modal properties.
2.2.1 Plural realisation
I am now going to offer an argument designed to show that the move from a type-type
to a token-token identity theory fails. The argument is relatively straightforward. It
aims to show that there exists a class of the multiply realised dispositions, where the
members of the class are individuated by the fact that their manifestations are not
caused by a unique token of any categorical property. Because of this appeals to token
identity fail. I call this class the plurally realised dispositions.
12Cf. (Mumford, 1998).
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Plurally realised dispositions should be distinguished from what I shall call the
distinctly realised dispositions, and the variably realised dispositions. We can define the
latter two as follows:
Distinct Realisation A disposition ‘D’ is distinctly realised just in case there
exist two distinct entities, x1 and x2, such that Dx1 and Dx2, and the causal
basis for Dx1 󲧰 the causal basis for Dx2.
Variable Realisation A disposition ‘D’ is variably realised just in case there
exists an entity x1, at two times t1 and t2, such that Dx1 at t1 and t2, where
the causal basis for Dx1 at t1 󲧰 the causal basis for Dx1 at t2.
The former concerns the prototypical case, such as those given above. Two objects
may be elastic, even if both are elastic due to distinct categorical properties. The latter
concerns change in causal basis over time. The very same object has at one time a given
causal basis for its disposition, but at some other time the causal basis has changed.
The standardly discussed cases involve neuroplasticity, where the causal basis for an
agent’s mental state is said to change with neurological adaptation.13
In contrast, I am concerned with dispositions that satisfy:
Plural Realisation A disposition ‘D’ is plurally realised just in case there
exists an entity x, such that Dx, C1 is a causal basis for Dx, C2 is a causal
basis for Dx, and C1 󲧰 C2.
Plurally realised dispositions are ones that are realised by more than one causal basis
in the same object at the same time. One purported example is given by Mackie. He
writes:
Even in the same material, the same disposition may have more than one
ground. A piece of cloth may absorb water in two ways, by the water being
taken into the individual fibres and by its being held in spaces between the
fibres: its absorbency then has two different bases, the molecular structure
of the fibres and the larger-scale structure in which those fibres are spun
and woven. (Mackie, 1972, p. 148)
Mackie’s case may be ersatz. Those tempted by the view that the bases of a
disposition must be intrinsic properties may resist the example. It may be thought
that the spaces are not intrinsic properties, but relational and thereby extrinsic. After
all, we could imagine that the threads were so tightly packed that the cloth would no
longer trap spaces between the fibres despite retaining its intrinsic properties. In any
13For interesting discussion on neuroplasticity, see (Hurley & Noë, 2003).
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case, there are more obvious examples. Cigarette smoke has the disposition to damage
the lungs once inhaled, but that disposition arises due to a wide variety of chemicals
present in the smoke’s composition.
I believe that the potential force of such counterexamples has largely been over-
looked by those attempting to advocate token-token versions of identity theory. The
reason this class is so problematic is as follows: The multiple realisation occurs not at
the type level, but at the token level. Because of this, we can run a reductio that is still
problematic for the identity theory, even the token-token version. Consider:
Overkill A vial of poison x contains two deadly chemicals, ‘DEATH1’ and
‘DEATH2’. In most individuals, each chemical taken by itself is sufficient
to give rise to the disposition to kill when ingested. But some individuals
are perfectly resistant to ‘DEATH1’, and others to ‘DEATH2’.
I will start with the token-token identity theory. With the instance to hand, we may
now re-run our reductio. First, consider:
Resistance-1 Jones ingests x. Jones is perfectly resistant to ‘DEATH2’. Un-
fortunately, however, Jones is not at all resistant to ‘DEATH1’, and thus, as
a result of ingesting x, Jones dies.
In Resistance-1, Jones’ death is caused by ‘DEATH1’. Not only that, but Jones’ death
is a manifestation of the vial’s disposition to kill when ingested. Given the token-token
identity theory, it follows that the vial’s disposition to kill when ingested is identical
to the causal basis ‘DEATH1’.
The problem should now be obvious. We can re-run the argument for another case,
merely switching the substance our agent is resistant to, and by doing so generate a
contradiction. Consider, for instance:
Resistance-2 Smith ingests x. Smith is perfectly resistant to ‘DEATH1’.
Unfortunately, however, Smith is not at all resistant to ‘DEATH2’, and thus,
as a result of ingesting x, Smith dies.
In Resistance-2, Smith’s death is caused by ‘DEATH2’. Not only that, but Smith’s
death is a manifestation of the vial’s disposition to kill when ingested. Given the token-
token identity theory, it follows that the disposition to kill when ingested is identical
to the causal basis ‘DEATH2’. By the transitivity of identity, it follows that DEATH1 =
DEATH2. But ex hypothesi, DEATH1 󲧰 DEATH2. We have our contradiction.
Notice that I do not deny that disjunctional states are the truth-makers of certain
propositions concerning the presence of dispositional properties. It is, rather, only
to deny that the dispositions may be reduced to or identified with them. The basic
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problem is that what is responsible for a disposition’s manifestations may be two
distinct bases. If that is so, then we cannot identify a disposition with its causal basis,
for the disposition is occupied by two distinct categorical properties. Plurally realised
dispositions are, then, as threatening to the token-token identity theses as standard
cases of multiple realisability are for the type-type identity theory.
How might the identity theorist respond? Other than accepting the identity of
DEATH1 and DEATH2, or denying the transitivity of identity, I will consider two
options.
Reply 1. Complex basis In some cases, a disposition has some conjunction of causal
bases. The flint, the gas, and the sparker all together give rise to events which cause
the manifestations of the lighter’s disposition to ignite when sparked. In such a case,
we would identify the disposition with the conjunction of those bases: The complex
composite of the flint-gas-sparker. Could we not say that the causal basis is the
conjunction of DEATH1 and DEATH2?
The answer is no. For the reason we would identify the disposition with the
conjunction in such a case is mereological. It is because the flint-gas-sparker whole, of
which the individual components are parts, causes the manifestations of the lighter.
But in the present case, the manifestations are not (always) caused by some whole
of DEATH1 and DEATH2. Each is individually unnecessary for the manifestation’s
occurrence. The obvious response is to appeal to a disjunctional causal basis. But this
also won’t do. For disjunctional states are causally inefficacious. As Shoemaker writes:
But if we characterize a disjunctive property as “the property of being F or
G or . . . ,” specifying it by a list of its disjuncts, it can easily seem that the
property is defined into existence, is in some sense a logical construction
out of its disjuncts, and is not the sort of property that could enter into
causal laws or have causal efficacy in its own right. (Shoemaker, 2007, p.
17)
I cannot be killed by DEATH1 or DEATH2, at most this would express ignorance.
There simply are no complex disjunctional causal bases.14 So dispositions cannot be
identical to them. My opponent may resist the last step: Why not allow the causal
efficacy of disjunctional states? But their question may be answered readily. For
suppose that disjunctional states are causally efficacious; we would have admitted
gross overdeterminacy into our causal ontology. For if Jones may be killed by DEATH1
or DEATH2, what reason is there to exclude DEATH1 or the water the substance is
dissolved in, or the other infinite possible disjunctions one may form?
Perhaps it will be argued that to count as a causal disjunct it need only be possible
for each of the disjuncts to bring about the effect. But this won’t do. For suppose
14Cf. (Lewis, 1986a).
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that x causes e, yet it was possible that y and z cause e also. It would follow that x
and the disjunction of y and z caused e! Further overdetermination looms. Another
modification would be to require that one of disjuncts in fact caused the event, but recall
that we are trying to establish that the disjunction is causally efficacious. Further still,
the move is not independently motivated. We should not be moved by ad hoc retreats
of this form. There is no good independent reason to take the notion of disjunctional
causation seriously. The ‘cement of the universe’, as Hume put it,15 does not involve
disjunctional states of affairs.
Reply 2. Double dispositions Perhaps the most plausible reply is that such cases are
ones in which objects have not one, but two dispositions. This reply is lent credence
through consideration of the fact that in Overkill, the two chemical compounds may
be thought to cause death via two distinct methods. It may be thought, then, that
this is not a case where x has two categorical bases for a single disposition, but rather
two categorical bases for two distinct dispositions. This would almost certainly be the
response Heil would offer. When writing on multiple realisability, he notes:
All this will seem plausible only so long as you are content to characterize
fragility in a relatively non-specific way. If being fragile is described as shat-
tering when struck by a massive solid object, for instance, this is something
shared by a light bulb, an ice cube, and a kneecap: same higher-level dispo-
sitional property, different lower-level realizing properties. Light bulbs, ice
cubes, and kneecaps shatter in very different ways, however. These “ways”
reflect these objects’ possession of distinct, though similar, dispositions.
(Heil, 2004, p. 246)
On this view, the problem is resolved at the level of predication, we have essen-
tially mistaken ‘a non-specific predicate satisfied by a range of imperfectly similar states or
properties for a specific predicate satisfied by a unique higher-level “multiply realized” state
or property. Putative lower-level realizers of fragility are really just different ways of being
fragile’.16 For analogy, take the predicate ‘being red’. This is, on Heil’s view, a general
imprecise predicate, which may denote a range of similar, though distinct properties.
A handkerchief that is both scarlet and crimson is red in has two properties of ‘being
red’, for it is red in two ways. An alternative way to pitch this would be with use of the
distinction between sparse and abundant properties. It may be thought, for instance,
that the predicate ‘red’ denotes an abundant property, perhaps some disjunction of
sparse dispositional properties.
Now, Heil’s contention is that multiple realisability in general is not problematic for
the identity theorist. It is worth bearing that in mind, for without multiple realisability
15(Hume, 1965).
16See (Heil, 1999) for a complete defence of this view.
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the type-type theorist has no (or at best significantly less) motivation to move to a
token-token account. Thus, at minimum a conditional claim will hold: if multiple
realisability is a problem, then token-token identity theories fail. Nonetheless, there
are good reasons to accept its non-conditional analogue, for it is far from obvious that
appeals to the imprecision of predication are sufficient to dull multiple realisability’s
blade. I will give two.
Response A The view fails to respect the way we talk about dispositions: We do not
say that an object has two of the same disposition. For instance, we would not say that a
glass has two fragilities. I do not deny that the parts of the mixture may be said to have
distinct dispositions, but the whole does not. One would, rather, say that the mixture
is poisonous for more than one reason. This is particularly vivid in the case of states of
mind: If one’s belief that p was disjunctively realised, one would not thereby be in two
states of belief that p. Put another way: Dispositional properties do not, prima facie,
admit of double counting.
Response B It may be that DEATH1 and DEATH2 both kill in exactly the same
way. Perhaps, for instance, they both block a certain kind of receptor. Notice this is
consistent with each chemical being causally distinct vis-á-vis their masking, as in the
cases above. What makes the two chemicals masked may concern causal properties
irrelevant to the manifestation of the disposition. If the chemicals both enter into the
same casual relations when the disposition manifests across cases, it seems plausible
to suppose that they base the very same disposition.
That completes my replies. I turn now to my defence of the modal account.
2.2.2 Dispositions as modal properties
Above, I argued against the causal identity theories. The argument that follows is
more constructive in spirit: I will support what I shall call
The Modal Identity Theory Dispositions are modal properties.
If dispositions are to modal properties, which modal properties are they identical
to? Recall in the last chapter I argued that dispositions may be analysed as causal
contingencies. I will argue: Dispositions are those modal properties. If that is correct,
it is precisely because dispositions are identical to such properties that they are coex-
tensive with them. The defence will be comprised of both a positive and a negative
component. I will start with the latter: I will defend the view from three objections. I
will then briefly offer some support.
We start with the objections. Here they are:
1. Loss of parsimony One of the major reasons given in support of the causal
identity theory is its parsimony. Once dispositions have been identified or reduced
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to their causal bases, we no longer need to appeal to occult possibilia, nor anything
else not already within our ontology. If dispositions are modal properties, we lose
that parsimony. This loss of parsimony is a strike against the modal identity theory.
Now, whilst I agree that the view is less parsimonious, in that it requires possibilia
to account for dispositions, I maintain that it is no strike against the modal identity
theory. Parsimony is only desirable when we have two competing explanations, where
one is more parsimonious ceteris paribus, and only when we can explain the relevant
phenomenon with fewer theoretical resources. If what I have argued in this chapter
is correct, we cannot. Causal bases do not account for dispositional properties. So the
parsimony may be lost, but loss of parsimony is not always a bad thing. Dispositions
are a case in point.
It should be finally noted that I do not intend to disclude reductionist accounts of
modality. It may be, for example, that modal properties reduce down to some other
kind of property. In which case, so too for dispositions. For what it is worth, I doubt
a such reductionist accounts will work; I am in sympathy with a fictionalist view of
modality, most likely some form of combinatorialism.17 But importantly, I claim only
that dispositions are not identical to their causal bases, not that they are irreducible
and non-identifiable tout court. So, in a sense, the view is as parsimonious as our best
total theory. We need to account for modality. Whatever account is given of modality
will yield an account of dispositions.
2. The argument from causal efficacy I turn now to Mellor’s objections. First, he
provides an argument from the causal efficacy of dispositions. It may be found in the
following passage:
[I]f mere possibilities distinguished fragile from other glasses, fragility
would be no real property, and change in it can be neither cause nor ef-
fect. The latter view has indeed been held but it is evidently false. Consider
a rod so twisted that, when put in liquid helium to make it brittle, it breaks.
Its becoming brittle is caused by the cooling and in turn causes it to break
[...] So dispositions are real properties in a sense that rules out any account
of them as mere potentialities or possibilities. (Mellor, 1974, pp. 172-173)
It may be formalised thus:
Argument from Causal Efficacy
1. If x is a modal property, then x is causally inefficacious.
2. Dispositional properties are causally efficacious.
therefore
C. Dispositional properties are not modal properties.
17For a classic example, see (Armstrong, 1989).
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The argument is valid, the first premise has initial plausibility, and the second is
supported by the example of the rod. Dispositions can be effects (the effect of being
put in the liquid helium) and causes (the cause of the breaking). So it follows that
dispositional properties can be causally efficacious, and thereby cannot be mere modal
properties. It follows that the modal identity theory is false.
We should not be perturbed by the argument; it may be rejected on both fronts. First
note that, strictly speaking, the example given does not include dispositions as causal
relata, for properties do not enter into causal relations: events causally relate.18 Of
course, manifestations are events, but manifestations are non-identical to dispositions,
for manifestations need not occur, despite the presence of a dispositional property.
Now, in the example given, it is the rod’s becoming brittle that we are told causes the
breaking, and the dipping causes the rod to become brittle. Dispositional properties
do not enter into causal relations, because properties do not enter into causal relations
simpliciter. So the example of the rod gives no support to the second premise.
In reply, Mellor may reformulate the argument as follows:
Argument from Causal Efficacy*
1*. If x is a modal property, then events of the kind ‘becoming x’
are causally inefficacious.
2*. Such events are causally efficacious.
therefore
C*. Dispositional properties are not modal properties.
but once reformulated, pressure may be put on the first premise. After all, one might
say that the event ‘the safe’s becoming locked’ causes the event ‘the treasure’s becoming
impossible to steal’. The effect here is an event, i.e., the attaining of a property, and
a modal property at that. Similar points apply to causes: The treasure’s becoming
impossible to steal may well cause it to persist unplundered. So the attainment of
modal properties can enter into causal relations, contra the first premise.
It might be doubted that such events are really causally efficacious.19 Perhaps to say
that the treasure was not plundered because it became impossible to steal is at most an
explanation, one that does not simply give information about the actual causal history
of the event.20 But such suspicions, I contend, would carry over to the dispositional
events in question. It may well be argued that the rod’s becoming brittle is not the
cause of the rod’s breaking. Rather it is the sudden change in temperature, or the rod’s
18I assume here the standard view. No doubt, some will be discontent. For instance, Bennett (1988)
takes facts to causally relate. But I take it that the view that properties are causally efficacious is, at best,
contentious. See also (Mackie, 1974).
19For example, Bennett writes ‘I submit that no modal facts—as distinct from their nonmodal bases—
are causally efficacious’. See (Bennett, 1988, p. 27).
20Cf. (Lewis, 1986a).
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being so dipped, may be properly called the cause of the rod’s breaking. So to disallow
modal properties to enter into the causal relations given above would be to disallow
the dispositional properties to enter into the causal relations Mellor requires. Either
way, I am in the clear: The argument from causal efficacy fails.
3. Modal Irrelevance The second argument Mellor gives is found in the following
passage:
Dispositional ascription entails statements of (admittedly conditional) fact,
not statements of possibility. A fragile glass is one that does break (if
dropped), not one that can break. Whether it can break depends inter alia
on whether it can be dropped, and its being fragile entails nothing about
that. (Bear in mind it must be physical, not logical, possibility at issue here.)
The safety precautions at our nuclear power station are intended to prevent
an explosion by making impossible the conditions in which the fuel would
explode. It is ridiculous to say that their success robs the fuel of its explosive
disposition and thus the precautions of their point. (Ibid., p. 173)
The basic thought is that whether or not an event is possible or impossible is
sensitive to irrelevant details of a given case. In the case given, the precautions make it
the case that it is not possible for the fuel to explode—yet it is still disposed to do so. It
follows that there are some cases in which an object possesses dispositional properties
where the relevant modal property is not possessed. It follows that dispositions are
non-identical to modal properties.
This argument is no good, for Mellor may be charged with equivocation: The
argument moves from one sense of ‘can’ to another. Recall that my analysis requires
only that the fuel in Mellor’s example could be caused to explode by being ignited,
given the laws of nature. To say that it could not explode, given the laws of nature, due
to the fact that there are safety precautions alters the kind of contingency at issue. It
may be the case that it could not explode, given that there are safety precautions. But this
does not imply that it could not explode tout court. Or, to take his other case: one can
sensibly say in one breath that the glass could break if dropped, and in the next that
it cannot be dropped without any pain of inconsistency. The consistency arises from
the fact that the modal evaluations concern different classes of possible world. I do
not say that a fragile glass can be dropped, given the various details about a particular
case. All I claim is that it could—on a weak nomological reading of ‘could’—break if
dropped. Mellor’s claim is silent with respect to that requirement.
I have defended the modal identity theory against three objections. A question
remains: Why should we accept it? The argument in its favour I will now offer
rests primarily on its theoretical virtues, ones which, I contend, make it favourable in
contrast to its contenders. I give three. They are as follows:
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1. Unity The account is more unifying. The notion of unity is highly vexed21, but
a slapdash account, which will suffice for present purposes, is that a theory T unifies
a set of data ∆ more than some rival theory T*, just in case T is able to offer a more
similar explanation of the members of ∆ than T*. For example, suppose our data set
is as follows: Smith’s car is not parked in front of his house, his keys are not on their
hook, and the back window has been smashed. We could offer a theory that explains
all of these independently. Perhaps the window was smashed by a cricket ball, an
opportunist entered and stole the keys, and sometime later the car was hot -wired by
a professional thief. But a better explanation is one that unifies the data: Smith locked
himself out, broke in through the back window, and took his car wherever he needed
to go. Of course, a better example would provide two theories equally confirming in
other respects, but for purposes of brevity the present case should suffice. The point is
that, in general at least, unification is a virtuous thing, theoretically speaking.
Evidently this is no scientific theory, and we are not here primarily concerned
with the explanation of events. But explanation is not only given of events, but also
of the holding of theoretical claims.22 The sense of unity at issue here concerns the
ability to offer answers to philosophical puzzles. More precisely: The modal account
is more unificatory than its competitors, because it is able to give a single answer
to both the semantic and the ontological questions that guide the present inquiry. For
on a standard version of the causal identity theory, as already noted, to ascribe a
dispositional property to some subject is to pick out an unknown categorical property,
and to characterise it in modal terms. On this view, we get a distinction between the
ontological question and the semantic question. What a statement such as ‘that yarn of
cotton is flammable’ means is ‘there is some categorical property of that yarn of cotton,
which would cause it to catch fire if ignited’. But the dispositional property simply is
the referent of the existential quantification, not the existential quantification itself. On
the present view, in contrast, the two questions are given one and the same answer:
What one means is the very same as what the disposition is. When I say ‘that yarn of
cotton is flammable’, I simply mean ‘the yarn could be caused by igniting to catch fire’.
Moreover, the disposition is the very thing I mean: It is the possibility of being caused
by ignition to catch fire. In that sense, the modal account, in contrast to its categorical
competitor, has greater unificatory power.
2. Simplicity The second theoretical virtue is simplicity, a virtue equally vexed.
Typically simplicity is given a two-fold classification: There is syntactic simplicity
(which is, strangely enough, sometimes called ‘semantic’ simplicity), and ontological
simplicity. The latter may be crudely put in Ockham’s terms: No entities beyond
21For interesting discussion, see (Friedman, 1974), (Kitcher, 1981), (Kitcher & Salmon, 1989), (Schwartz,
1999), (McGrew, 2003), (Myrvold, 2003), and (Patrick, forthcoming).
22Cf. (Lipton, 2004)
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necessity. But it is the former with which I am concerned. Syntactic simplicity concerns
a theory’s principles. For example: The Copernican theory of the celestial system was
less simple than its Ptolemaic predecessor. What I mean by ‘simpler’ here is as follows:
The account makes use of fewer conceptual resources. On the causal identity theory,
to explicate a disposition requires the use of both modal properties and categorical
properties. They are categorical properties with certain modal profiles i.e., a categorical
property that gives rise to certain modal properties. On the present view, in contrast, a
dispositional property just is that modal property which it gives rise to. The account is
simpler in that regard.23
3. Elimination The final argument is one from elimination. We have seen that
dispositions cannot be identical to causal bases. What is left? The objects must have
modal properties which must explain why they manifest. I say: The only option left
is identification. If they are not the causal bases then they must simply be the modal
properties themselves.
Conclusion
This chapter had the following aims:
[2.1] To outline the identity theory.
[2.2] To argue that the problem of multiple realisability holds at both the
type and the token level.
[2.3] To defend the view that dispositions are modal properties.
which have now been satisfied. That completes my investigation into the metaphysics
of dispositions. All that is left now is to investigate the relationship that holds between
dispositions and functions, and to outline the notion of a functional norm.
23For discussion on simplicity as a theoretical virtue in the sciences, see (Alan, 2003), (Cowling, 2013).
(Goodman, 1961), and (Grünbaum, 2007). For interesting discussion on simplicity arguments (such as




In the previous two chapters, I explored the truth-conditions and ontological status of
dispositional properties. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the relationship that
holds between dispositions and functions. On a widely endorsed view, the occupation
of functional roles implies the possession of dispositional properties. Its acceptance
is perhaps in part due to the influential work of Robert Cummins (1975), who argued
just that, and outlined the method of ‘functional analysis’, a method many hold to
be applicable to our mental conceptual scheme. Unfortunately, however, the view is
rarely given independent support. To some, it may sound platitudinous. Nonetheless,
as Lewis once wrote:
It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others accept
without thinking twice. A dangerous profession, since philosophers are
more easily discredited than platitudes, but a useful one. For when a good
philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out that the platitude
was essentially right; but the philosopher has noticed trouble that one who
did not think twice could not have met. In the end the challenge is answered
and the platitude survives, more often than not. But the philosopher has
done the adherents of the platitude a service: he has made them think twice.
(Lewis, 1969)
If it is the profession of philosophers to question a platitude, and our claim is
platitudinous, then Stephen Mumford (2003) has done its adherents a service. For in
Dispositions, Mumford presents a challenge for standard theorising on the relationship
between functions and dispositions. His challenge bears both a negative and a positive
component. The negative component is that functions do not entail dispositions. The
positive is just the rejected claim’s converse: That dispositions entail functions. In this
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chapter, I will defend the platitude. By doing so, I hope, it may be better understood,
for the arguments both for and against it rest upon a widespread conceptual confusion.
In particular, they rest upon equivocation over distinct (albeit highly related) senses of
the term ‘function’. There are two central aims. They are as follows:
[3.1] To disambiguate and outline four senses of the term ‘function’.
[3.2] To argue against the claim that bearing dispositions entails the occu-
pation of a functional role, and to argue that the occupation of a function
role entails the possession of certain dispositions.
Here is the plan. There are two sections. In the first, I deal with aim [3.1]. There are
four subsections: The first outlines the mathematical and social senses of ‘function’,
the second outlines the causal sense, the third outlines the teleological sense, and the
fourth outlines the similarity and differences that hold between the latter two. In
the second, I deal with aim [3.2]. There are two subsections: The first outlines two
arguments, one for the claim that functions entail dispositions, the other for the claim
that dispositions entail functions. Both are rejected on the grounds that they rest on
equivocation. The second provides an independent argument for the platitude: That
functions entail dispositions.
3.1 Four Senses of ‘Function’
Mental states are functionally individuated. This sentence is ambiguous, for it con-
tains the term ‘function’ and as Wright (1973) notes ‘[l]ike nearly every word in English,
“function” is multilaterally ambiguous’. Since Wright’s paper, much work has been done
to keep the term disambiguated. Nonetheless, its ambiguity still leads to arguments
based on fallacious equivocation. The present aim is the clear and careful disambigua-
tion of the term ‘function’. I will finish by briefly reflecting on the similarities and
differences that hold between two central senses: The causal role, and the teleological
senses.
3.1.1 Mathematical and social
I will briefly start with two senses that are not particularly relevant to the discussion
that follows. The first we should do away with quickly; it is the ‘social’ sense of
‘function’. It appears in statements such as:
S1. There is a function at the church this weekend.
S2. The Christmas Ball is an extravagant function.
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The referents of such expressions are those most curious entities: events.1 When
I say ‘the function’ was well attended, the entity of which I speak is some occasion,
an occasion attended by a significant number of individuals. Whilst there may be
interesting connections between this sense and other senses of the term, for present
purposes, the sense will be jettisoned. The reason for doing so is simple: It is far from
obvious that mental states are events, and even if they are to be treated as events, they
are not social events of the relevant sort.
I turn now to the second: The mathematical sense of the term. This will require a
little more detail, for whilst it is not the sense relevant to the individuation of mental
states, it is relevant with respect to the charges of equivocation I will employ in the
second section. The mathematical sense features in statements such as:
M1. Distance is representable as a function of time.
M2. A production function holds between outputs of production and
factors of production.
The mathematical sense of function is technical, and is thus explicatively defined.
Functions are a class of relation—those relations which hold between inputs and out-
puts, where for each value of the input I, there exists a unique relation between I and a
unique output O. A simple example would be the relation that holds between individ-
ual agents and ages. For each individual (at a given time) there exists a unique natural
number which constitutes that individual’s age. Each individual has an age, and each
individual has only one age. In contrast, the relation that holds between individuals
and siblings is non-functional. For each individual there may be none or more than
one other individual that counts as that individual’s sibling.
Mental states are not individuated in terms of the mathematical sense of ‘function’.2
Why not? For one, mathematical entities are (at least on a fairly standard view) abstract
entities that do not admit of spatio-temporal location. It may be argued that mental
states, in contrast, at least admit of temporal location; Smith may believe that p at t,
but cease to do so at t*. Some won’t buy that: On Williamson and Steward’s view,
which we shall discuss, mental states are general, and are thus plausibly abstract.
But regardless, even if abstract they are non-identical to the relevant mathematical
abstracta. After all, functions may be operated on; mental states may not. None of
this is to say that mental states cannot be represented or characterised with the use of
mathematical functions. But that tells us little: The scope of functional representation
is broad.3 That mental states may be represented with mathematical functions is to say
1Cf. Davidson (1969a, 1969b, 1970).
2That is not to say that the notion of a mathematical function has not been employed in functionalist
theorising. Early functionalists such as Putnam (1967), clearly used the term ‘function’ in places in its
mathematical sense. See also (Bird, 2018).
3Cf. (Crane, 2003, p. 86).
60 CHAPTER 3. FUNCTIONS
little about the distinctive nature of mental states. Whilst the mathematical sense will
be required for my argument against Mumford, it will not be the adopted sense of the
claim that mental states are functionally individuated.
3.1.2 Causal role functions
I turn now to the third sense of the term ‘function’: what I shall call the causal role
sense, or just causal for short. Typically, when taking its causal sense, the term features
in two kinds of statement. The first are statements of the form ‘x functions as an F’. For
example:
CR1. The organ functions as a heart.
CR2. The button functions as a screen dimmer.
Notice that with ascriptions of this kind we typically would not count the relevant
causal functions as ‘the function’ or ‘one of the functions’ of the entity in question.
Rather, to attribute a causal function is to say that the entity occupies a certain kind
of causal role. If counting functions, what would be counted are functional role
occupations, not the possession of functions. Under what conditions is it true that an
individual x functions as an F?
In what follows, I will defend the following account:
Function-as
x functions as an F iff.
F1. (∃χ) x ∈ χ
F2. ✸ (Sx→c e f )
The notation must be explained, and the conditions require support. That is the task
to which I now turn. Take F1 for starters. The notation is as follows: ‘χ’ denotes what I
shall call a complex, the set membership relation should be interpreted mereologically,
as ‘is a proper part of’.4 So put into plain english, F1 says that there exists a complex,
such that x is a proper part of that complex.
Why should we accept that? Here is some support. Suppose that we say of a given
object that it is functioning as a water pump. Presumably, it must be functioning as a
water pump in some complex that works in such a way as to pump water. Some would
prefer to use the term ‘system’. But the notion of a system is dissatisfying, for there
4Some might whinge at my use of set theoretic notation for mereology. Fairly standard practice
dictates the use of non-alphabetic infix notation, but there appears to be no standard token non-alphabetic
symbols that may count as ‘standard notation’. Given the similarities that hold between mereology and
set theory (Cf. (Lewis, 1969)) the abuse of notation will do no harm.
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are entity complexes of which the parts may be properly regarded as functioning in
certain ways, despite the complex in question not obviously falling under the extension
of the concept expressed by ‘system’. For consider tools: Something may function as a
hammer, and may be doing so in virtue of its being in the hands of a hammerer. In such
a case: What counts as the system? Are we to say some obnoxiously abundant entity—
the ‘human-cum-hammer’—is to count as a system? That seems strange to me; the term
‘complex’ gives a better fit. Because functioning in this sense partly requires complex
integration, and complex integration is a relational property, functional occupation too
is at best a partly relational property of objects. Because the properties are relational in
this way, they are extrinsic. Intrinsic duplicates may differ with respect to their causal
role occupation. Remove a heart from the body, and the heart will retain its intrinsics,
despite ceasing to occupy its causal role.
It may be objected that for x to function as an F, that x need be part of no containing
complex. For suppose that a water pump is dismembered from its whole; could it not
still function as a water pump if, say, placed in a paddling pool and turned on? In
such a case, the pump would not be part of any complex, it may be contended, despite
functioning as water pump, contra F1. In reply, however, and to some extent this
vindicates the more liberal notion of a ‘complex’, we should note that whilst the water
pump will not be part of some mechanical system, that it may still be properly regarded
as part of a complex in the relevant case; namely the ‘paddling pool-cum-water-cum-
pump’. The body of water in which the pump rests and the pool that contains the
liquid may be thought of a complex in which the pump plays its functional role.
Pressure may be returned. With such a liberal conception of complexes, could
not anything be properly regarded? After all, could we not take something to be
functioning as part of the ‘pump-cum-jungle-cum-trombone?’. The answer is ‘no’. For
the complexes in question must exhibit a certain degree of spatiotemporal continuity
which our putative counterexample lacks. I do not say that such complexes are sparse
entities, nor distinct from their components; but not any blend of entities will do. Only
those with the right kind of spatiotemporal connection, whatever that may be.
And we can see why spatiotemporal continuity matters by considering F2. The
notation that requires explaining is as follows: ‘→c’ denotes a causal relation (cause for
the antecedent, effect for the consequent), ‘Sx’ denotes some kind of stimuli x receives,
and ‘e f ’ denotes what we may call an ‘F-event’. What is this strange expression, ‘F-
event’? The basic view is as follows. For any function ascription, the function F may be
linked to some kind of event e, an event which an entity, in order to count as possibly
functioning as an F, must be able to cause once causally acted upon. Gosh, that was a
mouthful! Here are some examples to clarify. First, consider ‘functioning as a deadly
weapon’. For something to function as a deadly weapon, all that is required is that
it could be caused (by murderous intentions) to kill, either in some designed system,
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or in the hands of an inventive criminal. Similarly if something functions as a set of
brakes then it must possibly be caused (via an activating device) to cause deceleration.
The relevant causal relation must, as we saw with dispositions, be direct. It is
for this reason spatiotemporal continuity of some form is required: No action at a
distance—for x to serve a function, it must possibly enter into direct causal relations,
and to enter into direct causal relations, x must be spatiotemporally contiguous with
the relevant complex. A letter to a hitman may result in the death of Jones, but this
does not show that the letter has functioned as a deadly weapon. The reason is that the
causal chain is indirect. That is not to deny that a letter could not function as a deadly
weapon, of course. Just that the deliverance of a message does not make it count as
such.
It should be noted that for many functional ascriptions, there are a plurality of
events that the entity must cause. To function as a liver, an entity must bear a range
of functions. Strictly speaking, then, we should construe e as a set, of which the entity
must possibly cause each member. Some may object that the requirement is too weak.
For far too much would function as a deadly weapon on this account: rocks, spades,
even bubbles of oxygen could kill, supposing they are injected into the bloodstream.
In reply, however, the bullet should be bit: oxygen bubbles may be functioning as a
deadly weapon, in the wrong hands at the right time. Being a deadly weapon may not
be their proper function, but they may function as a deadly weapon nonetheless.
What kind of modality is at issue? Typically nomological, though it may depend
on context. It does not appear senseless to ask whether something could function as
a hammer if the laws of nature differed, though that depends upon the necessity of
those laws. Similarly, it does not appear senseless to suppose that something couldn’t
function as it usually can, given such changes. But in any case, for all such ascriptions,
there must be some laws held fixed. Similarly, just as the laws of nature are to be held
fixed, F2 should also fix both the intrinsic properties of x, and most of those relational
properties it bears to the complex in which it is so-integrated. Otherwise, it could
possibly enter into the relevant causal relations simply by changing its integration. A
heart duct taped onto a human body is, in some sense, integrated, and may possibly
cause circulation given changes in the properties relevant to the integration. But we
are not interested in cases in which those properties change, but only in which the
heart remains affixed in the same rough-and-ready fashion. Of course, we cannot
hold all of those extrinsic relational properties fixed – after all, entities often rely upon
undergoing change in their extrinsic properties in order to manifest their functionally
relevant dispositions. In order to function as a set of brakes, the brake pads and wheels
cannot retain their spatial relations: the pads must touch the wheels. Put another
way: We must exclude the relations relevant to the ‘moving parts’ of the complex.
Determining which extrinsic properties we are to allow to vary should most likely be
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done on a case-by-case basis; they are simply those that are sufficiently relevant to the
manifestations of the function-relevant dispositions.
Another objection is as follows: x might not function as an x at some time t, despite
satisfying F1 and F2, for it may be causally inert at t. For instance, the pancreas functions
as an insulin producer, but only releases insulin upon the intake of a sufficiently
calorific meal. But this relies upon the tempting though mistaken supposition that x
is functioning as an F just in case it is serving its function, i.e., actually part of a system
S, and causing the F-event relevant for the functional ascription. But this would be a
mistake. For suppose that something is functioning as a doorstop. Does that imply
that it is in fact, at every moment at which it is doing so, stopping the door? I say
no! The door stop may be there, in front of the door, waiting for the wind to push it
towards the frame, despite occupying a functional role. Or take to another example,
a set of brakes may be functioning in a vehicle even if the brake lever is untouched. I
suggest, then, that to say something is functioning as an F, is not to say that it is in fact
causing such an event, but rather that it is part of some system, and that within that
containing system it could cause an F-event. But, it may be asked, if that is so should
we not replace the modal expression ‘could’ with the stricter ‘would’? The answer
again is ‘no’. For to say that the brakes are functioning does not imply that they will
always stop the vehicle, just that they could. True enough, to count as fully functioning,
or to be functioning well they may need to stop the car on most occasions. But entities
can function as brakes, even if they function poorly as brakes. That is accommodated
by formulation with the stronger modality. So the chosen modal expression should
remain.
With that in mind, F2 reads that x’s being a member of the complex χ entails that it
is nomologically possible that x cause some F-event, where the value is determined by
the relevant given functional role. An example may serve to clarify. If x functions as
a heart, then (1) x is part of some complex (perhaps a human body), and (2) x’s being
a member of that complex implies that it could possibly cause a ‘heart-event’, given
certain stimuli (in this case, the circulation of the blood, given impulses from the sinus
node).
That deals with the first class of ascription. Now for the second. The class I have in
mind contains members that appeal to contingent modality, namely statements of the
form: ‘x could function as an F’. For example:
MC1. The water pump could function as a heart.
MC2. The kitchen knife could function as a deadly weapon.
Such ascriptions tell us not what an entity is in fact doing, but rather what it could
do. But, it may be asked, have we not defined the first type above in terms of just
that? After all, F2 requires that the entity, once subsumed under some complex, could
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cause a certain kind of event. So the two kinds of statement cannot be distinguished
in terms of modality, as I claim. Fortunately, the reply fails; it rests upon improper
individuation of the scope of the modality at issue. For to say that x functions as an
F is to give information about what x can do, to say that x could function of an x is to
say of that entity that it could bear certain modal properties. The former kind are singly
modal, the latter doubly so.
The account I have in mind is as follows:
Contingent function-as
x could function as an F iff.
F1*. (∃χ) ✸ x ∈ χ
F2*. ✸ (Sx→c e f )
The main difference lies in F1*. To say that something could function as an F is
to make a claim concerning the possibility of its being subsumed under some system
complex, in which it bears the relevant contingent causal relation to F-events. We are
not interested in whether it is functioning in some case as an F, but rather whether there
is some case in which is does. Put another way: To say that x could function as an F
is not to say that it in fact occupies some causal role, but rather that it could occupy
that causal role. The relevant kind of possibility, it should be said, fixes the intrinsic
properties of the object.5 For suppose that we take a heart so diseased that it could not
function as a heart, at least in the state that it is in. There is a sense still in which it
could function as a heart if it were to be the target of extensive surgery, perhaps. But
this is not the sense that is at issue; when I say that a water pump could act as a heart,
I am saying that it could be integrated into some system in which, fixing its intrinsic
properties, it would circulate the blood. In short: The difference between actual and
contingent function ascriptions does not concern the modality of the causal relation
between x and certain F-events, but rather modality surrounding systemic integration.
F2* must differ slightly, in that the accessible worlds will not be ones in which x bears
most of the same integration properties it does in the actual world, but rather most of
the relational properties it bears in the worlds in which the proposition ranged over
by the possibility operator in F1* holds true. If something could function as a set of
brakes, there is some world in which it is part of some system, such that holding fixed
those integrational properties, it could cause an F-event.
Interestingly enough, and in contrast to the non-contingent analogues, possible
causal occupations are plausibly intrinsic, namely for the reason given above: The
intrinsic properties are fixed. After all, they make no requirement of mereological
relations holding between the possible occupier, and the relevant complexes. Of course,
5Vetter, following Lewis, makes a similar remark. See (Vetter, 2014, p. 136), and (Lewis, 1976).
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whether it could do so will be dependent, in part, by the properties of those complexes.
Nonetheless, they are properties intrinsic duplicates will share, and are thus plausibly
intrinsic.
In this section, I outlined what I called causal role functions, which are functions
typically denoted by statements of the form ‘x functions as an F’, or ‘x could function
as an F’. These are the occupiers and the possible occupiers of causal roles respectively.
It was argued that such ascriptions are essentially ascriptions of modal causal contin-
gency. I turn now to the final concept expressed by the term ‘function’, the teleological
sense of the term.
3.1.3 Teleological functions
If Smith had seen Jones place a pistol, a mask, and a bag marked ‘loot’ in his bag,
then he would have understood the purpose of Jones’ asking for a lift to the bank.
The aim of the honey bee’s visiting flowers is the collection of nectar; this behaviour
also serves a greater purpose, as in collecting nectar the bee serves a crucial service to
flowers—the dissemination of pollen. The tassels on some dresses are there to make
pretty patterns during a dance, but there is no purpose to dancing other than having
fun. These claims are teleological. That is to say, they concern the aim, goal, point, or
purpose of phenomena.
Sometimes, the term ‘function’ expresses a teleological concept. Though as Wright
notes:
The notion of function is not all there is to teleology, although it is sometimes
treated as though it were. Function is not even the central, or paradigm,
teleological concept. But it is interesting and important... (Wright, 1973, p.
139)
I think Wright is correct that ‘function’ is not a central or paradigmatic teleological
concept. In fact, strictly speaking, we might say that the term ‘function’, when used
to express a teleological concept, is short-hand for the phrase ‘proper function’. The
teleological aspect of the phrase concerns its first constituent: The proper function of x
is the function of x that x is supposed to serve. Alternately put: It is when the serving of
a causal function is the purpose, point, aim, or goal of some entity.
Before we consider the teleological notion of function in detail, it will be helpful
to give a general outline of the notion of teleology. As I shall be taking it, the term
‘purpose’ is the prototypical teleological term. What are purposes? So long as we are
allowed an abundant reading, we may say that purposes are properties of entities. At
least, we certainly speak as though they are; we certainly attribute purposes to entities,
just as we attribute other properties. Just as we might say ‘the colour of the ruby is
red’, we may say:
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OP1. The purpose of the fuse is to prevent electrical fires.
OP2. The purpose of the yeast is to make the dough rise.
and to take examples involving events, just as we might say ‘the turnout to the gala
was poor’ we may also say:
EP1. The purpose of Harry’s telling the joke was to impress Sally.
EP2. The aim of Sally’s rolling her eyes was to signal her boredom.
No doubt, language misleads. But assuming grammatical form to be ontologically
indicative, purposes appear to be properties. Whenever an entity, whether it be an
object or an event, has a purpose, that purpose is correlated with a kind of content.
In the above, the purpose is denoted in the infinite mood: the purpose is to prevent
electrical fires, or to impress Sally. Call the content of a teleological ascription its
τ-content.
Not all purposes however, even so divided, are of the same ilk. There are three
prominent kinds. The first we may call intentional purposes. These are purposes that
feature in the descriptions of action such as those found in EP1 and EP2 above. They
involve the intended purpose of a given act. It was Harry’s intentions in telling the
joke that determine the purpose; what Harry was trying to achieve by doing so. Notice
that intentional purposes are, to use Williamson’s (2000) terminology, non-luminous
conditions. It does not hold that, for any behavioural event φ caused by an agent S,
where the purpose of S’s φ-ing is τ, that S is in a position to know that the purpose of
φ is τ. Harry may join the gym, believing that his purpose in doing so is to keep fit,
where his true motivation is developing a muscular physique to impress Sally.
The second class involves not human action, at least not directly, but rather human
artifice. We may call these artefact purposes. These are purposes typically attributed
to the objects of design, such as those found in OP1 and OP2 above. Note that in
the latter case, what is being attributed the purpose is, despite appearances, not the
yeast, but rather the appearance of ‘yeast’ on the recipe for bread. The third class are
not the purposes of artefacts or action, but rather to what we may call natural entities.
What is a natural entity? We may tentatively, in Quinean spirit, answer: Those entities
stipulated as real by the biological sciences. Typically, they would be traits. They may
be found in statements of the form:
NP1. The purpose of the heart is to pump the blood.
NP2. The purpose of the lizard’s display is to attract a mate.
Notice that, as the examples above serve to show, natural purposes may be at-
tributed to events or objects; the lizard’s display is an event, the heart is an object. Such
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ascriptions have presented somewhat of a challenge to philosophers of biology, for
many take the use of teleological ascriptions in the biological sciences to be evidence
of its inadequacy; that is, evidence that it relies on fundamentally non-naturalistic
explanatory frameworks. Some vivid examples of this view are as follows:
Biology is sick. Fundamentally unscientific modes of thought are increas-
ingly accepted, and dominate the way the subject is explained to the next
generation. The heart of the problem is that we persist in making (literally)
sense of a world that we now know to be senseless by attributing subjective
values to the objects in it, values that have no basis in reality. (Hanke, 2004,
pp. 143-144)
The notions of proper function, disease, and damage apply here and in a
thousand other contexts; thinking in these terms is natural and apparently
unavoidable for human beings. Of course, the compelling character of this
sort of thought does not prove it coherent; nor does it show that these
notions can in face be correctly applied, not just to artefacts, but also to
natural organisms. [...] The bulk of mankind, however, has applied the
notions of purpose and proper function to natural organisms, and has done
so without any confusion or incoherence at all: for most human beings have
thought that natural organisms and their parts are, in fact, designed. Most
human beings now think so; certainly theists of all stripes do. (Plantinga,
1993, p. 196)
On this view, the attribution of teleological explanations to the natural world is to
trade in fables; to engage is compelling but fundamentally mistaken anthropomorphic
descriptions of nature. There is good reason, however, to resist this line of thought.
After all, speakers of the language are perfectly aware that natural phenomena are
not the product of design; it seems strange to attribute modern man with a belief that
is commonly known to be false. We know nature is not designed, but this does not
commit us to the denial of teleological explanations of the natural world. To suppose
that people always presuppose design when making teleological ascriptions is simply
wrongheaded. Moreover, the identification of natural purposes plays a central role in
legitimate naturalistic explanation. At least, so says Karen Neander:
[T]he apparent explanatory power of teleological explanations which ap-
peal to biological functions is quite robust. That the koala’s pouch has
the function of protecting its young does seem to explain why koalas have
pouches. That the bee’s dance is for directing other bees to pollen does seem
to explain why bees dance. I suppose it is just barely possible, perhaps, that
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this apparent explanatory power is illusory, based on hangovers from our
Creationist past, or due to our mistaking the metaphorical for the literal,
when we speak of ‘Mother Nature’s intentions’, ‘evolutionary design’, and
so on. However the thesis that we are persistently irrational in this respect is
psychologically implausible in contrast to a theory of functions that shows
such explanations to be legitimate. (Neander, 1991b, p. 457)
On whether teleological explanation is legitimate I will remain silent. But the
literature that surrounds its endorsement provides important points for what follows,
as the desire to legitimise such explanation resulted in a significant effort to analyse
teleological ascriptions. A wide range of views emerged, though the dust seems to have
settled, and it appears agreement has been reached that teleological explanations are
essentially a form of etiological explanation; that is, explanations that make essential
reference to the causal history of the bearers of purposes. On this view, an entity
inherits its purpose from its origins.
Call this the
Origins Account An object’s purpose is determined by its origins.6
The earliest version was developed by Wright (1973). Consider the following
passage:
The treatments we have so far considered have overlooked, ignored, or
at any rate failed to make, one important observation: that functional
ascriptions are—intrinsically, if you will—explanatory. Merely saying of
something, X, that it has a certain function, is to offer an important kind of
explanation of X [...] functional ascription-explanations are in some sense
etiological, concern the causal background of the phenomenon under con-
sideration. And this is indeed what I wish to argue: functional explanations,
although plainly not causal in the usual, restricted sense, do concern how
the thing with the function got there. Hence they are etiological, which is
to say “causal” in an extended sense. (Wright, 1973, p. 156)
Why would we accept the account? Part of the motivation Wright offers is that
the account makes sense of the explanatory role of functional ascriptions. When we
demand the function of x, we are typically interested in why or for what reason it came
about. For instance, the explanation-seeking questions:
6For a recent, though to my mind unsuccessful alternative, see Nanay’s ‘modal account’ of proper
functions. (Nanay, 2010).
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Q1. Why did Harry wink at Sally?
Q2. Why is the emergency brake painted yellow and black?
Q3. Why do humans have hearts?
we may offer teleological explanans. To these questions, for example, we may answer:
A1. The purpose was to seduce her.
A2. The purpose is to make the emergency brake visible.
A3. The purpose of the heart is to circulate the blood.
And in all three cases, a statement with teleological content answers an explanation-
seeking question. When we ask for information of the origins of x, then, a teleological
ascription may serve as an explanation. If the origins account holds true, then that
datum is accounted for.
The origins account certainly appears to work in the case of intentional and artefact
purposes. After all, when we ask what the purpose of Harry’s winking at Sally is, we
are primarily interested in the content of the intention which played a causal role in the
production of the behaviour i.e., the wink. Similar points apply to design functions;
when we ask what the purpose of an artefact is, we are asking about the content
of those intentions that gave rise to the entity’s existence. The τ-content just is the
content of the intentional origin. If I ask: What is the purpose of the tassels on the
dress, then on this account I am asking what the tassels were intended to do when the
dress was designed. Nonetheless, the origins account is less obviously applicable to
natural purposes, for precisely the reason that there appear to be no intentional origins,
contra the postulations of the pre-Darwinian religiously dominated biological sciences.
If there is no intentional content, how are we to determine the τ-content of a given
natural purpose?
A widely endorsed view, developed primarily by Karen Neander (1991a, 1991b) and
Ruth Millikan (1989) puts to rest the requirement of intentional origins.7 On this view,
what matters is not that the origins are intentional, but rather that the entity arises from
design: Intentional action is but one form of designed behaviour.8 Natural selection is
design also, albeit one unguided by the contents of intentional mental states. So to say
that the purpose of the heart is to pump the blood, but not to make a noise, is to say
that its pumping the blood is what the trait was selected for; its making a noise is merely
accidental, a property that cannot enter into a legitimate explanation of the persistence
of the trait in heart-bearing organisms. The τ-content of a natural purpose arises from
natural selection, in contrast to their intentional and artefact counterparts. A fairly
7Cf. Godfrey-Smith (1993, 2012) and Schwartz (1999).
8If forced to fudge, we could speak of ‘design-like’ processes also.
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standard objection to the origins account that is worth noting, especially with respect
to natural purposes, is that traits cannot make contributions to their own selection; it
is the beating of previous hearts, not a heart in fact attributed a purpose, that explains
the presence of the trait. But this objection rests on a confusion: The relevant bearer
of the purpose in the case of natural purposes are not tokens, but types. It is the trait
‘heart’ that has a purpose; at most, individual hearts inherit their purpose from their
type.
One neat implication of this is that the origins account is highly unificatory. τ-
content, no matter the purpose’s kind, is determined by design origins, whether the
design be selectionist or intentional. In other terms: To demand the purpose of x is to
ask what x was designed to do. This is independently plausible. In trying to ascertain
Jones’ purpose in winking, one is trying to ascertain the intentional component of the
design plan that resulted in the lashes’ movement.
A final point worth making is that the origins account tells us something important
about purposes; namely that they are, like the functions-as kind of function, extrinsic
properties of entities. Why so? The argument is as follows: It is possible that there
are two intrinsic duplicates which are nonetheless non-identical with respect to their
purposes. Given that purposes are properties, they must be extrinsic. Consider for
example the human heart. In our species, the heart functions as a blood pumper, but it
does not function as a noise maker. But it may function as a noise maker, without any
change in its intrinsic properties. This is, of course, because the purpose is set by its
origins which are plausibly extrinsic. For take a particular human heart, and consider
what its purpose would be in another world, had its origins differed in the following
way. Suppose that it had developed in some other species, ‘Schumans’, who live on
a quiet planet. On this planet the beating of the heart serves a purpose; when a heart
beats strong, a member of the species is seen to be a more attractive mate, and so the
noise made by a given heart features in an explanation of its persistence through the
species. In such a case, the heart, identical in its intrinsic properties though it may
be, differs in its purpose. So purposes are not intrinsic properties; they are extrinsic,
relational properties—ones determined by the entity’s origins.
So far, I have distinguished four senses, the ‘social’, the ‘mathematical’, the ‘causal
role’, and the ‘teleological’. In what remains of this section, I would like to briefly give
attention to the relationship that holds between the two senses detailed over the last
two subsections: The teleological and causal senses of ‘function’.
3.1.4 Relation between causal and teleological functions
What is quite remarkable about the causal and teleological senses of ‘function’ is the
extent to which they yield equivocation; it is fairly standard practice to conflate these
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senses of the term. As Godfrey-Smith writes:
Although it is common in the philosophical literature to understand these
two views as competing analyses of a single concept, there is no obstacle to
accepting both concepts as legitimate. On this view, ‘function’ in scientific
contexts is ambiguous – or rather, more ambiguous than it is usually thought
to be. (Godfrey-Smith, 2012, p. 15)
This is all bad business, partly due to the fact that the senses bear striking differences.
Consider for example the following two:
Difference 1 The truth-makers are temporally distinct.9 What makes a teleological
functional ascription true is an entity’s history. In contrast, what makes a causal
role functional ascription true are the details about its current dispositions and its
integration (possible or actual) into certain complexes. Thus, the truth-makers for the
latter are current or obtaining states of affairs, whereas the truth-makers for teleological
functional descriptions are past or non-obtaining states of affairs.
Difference 2 They may enter into distinct explanations. I will give two examples.
First, whilst both causal role and teleological ascriptions can enter into explanations of
events that occur when things are ‘going as they should’, causal role ascriptions can
enter into explanations when things do not. For example, I can explain how Smith
got from A to B by saying that he took a car, and by citing how cars function (read
teleologically). But if the car is malfunctioning at least one non-proper function must
enter into the explanation. If the engine breaks and the car crashes, I may appeal to
how things were functioning in contrast to how they are supposed to function. So some
events causal functions can enter into proper functions cannot, because some events
occur due to the serving of non-proper causal roles. Second, teleological explanations
can enter into etiological explanations that causal role functions cannot. If I wish to
explain the persistence of a trait, then I can cite the function of previous instances of
the trait. In such a case, what explains why the token is present is not its actual causal
profile – again, this token may malfunction. Rather, what does the explanatory work
is the proper function – that causal function it was selected to serve.
If so distinct, what explains the readiness with which the senses are conflated? The
answer: Certain similarities between the usage of the two senses. Again, I offer two:
Similarity 1 The first similarity is that whilst both enter into different kinds of causal
explanation, that often a complete explanation of a phenomenon must make explicit
reference to both kinds of function. Consider Lean:
[E]ven the strong theory of functions relies in some sense on the non-
historical, causal-mechanistic notion of function discussed by Cummins
9For an excellent read on truth-making, see (Armstrong, 2004).
72 CHAPTER 3. FUNCTIONS
(1975). This notion of function is needed to make sense of the causal
contribution to the organism’s fecundity that selection favours in the first
place. Etiological functions therefore entail a Cummins function, albeit one
that was performed by past tokens of some trait, rather than the current
token. (Lean, 2014)10
Lean’s point here is that when it comes to natural purposes, teleological explana-
tions often appeal to some causal function that the trait in question bears. We saw that
in Difference 2 above, though a particularly vivid case may be found in Cummins’ later
work. In Psychological Explanation, he attempts to re-cast Freud as a functional ana-
lyst. The details are not too important, but his method of determining the causal roles
that are to be attributed involves terms quite obviously used to express teleological
concepts. The following passage may serve:
Functional questions about Freudian theory and about particular analyses
are naturally couched in functional language: (i) When we ask what re-
pression is, we want to know how a repressor would function, i.e., what
its input-output properties would be. (ii) Once we grant that repression
occurs, the next question is, why? Here, what we want to know is: What is
the function of repression? (Cummins, 1983, p. 146)
In the latter part of this passage, he is in essence asking what repression is for?
This questions asks the purpose of repression: What it was ‘designed’ to do. That is,
what its purpose is in mental systems. Recall, it may have a function, without in fact
serving that function. Those who excessively repress, for instance, may be thought of
as undergoing some kind of cognitive malfunction, and to classify such repression as
malfunction is to say that the repression does not do what it is supposed to – does not
occupy its appropriate causal role.
Or, to consider a non-fictional functional analysis, when we ask what the purpose
of the heart is then we must make reference to what tokens of the type ‘heart’ did
in the organism complex which resulted in the trait being inherited by subsequent
generations. Similar points apply to artefact purposes; to understand the purpose of
the brakes, one must make reference to what the brakes do in systems with certain
features i.e., those causal roles brakes are supposed to occupy. So too for intentional
purposes; the intention is the content of the state(s) which is causally responsible for
the event’s occurrence. The τ-content of Harry’s purposive wink is the content of
that intention that caused Harry to wink. The upshot of these remarks is that the
relationship between the two is close, and thus their conflation is explained, because
functional purposes are causal roles. That is to say: the function (read teleologically)
10See also (Buller, 1998).
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of an object is just the way it is supposed to function (read causally). Put another way
still: proper functions are the causal functions some entity is supposed to bear.
Similarity 2 We often answer questions that demand how an entity functions (in
the causal sense) by offering their teleological function. If Smith asks, pointing at
the brakes on my bike, ‘What does this do?’, I will typically give him the purpose,
i.e., ‘It stops the bike once the lever is pressed’. This may be false: the brakes may
be malfunctioning, or functioning improperly. Nonetheless, it is of heuristic value to
assume entities are working as they are supposed to be, and to correct once that is
discovered to be false, rather than to determine, for each such question, what exactly
the brakes are capable of doing in the system of which it is a part.
There are, then, similarities that hold between usage of the terms. But importantly,
the two concepts are distinct. For an object may be supposed to bear some causal role C
even if it plays no such role. As Aristotle put it, something may be part of a function
category ‘only in name’. Harry may wink at Sally, and the wink may be designed to
seduce, even if it disgusts. Similarly, the button may be designed to dim the screen,
even if the light cannot do so due to some fault; the heart may be designed to pump
the blood, even if it cannot due to disease. This tells us that whilst it follows from:
A. F is the causal function of x.
that
B. x can F.
no such statement follows from:
C. x’s proper function is to F.
That is, if something occupies a causal role, it must be able to serve that role. But it
does not follow from something’s being supposed to occupy a causal role that it does.
We are due a recap. The aim of this section was to disambiguate the term ‘function’.
That aim is now complete. First, I outlined four senses of the term, and looked at
the relationship between the causal role and teleological senses. I now turn to the
second aim of this chapter, which concerns the relationship between functions and
dispositions.
3.2 Functions and Dispositions
Above, the term ‘function’ was disambiguated with care. The fruit of the disambigua-
tion will be found below. I will reject a number of arguments in the literature concerning
the relationship between functions and dispositions, on the grounds that they equivo-
cate between the various senses. Following that, I will provide a (non-equivocatory)
argument of my own for the view that functions entail dispositions.
74 CHAPTER 3. FUNCTIONS
3.2.1 Two equivocatory arguments
What is the relationship that holds between causal functions and dispositions? Some-
times, authors talk as though dispositions are functions. For example, consider:
Biological functions are dispositions or effects a trait has which explain the
recent maintenance of the trait under natural selection. This is the “modern
history” approach to functions. The approach is historical because to ascribe
a function is to make a claim about the past, but the relevant past is the recent
past; modern history rather than ancient. (Godfrey-Smith, 1994, p. 344)
Godfrey-Smith is being liberal with ontological ascriptions here: if we were to be
precise, then we would not say that functions of any sort are dispositions, though they
may entail them. This point is of importance, for if functions simply are dispositions,
then a functionalist theory of mind just is a dispositional theory of mind, albeit a
dispositional theory of a certain stripe. But if they are not, as we should accept, then
functionalism in the philosophy of mind is no mere dispositional theory, though it
contains an important dispositional element. Let us call the weaker of these theses the
‘functions entail dispositions’ thesis:
FED Functions entail dispositions.
The thesis is rarely supported, and where it is, as I shall argue, its support rests on
equivocation. Similar points apply to the thesis’ converse, namely the ‘dispositions
entail functions’ thesis:
DEF Dispositions entail functions.
This thesis is also rarely supported, though in this case the absence of support is
likely due to its prima facie implausibility. Nonetheless, support exists; but like before,
that support rests on equivocation. In this section, I am going to (1) outline and reject
an argument for FED, and an argument for DEF, and (2) provide an alternative defence
of the former; that functions entail dispositions.
Cummins on FED
Do functions entail dispositions? According to Cummins (1975), they do. His argument
may be found in the following passage:
Something may be capable of pumping even though it does not function as
a pump (ever) and even though pumping is not its function. On the other
hand, if something functions as a pump in a system s or if the function of
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something in a system s is to pump, then it must be capable of pumping
in s. Thus, function ascribing statements imply disposition statements; to
attribute a function to something is, in part, to attribute a disposition to it. If
the function of x in s is to φ, then x has the disposition to φ in s. (Cummins,
1975, p. 757)
He also gives a case for elucidation:
For instance, if the function of the contractile vacuole on fresh-water pro-
tozoans is to eliminate excess water from the organism, then there must be
circumstances under which the contractile vacuole would actually manifest
a disposition to eliminate excess water from the protozoan that incorporates
it. (Ibid)
There is a lot going on in these passages. Let us start by drawing out the various
claims Cummins is making. They are as follows:
W. Something may be disposed to pump even though it does not function
as a pump (ever).
X. Something may be disposed to pump even though pumping is not its
function.
Y. If the function of x is to pump in s, then x must have the disposition to
pump in s.
Z. If x functions as a pump in s, then x must have the disposition to pump
in s.
I hope the reader is aware of the equivocation here: Cummins runs together ‘F is
the function of x’ and ‘x functions as an F’, as though the expressions are synonymous,
which they are not. This is particularly clear in the case of Y and Z. Notice also that Y is
patently false. We have already established that. For, if Y were true, then a statement
of the form of B would follow from C, but no such statement follows. The function of
x (in the teleological sense) may be to F, even if x is not disposed to F. A heart may
be diseased, and may thereby not be disposed to pump the blood, even if its purpose
is to do just that. Similar points apply to X: Something may be disposed to pump
even though pumping is not its function, because something may be disposed to F,
even though F-ing is not its purpose. Again, this is a teleological claim. The heart is
disposed to make a beating sound, but that is not its proper function.
What, then, about the remaining claims? On closer reflection, W is rather puzzling.
As Mumford notes:
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Cummins’s claim that something can be disposed to F though it does not
function to F seems to be using a sense of ‘function’ where x has a function
to F iff x is actually used at some point to F. (Mumford, 1998, p. 200)
We could put Mumford’s criticism in even clearer terms: W seems to use the term
‘function’ to mean ‘is actually functioning’ or ‘has actually functioned’ i.e., is currently
or previously serving its function. So this gives us:
W*. Something may be disposed to F, even if it never actually F-s.
to which an immature response is warranted: Duh! Of course something may be
disposed to F, even if it never does F. This is a prototypical feature of dispositional
properties, it is none other than that feature already much discussed: their latency.
Quite remarkably, when criticising the argument along these lines, Mumford manages
to equivocate. He writes:
The function of a can-opener is still to open cans even if it never actually
opens a can: for instance, if all cans are destroyed. (202)
To say that ‘the function of a can-opener is still to open cans’ is to make a teleological,
not a causal claim. It tells us what the object is supposed to do, not what it in fact
can do. That the purpose of something may not be manifested is irrelevant here: We
are concerned with causal functions, not their teleological counterparts. That leaves
us with Z. If something causally functions as an F, then it is disposed to F. Whilst I
take it that this claim is true, it garners no support whatsoever from Cummins’ chosen
example. The statement ‘the function of the contractile vacuole’ is teleological; it asks
what the purpose of the vacuole is. So the example fails to support FED, for it targets
the wrong sense of the term ‘function’. So Cummins’ argument for FED fails, as it rests
on equivocation.
Mumford on DEF
Mumford has argued not only that FED is false, but that its converse, DEF, holds true.
But like Cummins’, Mumford’s argument is fallacious, as it rests of equivocation. We
will call the former the negative claim, and the latter the positive claim. Let us start with
The negative claim: Functions do not entail dispositions.
What reason does Mumford give? He writes:
The response of the functionalist about dispositions to Cummins’ attack
should thus be along the following lines. Cummins is using a sense of
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‘function’ where a function-ascribing statement is understood as a causal-
role ascribing statement [...] [t]his is too narrow a sense of ‘function’;
because not all function ascriptions are ascriptions of dispositions of any
kind. (Ibid)
For support, he gives the following series of examples:
On this view, things can have functions but not dispositions. Examples
could be the function of a flag being to add grandeur or the function played
by a premiss in an argument. There are legal functions played by a magis-
trate, the function of a protest, the function of a rule in a game, the function
of a road sign. These are fairly commonplace cases where in saying that
something has a function, we are not saying that it has a disposition to do
something. (Ibid, p. 203)
Mumford then breaks down the examples into two classes, giving support for their
exclusion from the category of dispositions. In what follows, I will outline the classes,
and reject his support. We will start with:
Class 1: Conventions “There are functions of things that are determined by
convention such as flags being a symbol of grandeur or a road sign being an
instruction. These functions depend essentially on our responses to certain
objects or symbols and for this reason it would seem a mistake to ascribe a
disposition to such an object.” (Ibid)
The first point that cries out for noting: These examples are clearly teleological.
To say that the function of a flag is to add grandeur is to say what the purpose of
the flag is, not to say what it in fact does. So too for the road sign; it is meant to
be an instruction, irrespective of whether its message is ignored. So the examples
appear to be non-starters, on equivocatory grounds. But let us assume that Mumford
has in mind how a particular flag functions. Mumford’s claim is that because the
flag’s functioning in a certain way is response-dependent, that it may not be properly
regarded as dispositional.
But we should ask: Why should response dependency have this consequence? Pro-
totypical dispositions are response dependent in this way: Whether a poison manifests
its deadly disposition is determined by an agent’s responses to the substance. Similar
points apply to certain dispositional theories of colour. The response dependency is
built into the theory.11 So Mumford owes us a reason as to why this is problematic.
Let us now consider:
11See, for example, (Johnston, 1992) and (Peacocke, 1983).
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Class 2: Relations “There are functions that are determined by relations to
other items in a system such as rules of a game or the function of a premiss
in an argument. These functions would make no sense and would not be
possessed outside the system. A premiss which is part of no argument is no
premiss at all but only a proposition. Dispositions, in contrast, are possessed
in the absence of conditions which would provoke their manifestation.”
(Ibid)
This problem here appears to be one of complex integration. The basic thought is
that dispositions are possessed irrespective of their integration into complexes, but
various functions are not. So not all functions entail dispositions. The example he
chooses to support this, however, is somewhat puzzling. For one, it is unclear that
propositions are the bearers of dispositions. If propositions are abstract entities, then
at most it is that which expresses a proposition i.e., a statement, whether that be a
sentence written or uttered, or the content of a state of mind that plays a role in an
argument. Certainly, on a Russellian view, on which propositions are constituted from
facts, propositions cannot play such roles: Facts cannot be premises, though they may
be expressed by premises. Moreover, and again, the most natural interpretation of this
claim is teleological. A proposition may serve the purpose of being part of an argument
but it need not serve that purpose, if, say, it is never employed in a derivation.
Nonetheless, it may be thought that an objection remains. After all, Mumford is
correct to suppose that an object can bear a disposition whilst not being part of a
relevant complex, despite the relevant functional ascription holding true. But this is
silent on whether functions entail dispositions. It may help us see that dispositions do
not imply functions, but it cannot support the converse. It is true that when we say
that x is functioning as an F, we are committed to x’s being actually integrated into a
system. And it follows that functional ascriptions are not straightforward ascriptions
of dispositions. Nonetheless, the functional ascription does imply a disposition, it is just
that a necessary condition on its manifesting that disposition is its being so integrated.
So, whilst it is true that x will not be functioning as an F when not integrated, it still
bears the relevant disposition. Let us now turn to
The positive claim Dispositions entail functions.
This claim is given little support, though he does offer an argument from unification.
Consider:
I have made the claim that some dispositions may be understood as abstract,
such as being divisible by 2. A functionalist theory of dispositions has the
advantage of being able to explain why it is plausible that such abstract
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powers are dispositional in addition to the more commonly cited concrete
dispositions of fragility, solubility, and the like. If a theory of dispositions
can include such cases, at no added cost, then there seems no objection to
including them even if there may be certain grounds upon which abstract
dispositions are atypical. (Mumford, 1998, p. 203)
Presumably, when he says that the disposition is abstract, Mumford means that
it can be attributed to abstract objects. At least, in the discussion that follows, that
appears to be his claim. But read that way, it is unfortunate that our given example
is ‘divisible by 2’, for this is not obviously an example of a disposition. Whether its
inclusion is a benefit to the functionalist account, then, depends upon his argument for
their inclusion, to which I now turn.
His argument is as follows. Properties of abstracta such as ‘being divisible by two’
share the prototypical features of dispositions, and thereby should be classified as such.
There are four features. Consider first:
1. Generality “[B]eing divisible by 2 is something that can be true of more
than one number in the same way that being soluble can be true of more
than one substance.” (Mumford, 1998, p. 165)
2. Similarity “Second, being divided by 2 is something that can be done to
certain numbers in a similar way that being dissolved in water is something
that can be done to certain substances.” (Ibid)
Let us pause to consider these two. Firstly, are they different? Not obviously, ‘being
divisible by 2’ is both true of many numbers, and many numbers can be divided by
two. These two claims are synonymous. But more seriously: So what? Why does this
give support to the view that they are dispositional? The property ‘being dispositional’
is presumably not dispositional, but it applies to a range of different entities. So it is
not clear how this gives support to the view.
Consider now the second pair:
3. Divisibility “Third, to predicate divisibility by 2 is to ascribe a functional
role that a number can play; it is to say that if divided by 2, then a whole
number will remain.” (Ibid)
4. Stimulus conditions “Fourth, focusing just on the example of divisibility,
though it applies also to other mathematical properties, numbers can have
different functional roles in different conditions. These may be regarded
as corresponding to the different stimulus conditions for a non-abstract
disposition where the functional role is a causal role. Hence, a single
number may be divisible by two or by three or by five, as in the case of the
number thirty.” (Ibid)
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The third assumes the conclusion under question, and thus may be jettisoned. The
fourth does not. The thought is that we can see ‘dividing by x’ as a kind of stimulus con-
dition. Just like other properties that bear dispositional properties, different stimulus
conditions will cause different manifestations. Numbers, if we construe their divisors
as stimuli, are alike dispositions in that respect. Closer inspection, however, reveals
that treating divisors as stimuli is very odd. In fact, by some plausible assumptions,
we can generate a strong argument against the claim that ‘divisibility by 2’ is a bona
fide disposition. Firstly, it would entail that a disposition can both be part of its own
stimulus, and its own manifestation. After all, 2 is both divisible by 2, in which case
the bearer of the disposition i.e., the number 2 is part of its own stimulus, and divisible
by 1, in which case the ‘manifestation’ would be itself—the number 2. This yields a
substantive difference from standard dispositional expressions. If we are to accept that
a disposition cannot be either part of its own stimulus, nor its own manifestation, then
we should reject the claim that divisibility is a dispositional property, at least insofar
as they are predicated over numerical subjects. That is not to say that ‘divisible by 2’
is not a disposition (though I doubt it is), where the subject is concrete. But the sense
of ‘divisible by 2’, when applied to concreta, is distinct from the sense as it applies to
mathematical abstracta. A melon is divisible by 2 because it could be caused to split
in half. Numbers cannot be ‘split in two’ in that sense.
Moreover, the account fails to accommodate the conceptual centrality of causation
involved in dispositional ascriptions. Mumford notes this diligently, and in response
writes that:
The argument from causal role clearly has no application to these cases,
as causal roles are not involved. However, the property monist is not
committed to monism with respect to all kinds of property. A fundamental
split between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ properties could be accepted [...] [t]o
ascribe divisibility by 2 is just to give a functional characterization of that
number’s properties: it is to say what can be done with it... (Ibid, p. 167)
Ergh! More equivocation. To reiterate: One cannot ‘do things with numbers’ in the
relevant sense. Numbers are abstract entities—one cannot literally divide a number
by two. To say ‘n is divisible by 2’ is not to say what can be done with the number, it
is simply to say that the value of x in the equation ‘n ÷ 2 = x’ takes a natural number.
Moreover, it is straightforwardly false that functional ascriptions tell us what can be
done with the bearers of those functions. If to give a functional characterisation of x
is to say what can be done with x, then a hammer is disposed to be a prop in a play,
a piece of art, or to be thrown by the irascible. Not all modal properties of that ilk are
dispositional properties.
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With that in mind, Mumford has offered us absolutely no way to classify entities
in such a way as to allow for abstract dispositions, without including a whole host
of obviously non-dispositional properties.12 In fact, it seems as though the causal
requirement is precisely why we are moved to exclude divisibility (at least as it applies
to numbers, and not objects) as bona fide dispositions. A dispositional ascription makes
a claim about what an object could be caused to do, not what can be done with it in some
broader sense. If Mumford wants to argue that dispositions are a kind of function,
then he needs to offer us a plausible account of what he means by the term ‘function’.
His examples equivocate between the causal and teleological senses of the term, and
his argument appears to endorse a strange new sense which identifies functions with
mere possibilities. Now, it may be that Mumford has in mind the mathematical sense
here. That would certainly unify the abstract dispositions at issue. But, as was noted
above, mathematical functions may be used to model dispositions, just as they may
be used to model a vast range of phenomena. Taken on this sense, then, the claim is
empty at best.
In this section, I outlined and rejected two equivocatory arguments. The first was
given by Cummins in support of FED, the second by Mumford in support of DEF. In
the next section, I provide a (non-equivocatory) argument for FED.
3.2.2 Functions entail dispositions
When the term ‘function’ takes its causal sense, functional ascriptions entail disposi-
tional ascriptions. An entity only has functional properties if it has certain dispositional
properties. But not all dispositional ascriptions entail functional ascriptions. This is the
view I now support. As before, we may split the claim into a positive and a negative
component. The positive component states that all functions entail dispositions. The
negative component states that not all dispositions entail functions. We will start with
the former.
All functions entail dispositions: Both ‘actual function as’ and ‘contingent func-
tion as’, where true, entail the possession of dispositional properties. From either a
statement of the form:
x could function as an F.
or a statement of the form:
x is functioning as an F.
12Admittedly, Mumford believes that all properties have both a ‘categorical’ and a ‘dispositional’
aspect. He is not the only one. See (Mumford & Anjum, 2011) and (Marmodoro, 2010) for defences.
Nonetheless, the view is wildly implausible. For a powerful (no pun intended) argument to that effect,
see (Bird, 2016).
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it follows that:
(∃D(s,m)) Dx(s,m)
where the value(s) of D(s,m) are determined by the value taken by F. For instance, if it is
true that either x could function as a set of brakes, or x is functioning as a set of brakes,
then it is true that there is some disposition, in this case the disposition to decrease
acceleration upon activation, which x bears. Why so? The first avenue I will explore
relies heavily on the account of dispositional expressions developed in Chapter 1. The
basic thought is that the truth conditions for dispositional ascriptions are themselves
necessary but insufficient for the truth of functional ascriptions. Recall that on the
account given dispositional truth conditions are as follows:
Contingent Causal Analysis
Dx(s,m) iff.
1. ✸ (Sx→c Mx).
Now consider the condition that was argued to hold on both senses of ‘function-as’,
namely:
F2. ✸ (Sx→c e f )
It may be thought that the dispositional requirement is now obvious: If we take
e f to be a manifestation, then they are equivalent. Given that a function ascription,
whether contingent or not, will be true only if F2 is satisfied, it follows that function-as
(both contingent and actual) ascriptions entail dispositional ascriptions. But, it may be
asked: Should we take e f to denote manifestations? The answer: Unfortunately not.
The manifestation of the brakes may not be the deceleration of the vehicle, but rather,
perhaps, the pulling of a brake-cable. Nevertheless, in order to decelerate the vehicle,
there must be some manifestation which, transitively or no, results in the deceleration
of the vehicle. Put another way: For x to cause an F-event requires that it manifest,
though the F-event itself need not be identical to that manifestation.
It may be objected that the support relies too heavily on the account of dispositions
offered: The argument’s force relies upon the veracity of our truth conditions for
dispositions, of which some will not be content. Are there other ways, not laden by
the contingent causal analysis, that we may support the requirement? The answer, I
think, is ‘yes’. In what remains, I give two independent reasons.
Reason 1 Suppose that Jones asserts that x is functioning as a set of brakes, and then
in the same breath asserts that x does not have the disposition to decelerate vehicles.
There is something strange about this assertion. If the thesis is correct, that much is
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explained: it is a conceptual confusion to say that x functions as an F, and then to deny
that x has the disposition to cause the relevant F-events.
Reason 2 Functional components bear many of the properties of dispositions. For
one, they lie latent; for the brakes to be functioning, they need only manifest upon
being activated, they need not do so at all times. Moreover, like dispositions, they may
never manifest. The brakes may never be activated, if, say, the vehicle is owned by a
reckless individual.
The remarks above, if true, establish that functional ascriptions entail dispositional
ascriptions. But that is not the end of the story. For such ascriptions also involve claims
concerning the integration into complexes. If something could function as an F, then
it could be integrated into some complex where it will be in a position to manifest its
disposition, if it actually functions as an F then it is a member of such a complex. Not
all dispositions, then, entail functions, because the content of functional ascriptions
is not exhausted by its dispositional content: to ascribe a function is to do more
than just ascribe a disposition, such ascriptions also make claims about the modal
status of the entity’s integration into certain mereological complexes. Because not
all dispositional ascriptions make such claims, not all dispositional ascriptions entail
functional ascriptions. For example, an artificial organ may be disposed to pump, even
if it could not function as a heart, due to its inability to enter into a mereological relation
with circulatory systems. Or, to take another example, a glass’s fragility is amongst its
dispositions: It does not make sense to say that it functions as a fragile object. So, not
all dispositions entail causal functions. The two claims, together, gives us FED and the
negation of DEF.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I looked at the relationship that holds between functions and disposi-
tions. There were two aims. They were as follows:
[3.1] To disambiguate and outline four senses of the term ‘function’.
[3.2] To argue against the claim that bearing dispositions entails the occu-
pation of a functional role, and to argue that the occupation of a function
role entails the possession of certain dispositions.
First, I disambiguated the term ‘function’ into four central senses. Next, I looked
at two arguments concerning the relationship between functions and dispositions,
and showed that both rest on equivocation. Following that, I argued that functional
ascriptions entail dispositional ascriptions.




The ladder is for travelling up and down, so it should have rungs. Glue is for sticking
parts together, and thus ought to have a firm hold. The heart is for blood pumping,
and thus should pump the blood. These statements concern what entities ought to do
given what they are for, that is, given their purpose. Put another way, these claims are
teleo-normative.
In the last chapter, I disambiguated the term ‘function’. Of notable import were
two senses: The causal role sense, and the teleological sense. In this chapter, I am
concerned with statements of the above sort, that involve the teleological sense and
the normative. Its central task is the explication of the concept of a functional norm, a
notion that will be employed later in the thesis. The aims are as follows:
[4.1] To outline the notion of a normative judgement.
[4.2] To distinguish two classes of normative judgement: teleological judge-
ments and deontological judgements.
[4.3] To explicate the concept of a functional norm.
This chapter is composed of two sections. The first is composed of two subsections,
the second of three. In section 1, I outline the notion of a normative judgement, and
give a general sketch of what makes a judgement normative. In the second, I outline
the notion of a teleo-normative judgement, and distinguish functional standards from
deontological or ‘rule’ standards. I then distinguish norms from conventions, and
outline the notion of a functional norm. Finally, I conclude.
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4.1 Normativity
4.1.1 Normative judgements
Some judgements are normative, others are not. Most would agree with that claim.
Nonetheless, there appears to be little agreement on precisely which judgements are
normative. The presence of normativity is generally uncontested; the same cannot
be said for its extension. The dispute is, however, down to ambiguity rather than
substantive philosophical disagreement. The term ‘normative’, like so many of terms
of philosophical art, is used in different ways by different authors. In what follows, I
clarify what I mean by use of the term ‘normative’.
But first, we should briefly clarify the subject of the predicate ‘normative’. It is
a judgement, rather than a proposition or statement that is said to be normative. Why
so? Primarily because there is little agreement about their intentional objects. Whilst
what follows will not hinge on a cognitivist conception of normative judgements,
on which they take propositional objects like belief, it will likely appeal to those of a
cognitivist ilk. That it does is, to my mind, a positive upshot: prima facie, cognitivism
is a plausible position to hold. After all, normative judgements, as we shall see, are
typically denoted by declaratives, i.e., statements of the form ‘that such-and-such is so-
and-so’. Declaratives typically express propositional content; a non-cognitivist must
meet the challenge of explaining why we speak as though they do, if they do not. In
that respect, I am in sympathy with Wedgwood, when he writes:
[T]he burden of proof should be on someone who claims that the mental
state normally expressed by the sincere utterance of a declarative sentence
is something other than belief in the propositional content of that sentence.
(Wedgwood, 2007, pp. 37-38)
In what follows I will speak of ‘judgements’, though at times I will slip between
the terms ‘statement’ and ‘proposition’. Dissatisfied non-cognitivists may replace as
required.
Which judgements are normative? My starting point will be with the following
view given by Fumerton. Consider:
[A] judgment is normative if it is equivalent in meaning to a conjunction of
statements which include paradigmatically normative terms. (Fumerton,
2001)
On this view, a judgement inherits its normativity from its constituents. We might
put the claim another way: those judgements that are normative are the ones which
are expressible with the use of normative terms. Put into the language of conceptual
4.1. NORMATIVITY 87
philosophy, a normative judgement is one that bears, as part of its conceptual con-
stituents, a normative concept. On reflection, however, Fumerton’s criterion may be
overpermissive. In particular, it is not obvious that a judgement contains a normative
term is sufficient for its counting as normative. After all, judgements that mention
paradigmatically normative terms, in contrast to one’s that use them, include prag-
matically normative terms, but are plausibly not properly regarded as normative. For
example, suppose that we take some normative term ‘∆’. The judgement:
∆ is a normative term.
bears a paradigmatically normative term. But the judgement is plausibly non-normative.1
The problem cannot be avoided by retreat to conceptual phrasing; replace ‘term’ with
‘concept’ and the issue re-arises. Not all discussion of normativity is necessarily nor-
mative. If the criterion is to be worth its salt, plausibly we must restrict its extension
to those judgements that use normative terms.
Whether this view is correct, I know not. Nonetheless, it will serve well as a
starting point: We may identify normative judgements through the identification of
paradigmatically normative terms. Which judgements are paradigmatically norma-
tive? According to Thomson:
Normative propositions divide into evaluatives (such as propositions to the
effect that such and such is good) and directives (such as propositions to
the effect that so and so ought to do this or that). (Thomson, 2010, p. 713)
This passage makes claims about normative propositions, but its point may be re-
cast in terms of judgements. Normative judgements fall into two classes: The first are
what she calls the directives, which others prefer to call prescriptives, and the second are
what she call evaluatives. I will take each class in turn.
Paradigmatic prescriptives are those judgements expressed by the term ‘ought’.
Consider:
Our thinking is rich in what is often called normativity. We think that A
ought to be kind to his little brother, that B ought to move his rook, and that
C ought to get a hair cut. These are normative judgements. Intuitively, they
differ starkly from such nonnormative judgements such as that A kicked his
little brother, that B is playing chess, and that C has brown hair. (Thomson,
2008)
As I shall use the term, these questions about what ought to be the case are
“normative” questions — indeed they are the paradigmatic examples of
normative questions. (Wedgwood, 2007)
1For a view on which the judgement may well be counted as normative, see (Gibbard, 2012). For
interesting discussion, see (Williamson, forthcoming).
88 CHAPTER 4. FUNCTIONAL NORMS
It should be noted, however, that strictly speaking not all statements that contain
the term ‘ought’ are either prescriptives or directives. Prescriptions and directions
are instructions, but not all judgements that include the term ‘ought’ are instructions.
Thomson’s examples serve well as illumination. If I say that C ought to get a hair
cut, then I might be issuing an instruction, if the judgement is expressed directly to
C, but I may not. If, for instance, I callously whisper that C ought to get a haircut
in B’s ear for the purposes of making fun of C, then I offer no instruction, but my
judgement nonetheless contains the term ‘ought’. Further examples of members of the
prescriptive class include:
1a. The frosting ought to be vanilla.
1b. One ought to eat pudding after the main course.
1c. Doughnuts ought to have holes.
Some would not include non-prescriptive uses of the term ‘ought’ from the exten-
sion of ‘normative’. Thus, ‘Doughnuts ought to have holes’ would not be counted
as normative. But as I shall use the term, at least some non-prescriptive uses are to
be included under the normative net. To avoid the impression that I count only the
instructional variety, I shall refer to prescriptives as ‘ought judgements’.
Before we turn to the second subclass of normative judgement, it should be noted
that whilst ‘ought’ is a paradigmatically normative term, it is not the only term that
feature in ought judgements, for two reasons. First, the term ‘ought’ as it features
in ought judgements, expresses the same concept as the terms ‘should’, and ‘must’,
at least in a wide range of contexts.2 Second, the concept ‘ought’ comes as part and
parcel of a cluster of concepts, all of which are, like certain quantificational concepts,
plausibly interdefinable alongside negation. The other members of the cluster which
I have in mind are the terms ‘forbidden’ and ‘permissible’. Hence, whilst I will focus
on ‘ought judgements’, we could perhaps just as easily focus on judgements of what
is permissible or forbidden.
That deals with the first class of normative judgement: Ought judgements. I now
turn to the second, what Thomson called evaluatives. Evaluative terms include ‘good’,
‘bad’, ‘better’, ‘average’, ‘worse’, and ‘awful’. Evaluative judgements include:
2a. Vanilla frosting is good frosting.
2b. Chocolate pudding is better than other kinds of pudding.
2c. A meal with no pudding is a bad meal.
So far, I have now outlined two subclasses of normative judgements, evaluative
judgements, and what I called ought judgements.
2Cf. (Broome, 2013, p.11).
4.1. NORMATIVITY 89
4.1.2 Upholding to standards
To call teleological judgements normative, at least where we hold a permissive sense
of ‘teleological’, is sometimes met with deserving scepticism. Moreover, to capture
evaluatives and prescriptive under the same net may be thought an exercise in mixing
specimens. The purpose of this section is to bruite a notion of normativity that will
be sufficiently liberal to include functional norms as bona fide normative, and to unite
both evaluative and prescriptive judgements under a single flag.
That may be thought a tough burden to bear. Is there anything that unifies norma-
tive terms, or do they form nothing more than a motley crew? On a fairly standard
view, the answer is ‘yes’; normative judgements are those that are non-descriptive.
Put in Ramsey’s terms, whilst descriptive statements—to use an unfortunately unil-
luminating term—describe the world, normative judgements criticise the world. Put
another familiar way, descriptive judgements say what is the case, whereas normative
judgements do not. Here are some examples:
A point that is generally acknowledged is that the evaluative is part of the
normative, where the normative is understood as concerning what we ought
to do, in contrast with what is the case. (Tappolet & Rossi, 2015)
We often think, not just about what is the case, but about what ought to be
the case. (Wedgwood, 2007, p. 17)
Is this the best way we have to distinguish the normative from the non-normative?
Not obviously. After all, there is a perfectly respectable sense in which some normative
judgements say what ‘is the case’, and a perfectly respectable sense in which some
descriptives do not. For instance:
3a. The yard is such that ball games are forbidden,
3b. There are good people and bad people, that’s just the way the world is,
are evidently normative, but appear to make claims about ‘how things are’. A similar
point is made by Mark Bauer. He writes:
It is common enough refrain when discussing the normative to talk about
the “prescriptive” versus the “descriptive” as if this captured the difference
between the normative and the non-normative respectively. The prescrip-
tive is just, however, one species of the normative [...] [t]he normative
includes norms that are not rules of prescriptions to act. “Fire exits ought
to be unblocked” or “A hammer head’s face ought to be 114 inches diame-
ter” are standards that are not prescriptions [they are] descriptives of, not
a prescription for, how things ought to be. The distinction between the
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prescriptive and the descriptive does not, then, suffice to distinguish the
normative from the non-normative. (Bauer, 2009, pp. 245-246)
Further examples include those judgements that bear, as constituents, the truth-
functional connectives. For instance, the statements:
4a. If you don’t wake up early tomorrow, then you may not have pudding,
4b. Either the next ball is red, or I made a bad financial decision,
appear to be (in part at least) normative, despite, again, ‘saying how things are’. It
may be thought that, strictly speaking, the property of being normative should only be
applied to truth-functional relata,3 but that would be a mistake: normative terms may
apply to complex judgements taken as a whole. After all, there is nothing senseless
about the judgement:
5. It is bad that life presents further hurdles if you are female,
in fact, the judgement seems perfectly respectable. There is something bad about the
conditional taken as a whole. Moreover, the judgements:
6a. The brownies may have been mouldy.
6b. Meat is not sweet.
do not concern what is the case, but rather how things could be and how things are not
respectively.4 It appears, then, that to merely distinguish the relevant judgements in
terms of whether they ‘say what is the case’, is either trivially false, or requires extensive
precisification. Is there another way that we may demarcate the non-normative from
the normative, that makes no essential reference to whether the judgement in question
‘says how things are’?
There is. The method of distinction I have in mind is similar to that given by
Meckler. Consider:
[A]ll normative expressions are, in one of their senses, descriptive. Some-
times they describe things in general, sometimes a narrower class of items
often called “values”. But they differ as normative expressions by virtue of
their function, which is to lay down “conditions to be met”. (Meckler, 1953,
p. 579)
3If we were to be precise, we would disclude those relata that themselves contain truth-functional
relata. We may think of these as, in some sense, ‘atomic’.
4Cf. (von Wright, 1963, pp. 9-11.).
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On this view, the distinction between a non-normative and a normative judgement
is one of linguistic function. When one makes a normative judgement, one’s judgement
makes essential reference to what we may call standards, which may be thought of as
ideals or values. More precisely; they involve ‘holding an entity up’ to some standard.
In the case of ought judgements, one merely holds the entity up to that standard. If
I judge that the pudding ought to be chocolate, then I hold the pudding up to some
standard. I am judging that when puddings are ‘as they should be’, puddings are
chocolate.
The notion of a standard, as I use it, is non-technical. I offer no principled way to
individuate standards. Rather, standards must often be determined on a case-by-case
basis, and by appeal to intuition. It will, however, be helpful to say a few words on the
topic. First: Standards need not be spatiotemporal particulars, whether idealised or
everyday. Nor are they mysterious platonic objects. The standard by which puddings
are assessed is not some ideal pudding, the best-of-all-possible puddings, though in
some cases consideration of idealised particulars may be fruitful in drawing out the
standard by which entities are assessed. Moreover, to hold up to a standard does not
require that the standard is explicit, known, or recognised. The notion is admittedly
vague, but is serviceable and, I contend, well-understood.
The ‘holding up to’ relation is rather puzzling; it should not be confused with
comparison. Comparison involves the determination of similarities, ought judgements
are silent on the properties of the entity that is held up to a standard. If the pudding
ought to be chocolate, then it ought to be chocolate irrespective of whether it is chocolate
or vanilla. There is no comparison made to the standard, the standard is merely
imposed. Nevertheless, comparison does enter essentially into evaluative judgements.
When one makes an evaluative judgement, on the present view, one engages in a
comparative enterprise: one compares the relevant phenomenon to a standard. But
to compare against a standard is not just to compare. Rather, to compare against a
standard requires also that a preference is given between the comparators. If I judge
that the pudding is good, then I hold the pudding up to a standard, and invoke positive
comparison between the standard and its comparator, i.e., the pudding. If I judge that
the pudding is good because it is chocolatey, then I judge that it is comparable to the
standard, where satisfaction of the standard may be achieved, in part at least, through
being chocolatey.
To surmise: What makes a judgement normative, on the sense I have in mind, is
that it ‘holds up’ an entity to a standard. To count as normative, a judgement need not
compare against that standard, though if it does the judgement will be evaluative. In
contrast, non-normative judgements do no such thing. If I judge that the ball is red,
or that the fire is hot, I neither hold up the ball or the fire to any standard. But when
I judge that the ball ought to be red, or that fire is good, then my judgement makes
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essential reference to standards.
In this section, I outlined the notion of normativity. I outlined two varieties of nor-
mative judgement: ought-judgements and evaluatives. I then criticised the standard
distinction between the normative and the descriptive, and outlined one way to un-
derstand the term ‘normative’, namely as denoting those judgements that hold up to
standards, values, or ideals. Some may be discontent with that account, they may take
normativity to require more than mere holding up to standards. Whilst there may be
senses on which that holds, those senses are not my concern. When I say normative, I
am speaking of those judgements that hold entities up to standards. Whilst that may
not be a ‘full-blooded’ sense of the term, it is normative enough, for present purposes
at least.
4.2 Teleological Normativity
Normative judgements are judgements that hold entities up to standards. ‘Teleological
normativity’ denotes a class of normative judgements. We may call these ‘teleo-
normative judgements’. The conception of normativity sketched above is sufficiently
liberal to include those judgements that may be called teleo-normative. What are those
judgements; what makes them teleo-normative? On the account outlined in what
follows, a judgement j is teleo-normative just in case j holds up an entity to a standard
imposed by that entity’s design origins. There are three subsections: in the first, I
introduce the notion of teleological normativity, in the second I outline the distinction
between norms and conventions, and in the third I outline the notion of a functional
norm.
4.2.1 Teleological standards
Teleological normativity is any form of normativity, where the normativity is deter-
mined by some purpose, aim, or goal. An example of a teleological judgement may be
found in the following passage:
Why should the ladder you’re building have sides? Because if it doesn’t
have sides there will be no place to put the rungs. Why should the ladder
you’re building have rungs? Because if it doesn’t have rungs it won’t be
able to help anyone climb up and down. Why should the ladder you’re
building be able to help someone climb up and down? It just should —
that’s what a ladder is for. If you dont understand why a ladder should be
able to help someone climb up and down, then you dont understand what
a ladder is! Here we appeal to the function of ladders to put a stop to a
regress of “Why?” questions. (Silverstein, 2016, p. 214)
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Consider the last of these claims, that the ladder should be able to help someone
climb up and down. The climbing up and down is the purpose of the ladder. That
is what it is to be a ladder. It is in virtue of its having that purpose that an ought-
judgement holds. The ladder ought to function as an object that allows one to climb up
and down, because that is the ladder’s purpose. This is a teleo-normative judgement.
Because purposes are determined by an entity’s origins, so too are the teleo-normative
standards to which such entity’s are upheld.
According to some, teleo-normative judgements are analytic truths.5 If one grasps
the concept of ladder, then one can, from the meaning of that term alone, come to know
that a ladder should allow one to climb up and down. Whether these are genuinely
analytic, however, is hard to tell. Determining analyticity is a tricky task, outside the
prototypical cases. Others, including Tyler Burge (2010, p. 312), have claimed not that
such truths are analytic, but rather that they are knowable a priori. If they are analytic,
that would be explained. Analytic truths are plausibly all knowable a priori, even if
not all truths knowable a priori are analytic. But like analyticity, a prioricity is difficult
to determine. When Burge uses the term, he means ‘warranted, but not warranted
through sensory material or perception [...] typically warranted through understanding or
reason.’ But if Williamson (2013) is correct, to describe a truth as knowable a priori is
empty—the notion is epistemologically insignificant. Of course, all of this hinges on
a broadly cognitivist conception of normative judgements. I do not know whether
such judgements are analytic, nor whether they are a priori. But they do share close
residence. Entities that are classified in terms of their purposes evidently bear their
purposes in virtue of that classification. We can accept that, whilst remaining silent on
whether that entails analyticity, or knowability by the capacities of reason alone.
When a normative judgement j is not teleo-normative, j is as I shall say ‘rule-
normative’. To call a judgement rule-normative is not to classify it as imposed by
some individual or institution. Rather, ‘rule-normative’ is a functional category: Rule
normative judgements play a cognitive functional role that teleo-normative judgements
cannot. In particular, rule normative judgements can play what may be thought of
as a motivational role: they can play a special role in items of practical reasoning. If I
judge that I ought to be good, then (oddities notwithstanding) I will try to be good.
My judging can motivate me to act in accord with the judgement’s content: it is in
that sense that they are ‘rules’. In contrast, teleo-normative judgements cannot play
that functional role. This is, I take it, why arguments from purpose are thought to
fail. To judge that one has a purpose is not motivational in this sense. Rather, to feel
the normative force of the content, one must first judge that one ought to act in accord
with one’s purpose. Interestingly enough, John Barth put this point excellently, in his
short story entitled ‘Night-Sea Journey’, in which the narrator is an angst-ridden sperm.
5See, for instance, (Foot & Montefiore, 1961) and (Foot, 2001).
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Consider:
Arguments from function and design don’t impress me: granted that we can
and do swim, that in a manner of speaking our long tails and streamlined
heads are ’meant for’ swimming; it by no means follows – for me, at least –
that we should swim, or otherwise endeavour to ’fulfil our destiny.’ (Barth,
1968)
Now, I must insist that the following point be clarified: not all judgements per-
taining to purpose may be properly regarded as teleo-normative, at least insofar as I
use the term. Rather, some are rule standards. Consider, for example, the former two
of Silverstein’s normative judgements—that the ladder should have sides, and that it
should have rungs. These are not teleological through-and-through. There is nothing
necessary about having sides or rungs—some rope ladders have neither. Such ladders
may be worse than those that have rungs and sides, vis-á-vis the ladder’s serving its pur-
pose. But this involves a distinct standard, one not imposed by design origins. Rather,
such judgements hold the ladder up to an ideal—the ideal of best ladder-performance.
That ideal is not determined by the ladder’s design origin. A ladder should allow one
to climb up and down, that is its purpose. Its purpose is not to allow one to climb up
and down as best it could, despite that being eminently desirable. Similarly, the heart
aims to pump the blood; a given heart could do so better. But its doing so better sets
it against a different kind of ideal—the best possible satisfaction of its aim. At best,
this tells us that entities can serve their purposes better than they in fact do. True
enough, but these are not distinctively functional evaluations—they are functional in
the sense that they take derive aims from purposes, not functional in the sense that they
are individuated by an entity’s history. That is to say, to function properly is for it to
function as it is supposed to. To function better is not to function properly. The heart,
when functioning as it is supposed to, does not pump as the best of all possible hearts
might pump.
We might call judgements of the former kind quasi-teleo-normative judgements.
Quasi and bona fide teleo-normative judgements are sometimes run together. Some
authors recognise the distinction, but take them both to be genuinely teleo-normative.
Consider Plantinga:
There is a sort of ambiguity in the notion of working properly. On the one
hand, a thing works properly when it works in accordance with its design
plan, when it works just the way in which it was designed to work. My
radio works properly when there is nothing wrong with it and it works just
as its designer designed it to. But what shall we say when it works as it was
designed to, all right, but has a very poor design and won’t receive stations
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more than 500 yards away? Then it does not work very well, despite its
functioning precisely in accord with its design plan. [...] Again, the same
distinction holds in the case of an animal or other organism. Perhaps you
think the human knee is poorly designed; then you may think that a knee
functioning in accord with its design plan is nonetheless not functioning
well, even when the way it works does not deviate from its design plan.
(Plantinga, 1993, p. 27)
If I am correct, there is no ambiguity here. Working ‘properly’ is a matter of working
in accord with the design plan that explains one’s origins; to work ‘well’ in this other
sense has nothing to do with the notion of functioning properly, aside from its role in
determining the ideal such judgements employ. Others are less careful to distinguish
the two. Burge, for instance, allows his notion of a ‘natural norm’ to include what I
have called the ‘quasi’ variety. He is, of course, aware that such norms are not, in his
own words ‘naturalistically reducible’.6
Teleo-normativity is not constrained to ought-judgements—there is a teleological
evaluative dimension also. We may say that x is functioning better or more properly
than y. Simpler: x may function poorly, y may function excellently, or x and y may
function just as well. Such evaluations, like evaluations of all kinds, differ only insofar
as they compare the functioning of an entity to its standards. To say that the heart
ought to pump the blood is to make explicit the design standard of the heart—to say
that a heart functions better is to compare it against that standard. Such standards may
be individuated in a coarse-grained, or a fine-grained fashion. We might say that the
heart is supposed to pump the blood, but we would do better to say that it is supposed
to pump the blood via, say, making squeezing motions. Consider Price:
The heart moves the blood around the body by making squeezing motions;
the wing provides lift by flapping. The flapping of earlier wings contributed
to the workings of their governors, because it is just by flapping that they
provided lift for flight. So the fact that this particular pair of wings is present
can certainly be explained by the fact that earlier wings flapped [...] it will
be perfectly legitimate to say the function of wings is to flap.7 (Price, 2001,
p. 52)
Question: how low do we go? Answer: ask mother nature, or the artefact’s designer.
It depends upon what was selected or intentionally designed, and what accidentally
occurred. Of course, we might also give a more fine-grained individuation by giving
a more fine-grained individuation of the bearer of the purpose. Hearts are supposed
6Cf. (Burge, 2010).
7There are, no doubt, analogies here with the case of intentional action. We say that Jones murdered
the town by poisoning the water supply, and so on. See (Hornsby, 1980).
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to pump the blood—the hearts of certain species are supposed to pump the blood in
specific ways. How fish hearts are supposed pump the blood, for example, differs
from how human hearts are supposed to do so. The types fish-heart and human-heart,
then, are united in their coarse-grained blood pumping purpose, and even in their
more fine-grained purposes to pump the blood by making squeezing motions. But
they differ in their even finer grained purposes.
Recall that there are three classes of purpose: natural, artificial, and intentional.
It would seem to follow that there are three corresponding classes of teleological
normativity. Examples of natural teleo-normative judgements include:
N1. The kidneys ought to filter the blood.
N2. The heart ought to pump when the sinus nodes activates.
whilst examples of artificial teleo-normative judgements include:
A1. The big red button ought to release a nuclear weapon.
A2. The brake lever ought to pull the brake wire once pressed.
Now, it may be argued that whilst there are three classes of purpose, there are not
three classes of teleological normativity. The proponent may ask that we consider:
I1. Harry ought to have impressed Sally with his jokes.
I2. Archie ought to have hit the target.
It seems evident that claims I1-I2 do not follow from the facts that Harry intended
to impress Sally and that Archie intended to hit the target respectively. This is rather
puzzling. But the puzzlement may be dispelled by noticing that the disanalogy arises
from incorrect individuation of the subject of the relevant obligations. The relevant
obligations do not hold on agents, but on their actions. For consider:
I1*. Harry’s joke ought to have impressed Sally.
I2*. Archie’s shot ought to have hit the target.
I1* and I2* now seem less strained. And that should be no surprise: If the origins
account is correct then purposes are determined etiologically, and we are concerned
not with the origin of the individual, but with the origin of the agent’s action. But
in any case, I will not be primarily interested in intentional purposes, so we may cast
them to one side.
Teleo-normative judgements play a central role in the diagnosis of fault. This will
be important, so permit me to end this subsection by tangentially spilling some ink.
A vivid example of what I have in mind may be found in the medical sciences, where
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the identification of malfunction serves a central role in diagnosis. Diagnosis of a
heart condition often requires a standard by which a given heart may be assessed;
the working of past tokens of the same type that explain the persistence of the trait.
Similar points apply to artefacts; to know why an engine has stopped running, one
often enough needs to know how an engine functions, when it functions properly.
Moreover, the identification of artefact purposes has other heuristic benefits. I can
typically come to know what something does by knowing what it was designed to do,
for artefacts typically do what they are supposed to. Again, purpose is no guarantee
of the occupation of causal roles, but it does well enough as an indicator, enough of
the time.
The act of holding entities up to teleo-normative standards finds value not only
in the identification of malfunction, but also in the identification of improper function.
When something improperly functions, it occupies what we may call its proper ‘coarse-
grained’ functional role, but not what we may call its ‘fine-grained’ functional role.
Consider a heart so-diseased that it cannot circulate the blood. The heart would
be malfunctioning. But consider now a heart also diseased that it does not occupy
its selected causal role but, through some sort of strange fluke, is nonetheless able to
circulate the blood. This heart would not malfunction, it would improperly function. The
distinction is important: the probability that x requires medical treatment conditional
on its malfunctioning is higher than its functioning improperly. So long as it does what
it is ‘supposed to’—in a coarse-grained way—often enough it will do well enough if
left alone. If it ain’t broke, so the saying goes.
So far in this section, I have outlined the notion of a teleo-normative judgement.
Along the way, I contrasted teleo-normative judgements with rule normative judge-
ments. Below, in what remains, I will outline the notion of a functional norm.
4.2.2 Norms and conventions
A broader recap is due. So far in this chapter, I have outlined the notion of normativ-
ity, and I have delineated two class of normative judgements: rule based normative
judgements and teleological judgements. In what remains of this chapter, I will outline
a notion that will play an important role in the argument given in the chapter that
follows: that of a functional norm.
Norms are widely discussed in the philosophical literature. Unfortunately, as is too
oft, discussion typically proceeds in the absence of a sufficiently clear account of what
norms are supposed to be. Much discussion on norms is, unsurprisingly, intimately
connected to rule-normative judgements. Here are some examples:
Now, a norm governing assertion is the rule that needs to be followed in
order to offer a proper assertion, much like we have rules that need to be
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followed in order to properly perform in certain competitive sports. Of
course [the norm] can be, and frequently is, violated. I may, for instance,
assert that pollution is killing our local wildlife when I only suspect that
this is the case [...] where an assertion is made in the absence of the [norm
satisfaction] the asserter in question is appropriately subject to criticism.
(Lackey, 2007, p.594)
[I]t is natural to suppose that some norms are more intimately connected to
the nature of asserting than any norm is to the nature of jumping. One might
suppose, for example, that someone who knowingly asserts a falsehood has
thereby broken a rule of assertion, much as if he had broken a rule of a game;
he has cheated. On this view, the speech act, like a game and unlike the act
of jumping, is constituted by rules. (Williamson, 1996, p. 489)
Norms are, on this view, a special sort of rule. The term ‘norm’, as is not supposed
to be synonymous with ‘rule’. Rather norms are supposed to be in some sense, and as
Williamson notes in the passage above, constitutive rules. If so, it may be reasonably
thought that the notion of a function norm contains a manifest contradiction. Nonethe-
less, it is not uncommon for authors to speak of ‘functional norms’. We saw that above,
where Burge spoke of what he calls ‘natural norms’, but a more explicit example may
be found in the following passage from Peter Graham:
There are norms that do not require the capacity to represent, think, inter-
nalize, or subscribe to a norm. There are norms that are neither prescriptions
nor guides. Functional norms are norms in this broader sense. [...] Such
norms need not prescribe or guide. No norm tells the heart what to do.
The heart does not look up or represent any norm to guide its activity.
Functional norms are a broader kind than prescriptive or guiding norms.
They do not depend on the aims or intentions of individuals, on being
represented or being endorsed. (Graham, 2014, pp. 22-23)
If the notion of a functional norm is to be of service, we need first to cast its
extensional net wider. That is the task to which I now turn. What, then, is a norm? As
I understand the term, a norm is a constitutive standard. The account is more general,
for not all standards are rules.
What is it to say that some standard is constitutive? As I will interpret the notion,
constitution is not a mereological notion, but rather denotes essentiality. At first blush,
essences are a class of property. Whether a property is essential to some entity x is
determined by the nature of x. x’s essential properties are those properties which x has
simply in virtue of being the sort of subject that x is. Put another way: Fx holds qua x’s
x-ness. When a property is non-essential, it is said to be accidental.
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Now, even more than the term ‘normativity’, the extension of the term ‘essence’
is highly contested. Purported examples of essential properties would include of
Socrates being a man, or of a particular organism being a Silverback Gorilla. On a
fairly standard view, essential and accidental properties are distinguished along modal
lines. Essential properties are ones that objects bear necessarily, accidental properties
are ones that objects bear contingently:
Essential F is essential to x iff. Fx, and necessarily, x exists only if Fx.
Accidental F is accidental to x iff. Fx, and possibly, x exists and not Fx.
Whilst the left to right direction of Essence is fairly uncontroversial, it is highly
dubious that the right to left direction holds, largely due to the work of Kit Fine. The
basic problem is that not all properties that hold as a matter of necessity are ones which
hold in virtue of an entity being the very entity that it is in the relevant sense. The
following passage from Fine puts the problem in clear terms:
Consider Socrates and the singleton containing him. Now although it is
plausible to suppose that the singleton essentially contains the man, it is
not plausible to suppose that the man essentially belongs to the singleton.
There is nothing in the nature of Socrates which demands that there be any
sets, let alone the one that contains him. However, the standard accounts of
essence in terms of necessity are unable to account for this asymmetry. For
under such an account, the singleton essentially containing Socrates will
consist in something like its being necessarily the case that the set contains
Socrates if the set exists. But if this is true, then it will also be necessarily
the case that Socrates belongs to the set if the man exists.8 (Fine, 1995, p.
241)
I don’t intend to delve into this metaphysical swamp here. Nonetheless, for present
purposes we can largely jettison these problematic cases, for the relevant essences with
which I will be concerned do not hold necessarily in the trivial way that set membership
does. We can, to borrow Davidson’s terminology,9 afford ‘Spinozistic extravagance’.
What would matter is the failure to include bona fide norms, that the conditions count
too much will not yield substantive problems.
Some standards are essential, in the following sense: it is constitutive of certain
entities that they are compared to a certain standard. That is, they are held up to that
standard in virtue of being the very entity that they are. In contrast, some entities are
compared to certain standards not qua the entity that they are. Where a standard S
8See also (Fine, 1994).
9See (Davidson, 1970, p. 212).
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holds on φ, but only accidentally, the standard is not a norm; with respect to S, φ is
governed by a convention. To classify a standard as a convention is not to denounce
that standard as trivial or unimportant. It does, in some sense, entail that the standard
is arbitrary. But arbitrariness need not entail triviality. It is a convention on question
asking at talks that one is polite and constructive; this is no trivial standard—it is
deeply important. Rather, to classify a standard as a convention is to say that it does
not govern the activity necessarily, or in virtue of its being the kind of activity that it
is. An example will help. Consider promising. Suppose that, in some case c, there are
two standards that apply to the institution of promising. They are as follows:
Word-Keeping If S promises S* to φ, then S ought to φ.
Spit-Shake If S promises S* to φ, then S ought to spit-handshake with S*.
The former is essential, the latter accidental. Thus, the former is a norm on promis-
ing, the latter is a convention. Why so? Because it is constitutive of promising that one
is held up to Word-Keeping. But is it not constitutive of promising that one is held up
to Spit-Shake. Put another way: if an activity is not governed by Word-Keeping, that
activity is not one of promising. But if an activity is not governed by Spit-Shake, then
it could be the activity of promising. In explicit terms:
Norm
ν is a norm on φ-ing if and only if:
N1. ✷ ∀x (x φ-s only if ν is a standard on φ-ing).
Convention
ν is a convention on φ-ing if and only if:
C1. ✸ ∃x (x φ-s and ν is not a standard on φ-ing),
C2. ν is a standard on φ-ing.
The definition of a norm differs from that of a convention, in that the latter imposes
two conditions of satisfaction, whilst the former imposes only one. But that is for
simplicity: given the axiom of reflexivity, which holds virtually all modal systems, the
norm analogue of C2 will straightforwardly follow.10
It is worth noting that the distinction so sketched, in contrast with that found in the
quotations given at the start of this section, make no essential reference to the notion
of a rule. As such, they are applicable to non-rule based normativity. Pleasingly, they
may be successfully applied to teleological norms, as I shall now show.
10Here is the axiom: T: ✷ p→ p. See (Zeman, 1973) for some systems in which T does not hold.
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4.2.3 Functional norms
Whenever x has either a natural or an artificial purpose, there are functional norms
that hold on x. We will start with artefacts. Suppose that Dexter designs some artefact
a, with the intention that it should mow the lawn once the grass is long. We might call
this radical invention the auto-mower. Now, to count as an auto-mower, it is neither
necessary nor sufficient, recall, that an object in fact mows the lawn once the grass
is long. Something could function as an auto-mower, without thereby being an auto-
mower. Rather, for x to be an auto-mower is for x to be such that x is supposed to
mow the lawn. Membership of the kind ‘auto-mower’ is teleological, not causal. Now,
because auto-mowers share the same purpose—that of cutting the lawn when the grass
is long—there are functional norms that hold necessarily on auto-mowers. Moreover,
anything with that purpose counts as an auto-mower.
Not all of the standards imposed on auto-mowers are essential. Auto-mowers may,
for instance, be held up against a standard of durability and frugality; it may be that in
Dexter’s society, auto-mowers ought to be durable and affordable. But these are not,
unlike its functional norms, essential to auto-mowers; in a society sufficiently affluent
and fond of single-use items, it may be that auto-mowers should be expensive and
dispensable.
Similar points apply to natural purposes. If something is a heart, then it need not
function as a heart. Nor does anything that functions as a heart count as a member
of the kind. Nonetheless, they all, in virtue of their being hearts, are governed by
functional norms. Anything that counts as a heart, in virtue of its being a heart, should
pump the blood. I don’t, notice, say that bearing such a purpose is sufficient. I say only
that all hearts share a common purpose, not that all entities that share that purpose are
hearts. Again, it may be that a society upholds biological traits to differing standards:
Hair has a purpose, but society holds one’s hairstyle up to the standards of fashion.
That is not a functional norm, nor is it a norm in any sense; it is a non-functional
convention.
To some extent, the remarks above are in keeping with the following claim from
Mumford, when he writes:
Some objects are the objects they are in virtue of the function they perform.
One example of such a thing is a thermostat. Something is a thermostat in
virtue of it having the function of triggering a switch when a pre-calibrated
temperature threshold is passed either from a higher or lower temperature.
Any object that has this functional role is a thermostat no matter what its
other properties are that realize this functional role. (Mumford, 1998, p.
197)
But Mumford, as before, is using ‘function’ in its causal sense, and that cannot be
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right. Something isn’t a thermostat merely because it could function as a thermostat, or
even because it is functioning as a thermostat. Something is a thermostat when it was
designed to function in a certain way, not when it in fact does. A broken thermostat is
still a thermostat.
I anticipate the following reply: For the argument to work, it must be that the
relevant purposes are essential to the objects in question. Now, in the last chapter it
was argued that purposes are extrinsic properties. If purposes are extrinsic properties
surely, it may be contended, they are not essential? In fact, it seems eminently plausible,
at least prima facie, that purposes could not be essential. For consider the case discussed:
A given heart could have developed in a different species, and in that species it could
have served a different purpose – i.e., it may have been a waste disposal organ. Now,
if purposes are extrinsic, then they are not essential. If purposes are not essential,
then the functional norms that hold in virtue of something’s having a certain purpose
cannot be essential.
The argument is powerful, but there are several responses available. The first would
be to deny the inference from ‘F is extrinsic’ to ‘F is inessential’. As Bird notes:
[T]hese reasons need not be taken to be decisive. Perhaps the membership
of some natural kinds is not an intrinsic matter. It may be that the belief
that it is intrinsic stems from the view that natural kinds have essences, and
that essential properties should be intrinsic. But as we have seen [...] the
essential properties of individuals need not be intrinsic; perhaps they need
not be for kinds either. (Bird, 2009a)
The examples to which Bird refers are those famously raised by Kripke: the necessity
of origins, and of natural kinds.11
Let us consider the former. Origins are extrinsic properties—after all, they are
relational. Nonetheless: I am not tempted by that response, for I take the argument
for origins essentialism to be weak. Certainly, it goes against the grain of metaphysical
intuition: it seems perfectly plausible to suppose that this very organ could have derived
from a distinct origin. Of course, metaphysical intuition is no infallible source of
knowledge. Nonetheless, an alternative response would be desirable: is one available?
Fortunately, one is, though is does require some modification to the notion of an
essence. In particular, we might adopt a form of property-essentialism, rather than
what we may call subject-essentialism. Authors who defend something like the former
include Okasha (2002), Elder (2007), and LaPorte (2004). Here is the distinction. Whilst
subject essentialism concerns those properties that an entity bears in virtue of being
the very individual that it is, property essentialism concerns those entities a property
11For a defence of the former, see McGinn (1976), Forbes (1985, 1986), Noonan (1979, 1981). For the
latter, see Kripke (1971, 1980) and Putnam (1975).
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applies to in virtue of its being the very property that it is. An example may help.
Suppose that x is a green triangle. Amongst x’s properties are being green, and being
a three-sided polygon. Now, whilst it is essential to x’s being a triangle that it is a
three-sided polygon—it is a three sided polygon qua being a triangle, it is accidental to
x’s being a triangle that it is green. It is not green qua being a triangle. A triangle is
triangular in virtue of its shape, not its colour. Similarly, suppose we take the property
‘being red’. It is an essential feature of that property that it is a property of spatially
extended surfaces. If F is a property, and F can apply to events, say, then F is not the
property of being red. It is an accidental, however, that F applies to chickens, or to
Rauschenberg’s paintings.
How does this help? Well, whilst it may be that the subject of the property ‘being
a heart’ could have not been a heart, perhaps in virtue of having different origins, it
is an essential feature of the property ‘being a heart’ that it applies to entities with
a certain kind of origin. After all, for x to count as a heart requires that it has been
selected to serve heart functions. So, it is essential to the kind ‘heart’ that it is governed
by functional norms; it need not be essential to any particular organ that it is a heart.
If this is the right view to take, then functional norms are not norms that must hold
necessarily on individuals, but rather of any individual that, as a matter of fact, bears
a certain kind of property, in this case a relational property—a certain origin. Whilst
a heart could have been other than a heart, conditional on an entity’s being a heart,
it is governed by functional norms as a matter of necessity. In that sense, hearts are
governed by functional norms.
Call this notion a property norm. In explicit terms:
Property Norm
ν is a property norm on F if and only if:
N1*. ✷ ∀x (Fx only if ν is a standard on x).
We could also define the notion of a property convention, as follows:
Property Convention
ν is a property convention on F if and only if:
C1*. ✸ ∃x (Fx and ν is not a standard on x),
C2*. ν is a standard on x.
Thus, necessarily, something is a heart just in case it ought to pump the blood. But
something is not a heart in virtue, say, of the fact that it ought to make a beating sound,
even if there is some sense in which that holds. Whilst it may be that not all property
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norms are functional norms, all functional norms are property norms. Something is a
functional norm just in case it is both a property norm, and is set in the relevant way
by the entity’s origins. That concludes my outline of the notion of a functional norm.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I had the following aims:
[4.1] To outline the notion of a normative judgement.
[4.2] To distinguish two classes of normative judgement: teleological judge-
ments and deontological judgements.
[4.3] To explicate the concept of a functional norm.
which are now satisfied. In the first section, I outlined the notion of a normative judge-
ment. I argued against the standard distinction between descriptive and normative
judgements, and argued that a normative judgement is one that involves comparison
with, or the bringing to light of a standard. In the second section, I gave several
examples of teleo-normative judgements, and distinguished them from deontological
judgements. In the third section, I explicated the notion of a functional norm, which I







are not clues to the workings of
minds; they are those workings.
Gilbert Ryle
The Concept of Mind
108
Introduction to Part II
I turn now to the metaphysics of belief. My primary concern will be the individuation
of belief content pairs. The term ‘individuation’ is often used rather ambiguously in
philosophy. Here is my usage. According to Lowe, there are two kinds of individ-
uation: Epistemic and metaphysical.12 Epistemic individuation concerns the way in
which we ‘carve up’ the world. In that sense, individuation is a kind of cognitive
ability. In contrast, metaphysical individuation concerns the similarity relations that
hold between entities within a given domain. That which individuates x and y, is that
which makes x and y identical or distinct, whichever they may be. In what follows, I
am concerned with metaphysical, not epistemic individuation.
Now, the question ‘what individuates belief-content pairs’? may be broken down
into several components. On the one hand, we may ask what individuates attitudes,
i.e., what makes one attitude a belief as opposed to, say, a desire. I won’t be concerned
with that question. On the other hand, we may ask what individuates contents of
distinct beliefs. Suppose I believe that apples are sweet, and you believe that apples
are sour. Our beliefs would differ in content. Suppose now that I believe apples are
sweet, and so too do you (great minds, I dare say!) We would have sameness of content.
My question is: Given S believes that p and that S* believes that q, what makes S’s
belief a belief that p as opposed to a belief that q and vice versa.
What follows will be an attempt to individuate belief-content pairs in purely dis-
positional terms. There are at least two major hurdles that such an account must
face: the holistic character of mental dispositions, which makes a pure dispositional
individuation appear to succumb to unavoidable circularity, the second is the content
externalism in the philosophy of mind, on which the content of one’s beliefs are indi-
viduated, in part at least, by extrinsic factors. Those who favour the first line of thought
may reject a dispositionalist account of belief in favour of a functionalist account. Those
who favour the second may eschew both positions outright. This part aims to make
two tentative conclusions. The first is that the holistic challenge can be accommodated
by a dispositional conception of belief. The second is that content externalism can be
accommodated by an appeal to dispositional ideals.
There are three chapters. In chapter five I outline the attitude of belief and contem-
porary theorising on the relationship between belief and dispositions. In chapter six,
I argue that a dispositional account of mind is better than a functionalist account. In
chapter seven, I outline the argument for content externalism, and argue that beliefs
are individuated in terms of dispositional ideals.
12(Lowe, 2003).
Chapter 5
The Attitude of Belief
Introduction
Consider:
1. Joey believes Jane is beautiful.
2. Jane believes Joey is a nice guy.
These statements tell us what Joey and Jane believe. They are ascriptions of belief.
It follows that they are ascriptions that contain, as part of their conceptual content,
the concept of belief. If Davidson (1982) is correct, the concept of belief is the mark
of a rational animal. Only those who grasp the concept may be said to believe; only
those who may be said to believe are candidates for rational thought. That the concept
of belief is the precursor to being an agent that believes is a strong claim, no doubt.
But even if false, the centrality of the concept should not be shirked. For whether
you require the concept of belief to believe, no doubt to count as an agent one must
have beliefs. To be an agent is, in part at least, to believe. This chapter introduces the
attitude, and contemporary theorising on the dispositional aspect of belief. There are
three aims, which are as follows:
[5.1] To outline the attitude of belief.
[5.2] To defend the propositional requirement on belief.
[5.3] To outline contemporary theorising on the relationship between dis-
positions and beliefs.
Here is the plan. There are two sections. In the first section, I outline and defend
what I call the ‘propositional requirement on belief’ against a recent argument from
Robert Audi (2013). This requirement states that S believes x only if x is a proposition.
In the second section, I outline a preliminary dispositional account of belief, which
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I call Simple Behaviourism. Finally, I offer some defence of the view, and reject three
purported differences between dispositions and beliefs given by Armstrong (1973).
5.1 The Propositional Requirement
Belief is one of the propositional attitudes. ‘Propositional attitude’ is a Russellian
phrase. Attitudes are expressible as dyadic relations which hold between agents, and
what are called contents. Both talk of ‘attitudes’ and ‘contents’ is metaphorical and
deliberately vague, and thus should not be taken at face value. Attitudes are the
kind of ‘stance’, or ‘posture’ that is taken towards a content.1 Other examples include
desiring, intending, deciding, and fearing. Contents are what an attitude is directed
towards or ‘about’. This ‘aboutness’ is what Brentano called intentionality.2 We call
what the attitude is about its intentional object. On a fairly standard (though in no way
uncontested) view, attitudes may be propositional or they may be qualitative. These
roughly coincide with Kant’s distinction between concepts and percepts.3
Qualitative contents are, roughly and uninformatively, those qualitative properties
of perceptual experiences, such as the ‘red-ness’ one undergoes when seeing a ripe
tomato, or the burning sensation one feels when touching a hot plate. Belief does not
(at least not characteristically) take perceptual objects. Belief is a propositional attitude.
To say that belief is a propositional attitude is to say that beliefs take propositions as
their intentional objects. All propositions are expressible in declarative terms, i.e., by
statements of the form ‘that such-and-such is so-and-so’.
What are propositions? A vexed question. On an early Russellian view, proposi-
tions are constituted from facts, what Armstrong calls states of affairs.4 Alternatively,
propositions may be thought of as abstract objects. Plausibly, the term ‘proposition’
is ambiguous, taking distinct meanings in distinct theoretical contexts. For present
purposes, we may bruit a rough view: Propositions are the expressed ‘meaning’ of
declaratives. Two declaratives express the same proposition just in case they are iden-
tical in meaning. Two declaratives express different propositions just in case they differ
in meaning.
Unfortunately the view so bruited is ambiguous, for our chosen definiens harbours
ambiguity of its own: We may individuate ‘meaning’ in either a coarse or a fine-
grained fashion. Where meaning is individuated in a fine or coarse-grained fashion,
we have respective coarse-grained and fine-grained individuation of propositions. The
distinction will become important, so I will say a few words about it.
1For use of these latter terms, see (McDowell, 1994).
2(Brentano, 1874).
3(Kant & Muller, 1896).
4See (Russell, 1919), and (Armstrong, 1997).
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The distinction between fine and coarse propositional individuation may be ex-
plained with the use of the notion of a concept. Philosophical concepts are not the
concepts of psychology; they are not ‘in the head’. Rather, concepts are what Frege
called a ‘presentational mode’ or ‘sense’.5 We may call this, following contemporary
idiom, conceptual content. For present purposes, we may take a concept to be the
constituent of a (coarse-grained) proposition, though again talk of constitution may be
mere metaphor.
Examples will clarify. Suppose Smith utters:
3a. Hesperus is bright.
whilst Jones utters:
3b. Alpha Centauri is bright.
What Jones and Smith mean is different. Smith means that the planet Venus is bright,
Jones means that the closest star system to Earth is bright. Their meaning differs in
both senses. 3a and 3b differ in their coarse-grained propositional content. And it
follows that they differ in their fine-grained content too: Coarse-grained difference in
meaning implies fine-grained difference in meaning.
But the converse fails: Difference in fine-grained propositional content does not
imply difference in coarse-grained propositional content. For example, the statements:
4a. Hesperus is bright.
4b. Phosphorus is bright.
express the same coarse-grained proposition, but are constituted from non-identical
concepts, i.e., the concepts of Hesperus and Phosphorus respectively. So 4a and 4b can
be said to express distinct fine-grained concepts.
It is important, especially for what follows, that reference and sense are kept dis-
tinct, for its conflation masks epistemologically important aspects of the propositional
attitudes. One may know Venus under the concept of Hesperus, but not under the
concept of Phosphorus. Hence, ascriptions of identity between referents known under
distinct conceptual modes may be informative. When I speak of propositions, I will
(unless stated otherwise) be speaking of the coarse-grained variety. To distinguish the
two, I will denote propositions individuated in a coarse-grained way with single sets
of angle brackets, i.e., <A course-grained proposition is denoted>, and fine-grained
propositions (that is, propositions specified by their conceptual content), with double
sets of angle brackets, i.e., <<A fine-grained proposition is denoted>>.
5(Frege 1892, 1942).
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If standard theorising on the attitude of belief is correct, then conceptualisation
under presentational modes is no contingent affair. As a matter of necessity, if belief
takes an object, then the object is so conceptualised. Call this the conceptual requirement
on belief :
CRB Necessarily, if S believes x, then x is mediated by a conceptual mode.
The requirement, as formulated, is silent with respect to the propositional require-
ment to be defended. If beliefs take non-propositional objects, they may still be con-
ceptualised as a matter of necessity. I take it that CRB is plausible enough. Given it
won’t be the focus of what follows, I will assume it holds.
Because the intentional objects of beliefs are conceptualised under presentational
modes, believing may, to use Carnap’s (1956) terms, be ascribed under an intensional
context. That belief is intensional (s) should not be confused with the claim that it takes
intentional (t) objects. Intentionality is a property of the attitudes—their ‘aboutness’.
Intensionality, in contrast, is a property not of the attitudes themselves, but of the
logical contexts in which they sometimes appear. For Davidson, intentionality is one
of the defining characteristics of the attitudes. He wrote:
We may call those verbs mental that express propositional attitudes like
believing, intending, desiring, hoping, knowing, perceiving, noticing, re-
membering, and so on. Such verbs are characterized by the fact that they
sometimes feature in sentences with subjects that refer to persons, and are
completed by embedded sentences in which the usual rules of substitution
appear to break down. (Davidson, 1978)
When a context is intensional, it is non-extensional.6 In alternative Quinean terms,
intensional contexts are referentially opaque; extensional contexts are referentially trans-
parent.7 Extensional contexts are referentially transparent, in that such contexts are
not closed under extensional substitution and existential generalisation. That is, sub-
sentential expressions with the same extension may be substituted salva veritate. In
referentially opaque contexts, in contrast, no such substitution rule holds. An example
may serve to clarify. In transparent contexts, from a statement such as:
5. Hesperus is bright.
and a corresponding identity statements, such as
6Strictly speaking, ‘extensional’ is ambiguous. It can mean that substitution of coreferential singular
terms is truth-preserving, or it could mean that substitution of coextensive predicates is truth-preserving.
See (Mackie, 1974, p. 250).
7See (Quine, 1960). For discussion, see (Fodor, 1979).
5.1. THE PROPOSITIONAL REQUIREMENT 113
6. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
one may derive
7. Phosphorus is bright.
However, and in contrast, it does not follow from:
8. S wrote Hesperus is bright on the Great Wall of China.
and 6 that
9. S wrote Phosphorus is bright on the Great Wall of China.
so long as the statements are read under an intensional context, vis-á-vis the actual
words written.8 Analogously, belief ascriptions may be read under intensional con-
texts. There is a context under which it does not follow from:
10. S believes <Hesperus is bright>.
and 6 that
11. S believes <<Phosphorus is bright>>.
So far, I have outlined the attitude of belief. That deals with [5.1]. I then out-
lined the conceptual requirement on belief, and showed that the requirement makes
belief intensional. In what remains of this section, I will defend what I shall call the
propositional requirement on belief :
PRB Necessarily, if S believes x, then x is a proposition.
Put in equivalent terms: If some attitude does not take a proposition as its inten-
tional object, then it is not an attitude of belief. For any given possible content a belief
may take, that content is propositional.
Why should we think that beliefs are necessarily directed towards propositions?
Linguistic considerations give one line of support: We certainly talk as though they
are. Propositions are denoted by declaratives, and belief ascriptions make essential
reference to embedded declaratives. We say that Joey believes that Jane is beautiful,
that Jane believes that Joey is a nice guy. If we make the object some non-propositional
object, as in:
12. Joey believes beautiful.
13. Jane believes Joey nice guy.
8That is to say, the speaker should be using the relevant terms, rather than merely mentioning them.
114 CHAPTER 5. THE ATTITUDE OF BELIEF
the resulting sentences are ill-formed. That gives us prima facie reason to accept PRB.
But some deny that picture. Audi (2013) argues that whilst beliefs are necessarily
conceptual, they are not necessarily propositional. Whilst CRB holds, PRB does not.
In what remains of this section, I outline and reject two of Audi’s argument against the
propositional requirement on belief.
Here is the first argument. Whilst many non-declarative phrases make belief state-
ments ill-formed, some do not. In particular, what he calls predicative beliefs i.e., beliefs
denoted by statements of the form:
14. Joey believes his chances to be slim.
15. Jane believes Joey to be a nice guy.
Statements such as 14 and 15 ascribe genuine beliefs, and the beliefs do not have
propositions as their objects. Why so? Well, because the beliefs are not expressed by
declaratives; there is no ‘that’ clause. Rather, ‘believes’ is followed by an infinitive, i.e.,
the verb ‘to be’. Because there is no declarative, what follows the infinitive cannot
express a proposition. So there are beliefs that have non-propositional objects.9 Thus,
PRB is false.
Now, the natural inclination is to say that the distinction is false; 14 and 15 refer
to propositional beliefs under a predicative guise. The distinction only holds at the
notational level. It may be thought, for instance, that 14 simply is equivalent to:
14*. Joey believes <his chances are slim>.
But Audi maintains this would be mistaken. Predicative beliefs are not propo-
sitional beliefs under a predicative guise, they are different in kind to propositional
beliefs. Why so? Because propositional and predicative beliefs have different proper-
ties, and are thus (by Leibniz’s law) distinct kinds of belief. In what follows, I outline
two differences Audi gives. I will reject both.
The first concerns conceptual content. It is not that predicative beliefs do not have
conceptual content, but rather they differ in the extent to which they have conceptual
content. As he notes, to deny that beliefs must have propositional objects is not ‘to
deny that believing is essentially conceptual’. Thus, he accepts CRB.10 He maintains that
whilst beliefs that have propositions as objects are doubly conceptual, their predicative
counterparts are only singly conceptual:
9He also considers another kind of statement, statements of the form: ‘x looks to S to be y’, though
most of his attention is on the form given. Analogous points, however, apply.
10In fact, it is not patent where Audi stands on CRB. He seems to waver on the point. Consider: ‘We
might, then, speak of a purely (non-conceptually) predicative use of ‘believe’.’ It is not entirely clear
what it would mean for a belief to not be mediated via a conceptual mode. For present purposes, I have
taken Audi to accept (or remain neutral on, at least) CRB. The issue I wish to focus on is his denial of
PRB.
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The point is that whereas propositional believing is doubly conceptual—
requiring that the believer conceptualise both what the belief is about and
what is predicated of it—predicative believing, in minimal cases, is only
singly conceptual, requiring conceptualisation only of the predicated prop-
erty. (Audi, 2013, p. 33)
What exactly does Audi mean? What is it for x to be doubly, rather than singly
conceptual? The view is something like the following. In predicative believing, one
need not conceptualise both the subject and the predicate. In propositional belief,
one must conceptualise both. Why should we accept that? To see why, consider the
following case:
Shiny Glass S spots a shiny object out of the corner of their eye. Unbe-
knownst to S, it is a well polished glass.
In Shiny Glass, S believes the glass to be shiny, but does not believe <the glass is
shiny>. After all, S does not believe <the shiny thing is a glass>. Rather, S is simply
aware that something is shiny. Thus, S’s belief has the concept of shiny, but not the
concept of glass as part of its content. S does not conceptualise the subject, but only the
object. Shiny Glass shows that we conceptualise the subject only contingently when it
comes to predicative belief. In his own words:
With predicative belief, then [...] there is no particular notion, no specific
conceptual “handle”, that must yield the subject of any proposition I believe
about the object: in order to believe the rock to be craggy, I do not have to
believe ‘that the rock is craggy’, ‘that the stone is craggy’, ‘that the surface before
me is craggy’, or any such thing. (Audi, 2013, p. 34) (Italics in original.)
Now, in reply one could argue that our beliefs can bear what we might call ‘con-
ceptually thin’ content concerning the subject. For instance, it may be conceptualised
under the existential operator: S may believe there exists a shiny thing. The predicative
belief, then, might be de dicto. So, whilst S does not believe <<the glass is shiny>>, it
may still be that S believes <<there is something shiny>>. Thus, the object is concep-
tualised as an existing entity. Whilst it is thinly conceptualised as such, it is nonetheless
conceptualised.
It is quick to see, however, that this reply won’t quite do the trick. For existential
content of the above sort fails to adequately capture the content of the belief. After
all, S may have already formed a belief that something in the world is shiny; it seems
that S has formed a belief that differs in content when spotting the glass. The problem
is particularly pressing, for in the present case the subject is not properly regarded
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as conceptualised; there is nothing about the glass that features in the content of the
belief.
But we may enrol another kind of conceptually thin content to jettison the reply:
demonstrative content. Whilst it may be that S does not conceptualise the subject under
any particular mode, S may well conceptualise the glass as ‘that shiny thing’ or ‘thus
is shiny’.11 This is problematic for Audi, as now the relevant predicative belief may be
translated into a propositional notation, as follows:
16. S believes <that is shiny>.
In response, Audi may resist the notion of demonstrative content—he would not
be the first. But that gives rise to an alternative objection: We will have failed to
distinguish propositional from predicative belief, for if there are plausibly cases of
predicative belief in which we do not conceptualise the subject, then there are plausibly
cases of propositional belief in which the same holds. Namely, those declaratives that
appear to make reference to demonstrative content. After all, one can believe <that
is shiny>, as in 16, whilst the ‘that’ represents a demonstrative. Or, to take a fairly
standard kind of case, Harry may believe <that is watching him>, without believing
anything about the particular that is doing the watching. The first difference, then,
is merely apparent. Either all beliefs involve conceptualisation of the belief’s object,
or else propositional beliefs, just like predicative beliefs, may not conceptualise the
subject.
I turn now to the second purported difference, which concerns the extent to which
the beliefs in question are truth-apt. He writes:
Propositional beliefs are (1) true or false, depending on whether p—say ‘that
the font is weighted’—is true or false, [...] [u]nlike propositional beliefs,
predicative (objectual) beliefs have a significant degree of indefiniteness
in virtue of which it can be misleading to call them true or false. They
are accurate or inaccurate, depending on whether what one believes of the
object (such as that it is rectangular) is or is not true of it. (Ibid, p. 32)
In support, he considers the following kind of case:
Noisey Fan Samantha, a young child, attributes the property ‘noise maker’
to a fan. She believes the fan to be making noise. However, Samantha is
too young to know what a fan is.
11For more on demonstrative content, see McDowell (1994a, 1998), Kelly (2001), Peacocke (2001), Tye
(2006), and Wright (2003).
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His contention is that whilst Samantha’s belief is to an extent, ‘correct’, or ‘right’,
that it lacks the required specificity to be correct or right in virtue of its being true. The
possession of a semantic value requires sharp determinacy, which Samantha’s belief
lacks. Thus, Samantha’s belief is not truth-apt. He writes:
[S]he truly believes it to be making noise. She is, then, right about it. But
this holds even if she has no specific concept of what it is that is making the
noise. (Ibid, 31)
It follows that her belief does not express a proposition, for all propositions are
truth-apt. Thus, PRB is, it seems again, false.
But we should ask: Why are we to think that Samantha’s belief cannot be true?
That much is not clear. The reason Audi cites is that it is not determinate enough
to take a semantic content. He appears to be suggesting as follows: Because there is
nothing that Samantha conceptualises the object under, she cannot have true or false
belief about it. But this is patently false, so long as we allow demonstrative content.
Interestingly, this is exactly what Audi does in the above passage: He attributes truth
to a belief—the belief <it is making noise>. If the ‘it’ denotes demonstrative content,
then its truth conditions are as clear as day. The belief is true just in case the referent of
the demonstrative bears the attributed property. So Audi owes us a stronger account
of why the belief is indeterminate, and in what sense it is.
An alternative argument might run as follows. The content of a predicative belief
cannot be true, for the content is presented under a non-declarative form. Thus,
Samantha’s belief may be correct, in the sense that other non-declarative speech acts
(i.e., ‘Get out of my house and never come back!’) may be correct. But the belief cannot,
due to its non-declarative form, be true or false. So, there is a difference between the
two: The content of propositional beliefs must be true or false predicative beliefs need
not. We should note, however, that this view is viciously circular, at least vis-á-vis PRB.
To say that predicative beliefs are devoid of declarative content is itself to reject PRB;
it thus cannot be used against the requirement. And in any case, that would require
that such beliefs are never true. But that is patently false. Georgia may truly see the
grass to be green, Sally may truly see Harry to be the useless chump that he is.
So far, I have outlined and rejected the first motivation Audi gives for the rejection
of PRB; namely that there are predicative beliefs, which are beliefs that do not take
propositions as their intentional objects. I looked at two ways that predicative beliefs
are purported to differ. I argued both differences were merely apparent. In the absence
of a difference in properties, appeals to Leibniz’ law must be revoked. That deals with
his first argument. In what remains, I outline Audi’s second argument against PRB.
The second argument involves a parallel with perception. He writes:
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Notice that just as we may speak of perceiving that and perceiving to be
— which imply corresponding kinds of beliefs, we may speak of believing
that something is so and, by contrast, believing a thing to be such-and-such.
(31)
It is worth briefly drawing out two claims here. Put schematically, they are as
follows:
(α) For all cases c, S sees <x is such-and-such> in c only if S believes <x is
such-and-such> in c.
(β) For all cases c, S sees ‘x to be such-and-such’ in c only if S believes ‘x to
be such-and-such’ in c.
Both may be doubted. It may be argued, for instance, that there is some case c, such
that S sees a stick to be bent in c, without believing the stick to be bent in c. For example,
if one is aware of the illusion. Even if seeing is knowing, it is not obvious that knowing
implies believing.12 But for present purposes let us grant Audi the schemata’s validity.
Audi’s claim is as follows. Suppose that in a case c, S does not believe that p. He claims
that:
(γ) Possibly, there is a case c* in which S sees ‘x to be such-and-such’ and
not <x is such-and-such>.
where c* is alike in all respects to c except with respect to S’s seeing. It will follow, given
(β), that S believes x to be such-and-such, but it will not, at least from the schemata
above, follow that S believes <x is such-and-such> in c. He gives the following case in
support:
Planetarium Millie believes herself to be in a planetarium. She is incorrect;
she is in an open-air theatre. She sees the moon to be bright. However,
Millie does not see that the moon is bright.13
Why is it correct to say, of Millie, that she sees the moon to be bright, without seeing
that the moon is bright? The purported answer is as follows. Millie does not believe
that the moon is full, for she falsely believes that what she is seeing is not the moon.
As he notes, Millie ‘sees the moon and its fullness while falsely thinking that [she] is in a
planetarium, and so does not believe either that the moon is full or that it is the moon [she] sees’.
12Cf. (Williamson, 2000).
13In the original, Audi speaks of Millie seeing the moon to be full. I modified the case to ‘bright’, as it
is unclear that Millie will see the moon to be full if she does not believe herself to be looking at the moon,
but she will believe herself to be looking at something bright, irrespective of whether it is the moon.
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That negates the consequent of the relevant instance of (β). The falsity of the
antecedent then follows: Millie does not believe <The moon is bright>. Nonetheless,
Millie believes the moon to be bright. She does not know it is the moon see believes to
be bright, but she nonetheless believes the moon to be bright. So, it follows that:
17. Millie believes the moon to be bright, and Millie does not believe <the
moon is bright>.
which gives us the negation of PRB; there are cases of predicative, non-propositional
belief.
Should we accept the argument? We should not. For the argument that Millie
does not believe <the moon is bright> rests on an intensional reading of the belief
ascription, whilst the argument that Millie does believe the moon to be bright rests
on an extensional reading. Put in the same context, the case no longer serves as a
counterexample. For whilst it is true that Millie (extensionally) sees the moon to be
bright, we may rerun the same point: Millie does not believe it is the moon she sees,
for she believes herself to be in a planetarium. So, whilst she believes:
18. The moon to be bright.
read extensionally, she does not believe 18 read intensionally. Rather, on an intensional
reading, she is perhaps better characterised as believing:
19. The computer-generated image to be bright.
but her belief in 19 is now plausibly just a matter of her believing the fine-grained
proposition:
20. <<The computer-generated image is bright>>.
It is commonplace to attribute beliefs to agents in an extensional context. The
attribution may be true, even if the content of the belief, the mode under which the
content is presented, differs for the agent in question. So Audi’s case may be interpreted
along those lines. Millie may not believe that she is looking at the moon, but she may
nonetheless believe <The moon is bright>, or the moon to be bright. If so, we have
no reason to suppose that seeing the moon to be bright does not imply believing <the
moon is bright>. Audi’s argument rests on a fallacious contextual shift. Thus, we have
no reason to reject PRB.
In this section, I looked at two arguments given by Audi to reject what I called the
‘propositional requirement on belief’. Both revolved around the notion of predicative
belief. The first was that there are sufficient differences between the two kinds of
belief, the second was that, by analogy with perception, there are cases of believing
in the predicative sense, which do not entail believing in the propositional sense. I
argued that both fail. In the absence of a compelling argument, we should accept the
propositional requirement on belief. That deals with aim [5.2].
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5.2 Belief as Dispositional
Above I defended the view that belief is necessarily a propositional attitude. The
defence rested essentially on the intentionality of the attitude—its featuring in contexts
in which the logical rules of substitution break down, and the notion of demonstrative
content. I turn now to the third and final aim of this chapter, to outline the relationship
between belief and dispositions.
5.2.1 Simple behaviourism
Belief is a dispositional state. Whilst philosophers are well known for their disagree-
ment, philosophers of all kinds have come to share the view that belief is, in some
sense, essentially dispositional. Of course, beliefs are not any old disposition—rather
they are a kind of behavioural disposition. Here are some historical endorsements, first
from Quine:
For all the liveliness and fluctuation of beliefs, believing is not an activity.
It is not like scansion or long division. [...] Nor is it a fit or a mood, like
joy or grief or astonishment. It is not something that we feel while it lasts.
Rather, believing is a disposition that can linger latent and unobserved. It is
a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issues arise.
(Quine, 1970, p. 10)
and second from Ryle:
Certainly, to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesitant
in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people’s
assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements to the contrary, in drawing
consequences to the contrary, and so forth. But it is also to be prone to skate
warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disaster and to warn
other skaters. It is a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves,
as well as to have certain feelings. (Ryle, 1949, p. 135)
Both Ryle and Quine come to the same conclusion, though the theoretical backdrop
of their claims could not differ more starkly. On Quine’s view, dispositions were
‘placeholders’ for scientifically respectable concepts; on Ryle’s, to attribute existence
to dispositions—and thereby states of belief—was none other than to commit gross
category error. Dispositional ascriptions did not serve the function of reference. Rather,
they served as ‘inference tickets’; warrants from assertions to assertions.
On this view, which we may think of as the simple dispositional account, beliefs are
to be straightforwardly identified with behavioural dispositions. To possess a belief
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is to be in some dispositional state. Moreover, dispositional properties can be said to
individuate belief-content pairs. What distinguishes beliefs that p from, say, beliefs
that q are those dispositions agents who hold the belief bears. What makes two beliefs
that p the same is that agents in those states share certain dispositional properties. We
can put these two claims explicitly as follows:
Simple Behaviourism
1. Possession Condition
For all propositions p, there exists a unique behavioural disposi-
tional property D, such that for all agents S, S believes that p iff.
DS.
2. Individuation Conditions
2.1 Sameness Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the same content just in
case they bestow the same behavioural dispositional properties
on their bearers.
2.2 Difference Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have distinct content just in case
they bestow the distinct behavioural dispositional properties on
their bearers.
What is a behavioural disposition? As I understand it, behaviour may be re-
garded as any in principle observable movement of the agent in question, where that
movement is, to use an inadequete turn of phrase ‘under one’s control’. Thus, non-
intentional breathing is not a behaviour; intentional breathing is. It will be helpful, for
what follows, to distinguish two kinds of behaviour: verbal behaviour, which includes
sayings, writings, and other forms of communication, and non-verbal behaviour, which
includes any kind of behaviour not counted as verbal.
If belief is a behavioural disposition, then quite clearly we should not interpret belief
to be a canonical disposition, but rather a conventional disposition. Perhaps this is what
Armstrong had in mind when, in the preceding chapter, he argued that beliefs differ
from dispositions in that they are not individuated with respect to certain stimuli
and/or manifestations. Why so? The answer is not hard to come by. Take Smith’s
belief with the content <the volcano is erupting>. There are a wide range of canonical
dispositions that are indicative of holding that belief. Crucially, they differ drastically
in their stimuli and manifestations. For instance, if Smith will be disposed to upon
being asked ‘what should we do?’, reply ‘get under the tables!’, and upon seeing pillars
of smoke, to run for cover, and so on. So states of belief must be ‘reduced down’ to
different canonical behavioural dispositions, however that is to be achieved.
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But importantly, it will not follow that people will behave in those ways, at least
given the view sketched in part I—not even counterfactually. All that is required is
that they could be caused to do so. Now, it may be thought that this would severely
diminish the explanatory power of the account. After all, if all that ascriptions of belief
entail are nomological possibilities, how could we possibly get the kind of explanatory
power and predictive success from the theoretical framework that we in fact do? This
is a strong objection. The behaviourist may reply that the dispositions have to be
‘sufficiently stable’, whatever that amounts to. Thus, it must be that one could easily,
say, run upon seeing pillars of smoke, or buy flowers upon seeing them if one believes
that is one’s lover’s desire. We do speak of strengths of belief, so this is not an altogether
implausible route to follow. Nevertheless, a simpler reply is readily available. Namely:
The kind of causal relations relevant to dispositional ascriptions are typically robust.
Thus, in the absence of interferences with the causal basis, the relevant causal relations
will typically satisfy the relevant counterfactuals. So whilst all that is demanded is a
possibility, it is a causal possibility, and it is in virtue of the casual requirement that
mental states may bear explanatory force in behavioural explanans.
Now, if it is true that dispositions are non-identical to their causal bases, and the
causal bases are, to put it crudely ‘bits of brains’, then it will follow that dispositions
are non-identical to bits of brains. Nonetheless, it remains open that they are higher-
order properties of bits of brains—the claim is only that so long as states of mind
are dispositionally classified, no identity relation will hold between mind and body.
Rather, on the causal contingent account, beliefs would be, as Goodman feared, modal
properties of agents.
What might motivate the simple view? Why should we think, for example, that
to believe <The ice is dangerously thin> just is to be disposed to exhibit a range of
behaviour, i.e., careful treading, warning peers, and so on. In what follows I support
the account. I will give a range of prima facie motivations for the account. First, we
have four behavioural reasons. They are as follows:
B-Reason 1 If S believes p, then S will typically be disposed to behave in
certain ways. For example, if Billie believes that there are bad men out to get
him, then Billie will typically be disposed, under certain circumstances, to
draw the blinds, to check electrical devices for bugs, and to monitor phone
conversations with care.
B-Reason 2 If S and S* have the same beliefs, then they will typically be
disposed to behave in the same way. If Billie and Willie believe that there
are bad men out to get them, then Billie and Willie will typically both be
disposed to, under similar circumstances, draw the blinds, check for bugs,
and so on.
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B-Reason 3 If S and S* differ with respect to whether they believe that p, then
they will typically be disposed to behave in different ways. If Willie believes
that there are bad men out to get him, but Billie does not, then whilst Willie
will typically be disposed to draw the blinds, and check for bugs, in certain
conditions, Billie will not.
B-Reason 4 If S changes their beliefs, then S will typically change their
behaviour. If Willie believes that bad men are out to get him, but then
comes to be convinced by Billie that he is just being paranoid, then he will
typically no longer be disposed to draw the blinds, etc.
Second, we have two epistemological reasons. They are as follows:
E-Reason 1 We can come to know what agents believe, by observing their
behavioural manifestations. Billie can know that Willie believes there are
bad men out to get him by watching him draw the blinds, check for bugs,
and so on. Similarly, we can know what agents do not believe via the same
process. If the vicar lives a life of hedonism and debauchery, we may come
to doubt their faith.
E-Reason 2 We can predict people’s behaviour by knowing their beliefs. If
Billie knows that Willie believes there are bad men out to get him, then he
can successfully predict that he will behave in a paranoid fashion.
None of these are decisive. My point is not to defend the view fully, but to outline
why one might be tempted to hold it. The reasons given at least appear to present strong
prima facie evidence for Simple Behaviourism. Moreover, they present stronger evidence
for the view, virtually platitudinous in contemporary theorising, that the concepts of
mind form a folk explanatory framework. We employ the conceptual apparatus of mind
to explain why so-and-so did such-and-such, and to predict what so-and-so will do
given that certain conditions obtain.
A further positive upshot of the simple account is its ability to demarcate beliefs that
differ in their presentational modes. For it may be thought that beliefs which express
the same proposition, but present under distinct modes, are identical with respect
to certain ‘core’ behavioural dispositions, but non-identical with respect to certain
‘peripheral’ behavioural dispositions, such as certain verbal dispositions. Take for
example the belief <<Hesperus is bright>> and the belief <<Phosphorus is bright>>.
One who believes<<Hesperus is bright>>, but not<<Phosphorus is bright>>, will be
disposed to assent to requests such as, ‘could you tell me whether Hesperus is bright?’
but not to ‘could you tell me whether Phosphorus is bright?’ But believers who hold
just one will be united, perhaps, in their disposition to point to Venus, if asked to point
to a bright star.
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Further support for Simple Behaviourism may be found by considering several ways
in which beliefs are structurally similar to other dispositional concepts. In particular,
as noted above by Quine, beliefs like dispositions ‘lie latent’. Consider a lump of sugar.
The solubility of the lump is amongst its dispositional properties, but it does not reveal
itself at all times, but only once its stimulus conditions have been satisfied; in this case,
when the lump is placed in water. At that time, the disposition comes out of hiding—It
manifests. Analogously, a belief may lit latent, and need not manifest in behaviour at
any given time at which it is possessed. Rather, it need only manifest when certain
stimulus condition obtain. Consider Audi:
It is probably uncontroversial that the property of believing [...] is disposi-
tional rather than occurrent. [...] Take believing that I am a conscientious
citizen. This is, in part, being disposed to say that I am one, under condi-
tions that elicit that sort of verbal manifestation of my belief, such as your
asking me whether I intend to vote. Yet I have this belief in dreamless sleep,
just as sugar can be soluble while in a solid, unaltered lump. By contrast,
to have an occurrent property (at least for mental properties) is to be doing,
undergoing, or experiencing something. (Audi, 2013, pp. 30-31)
Audi makes use here of the dispositional/occurrent dichotomy. Beliefs are not
occurrent, on this view, in the sense that to believe p, one’s belief need not be manifesting
in any sense. Rather confusingly, this same distinction has been employed to denote a
quite different dichotomy. Examples may be found in the following passages, the first
from Armstrong:
Beliefs are states of the mind which, so far from us being currently conscious
of, we need not even know that we possess. (Other people, or we ourselves
at a later date, may postulate their existence in order to explain some feature
of our observed conduct or our mental life). Nevertheless, a belief can be a
content of consciousness. It can be ‘before our mind’. (Armstrong, 1973, p.
21)
the second from Mumford:
Occurrent and dispositional states of belief can be distinguished. Occurrent
beliefs are mental events, such as John’s belief at 3 o’clock on Thursday that
he is being watched. Dispositional beliefs are more enduring states that
can be ascribed over longer periods of time and need not be currently
entertained for the ascription to be true. (Mumford, 1998, p. 7)
the third from Cummins:
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There is a familiar distinction of common sense and philosophy between
beliefs that one has but is not currently aware of—“dormant beliefs” if you
will—and beliefs that are “currently present to consciousness.” (Cummins,
1983, p. 77)
The dichotomy Mumford, Armstrong, and Cummins have in mind is distinct from
that carved above. It is more akin to Hume’s distinction that employs the same
terms,14. Call a belief that is occurrent in this way ‘Hume-occurrent’. Call a belief that
is occurrent in the previous sense ‘Audi-occurrent’. Hume-occurrence differs from
Audi-occurrence, for whilst the former implies the latter, the converse fails. Hume-
occurrence is just one way that a belief may be Audi-occurrent, for a belief’s being
‘before the mind’ is, at most, only one kind of way in which a belief may manifest.
Here is a case to elucidate. Suppose that Sally believes that chocolate cake is bad for
her health. She may believe this, even if she does not spend all of her time reflecting on
the proposition. We might think, in contrast, that it ‘sits in her mind’ in some sense and
perhaps only comes to the forefront when she has perceptual experiences of chocolate
cake. She only Hume-occurrently believes that chocolate cake is bad for her health
when she sees a tempting slice. But beliefs may manifest in her behaviour in all sorts
of ways that arguably do not require the belief to be ‘before the mind’. Put another
way: A belief may manifest in behaviour, in the absence of the believer’s conscious
reflection on its content.
For example:
Good Catch Katy knocks a glass she believes to be precious from the cup-
board. Without thinking, Katy catches the glass before it smashes on the
marble surface.
In Good Catch, Katy may be said to manifest her belief that the glass is valuable.
But she may not consciously attend to that belief; it may be said to exhibit in her
behaviour without being accessible to reflective thought. We might, then, take the
conscious/unconscious distinction to be a subset of the manifestations the belief gives
rise to. Not all manifestations of dispositions involve conscious reflection, but all
conscious reflections on beliefs are doxastic manifestations.
Whilst the distinction is good, I would like to suggest that certain purported impli-
cations of the latency of belief are wrong-headed to draw. In particular, it appears that
the distinction has resulted in the attribution of far more beliefs to agents than they in
fact hold. One clear example may be found in the following passage from Lycan:
14See (Hume, 1739, Bk I, Part I, Sec. 7).
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At this moment (even as I write), my wife Mary believes that my tie looks
like a prize from the country fair coconut shy. This harsh observation oc-
curred to her a few seconds ago, and she has just voiced it. [...] My wife
also believes a number of other things, or so we might routinely suppose:
that she is less than eighteen feet tall, that 10,329 < 10,328, and that snow
in Stockholm does not instantaneously turn bright orange when it hits the
ground. (Lycan, 1986, p. 61)
Lycan’s contention here is that Mary explicitly believes that her husband’s tie looks
like a prize from the country fair coconut shy, but merely tacitly believes the proposition
concerning Swedish snow. We should note that there are two ways this case may
be read, that concern which propositions one counts as tacitly believing on Lycan’s
account.15 To see that, consider Mary’s belief <Mary is less than eighteen feet tall>.
On the one hand, Lycan may be read as suggesting that Mary has in fact formed the
belief, perhaps due to actively considering whether or not her own height is more or
less than eighteen feet. On the other, let us suppose that Mary counts as unconsciously
holding the belief on the basis of simply knowing that she is under six foot tall, and
that six feet is shorter than eighteen feet.
The example suggests the latter. But this permits the possession of an overwhelming
number of beliefs, and thus Lycan’s account appears to commit us to the view that we
have far more beliefs than we might commonly suppose. For Mary will be counted
as having infinite corresponding beliefs, where she believes that she is not over n feet
tall, where the value of n > 18. This should give us pause. We do not obviously have
infinite beliefs. It is plausible that most of our beliefs are not occurrent at any given
time, perhaps even that there are some beliefs we have never, and perhaps will never,
bring to conscious attention. But to commit to that should not require commitment to
our holding an infinite number of beliefs.
How, then, might we explain Lycan’s example away? Now following Audi, I
suggest that Mary does not believe <Mary is less than eighteen feet tall>, but rather
she is merely disposed to believe <Mary is less than eighteen feet tall>. As he notes:
Antecedent belief of the propositions in question, believing them before be-
ing asked whether we do, is also the readiest explanation of why we answer
the questions affirmatively without having to think about them. These con-
siderations incline many people to attribute to us far more beliefs than, in
my judgment, we have. Antecedent belief may be the readiest explanation
of our spontaneous answers, but it is not the best explanation. I contend
that, here, what may seem to be antecedently held but as yet unarticulated
15Cummins (1983, p. 7) gives a similar example: The belief that crocodiles do not wear silk pajamas.
5.2. BELIEF AS DISPOSITIONAL 127
dispositional beliefs are really something quite different: dispositions to
believe. (Audi, 1994)
The basic view is as follows. Mary may be quick to answer questions, such as
whether she is less than eighteen feet tall, but this need not imply that she in fact
believes that she is. There are, in contrast, some beliefs that we can form quickly, and
without significant cognitive effort.
An opponent may object: But if beliefs are dispositional, does Mary not have the
relevant dispositions here? If she were to be asked whether she was less than eighteen
feet, for instance, she would respond positively. But this objection rests on a confusion.
For Mary does not have the disposition in such a case; rather she is disposed to gain
the disposition, given certain stimuli. Put another way: Mary has a predisposition to
enter into a dispositional state. For analogy, darkening glasses have the disposition to
enter into a kind of dispositional state; upon being hit by sunlight, they are disposed
to alter their properties in such a way as to be disposed to reflect light differently. But
they do not bear the latter disposition until they have undergone such a change. They
are disposed to alter their dispositional properties. So too for Mary; she does not believe
the proposition, but she is disposed to do so. She is disposed to enter a dispositional
state—The state of belief.
5.2.2 Armstrong’s three differences
So far in this section, I have detailed several lines of support for what I called Simple
Behaviourism, which takes belief possession to be coextensive with the possession of
certain behavioural dispositions. I turn now to my third aim: To outline and reject three
purported differences between dispositions and states of belief. All three are given by
Armstrong (1973). The first concerns the nature of dispositional stimulus conditions,
the second dispositional manifestations, and the third the recombinant character of
content. Each will be taken in turn.
Difference 1. The first Armstrong considers concerns dispositional stimulus con-
ditions. He writes:
One point of distinction between dispositions such as brittleness, is that
the concept of the former involves the notion of an initiating cause of a
certain sort which triggers off the manifestation. The brittle glass is brittle
because it breaks when hit. A piece of sugar is soluble because it dissolves
when placed in water. But the concept of belief seems to involve no notion of
a class of initiating causes which in turn bring about the manifestation of
expression of the belief. No doubt initiating causes will always be present
when the belief is manifested. But they play no special role in the concept
of belief. (Armstrong, 1973, p. 16)
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The purported difference is as follows: (1) prototypical dispositional concepts are
individuated in terms of their stimulus conditions, whereas (2) the concept of belief
is not. I do not disagree with the latter, but I do disagree with the former. For
take Armstrong’s own example: It is not just hitting that counts as the stimulus for
brittleness. It could be striking, twisting, dropping on (or throwing at) a hard surface.
It could even be a sufficiently loud voice, appropriately pitched. It may be argued that
the various stimuli above may be classified in terms of the exertion of some kind of
force. But that, it should be noted, cannot be part of the meaning of the dispositional
concept; it was discovered that all relevant stimuli admitted of such classification, it was
not part of the concept of brittleness. So, there appears no reason to suppose that this
gives us a genuine distinction between the concept of belief, and other dispositional
concepts.
Difference 2. The second concerns not dispositional stimulus conditions, but rather
dispositional manifestations. Consider:
If brittleness is manifested, it can be manifested in only one sort of way:
the brittle object breaking if stuck. But there is no one such way that a
belief that the earth is flat must manifest itself, if it does manifest itself. For
instance, the manifestations may not take the form of outer or inner assent.
(Armstrong, 1973, p. 17)
Again, this claim is not obviously true, not on the belief front, but on the brittleness
front. For brittleness can manifest in a wide range of ways: A brittle glass may crack,
shatter, splinter, and so on. Or take another dispositional concept: Fragility. Kneecaps,
fine china teapots, and old parchments are fragile, but they manifest their fragility in a
wide range of ways. So beliefs are not unlike, but rather very much like dispositions in
that regard.
Difference 3. The third difference may be found in the following passage:
In the case of beliefs, as opposed to dispositions like brittleness, it seems
that the states involved must have a certain internal structure. Suppose that
A believes (i) the cat is on the mat; (ii) the cat is asleep; (iii) the cat is black.
These three beliefs, although all different, involve a common element. Now
if we take beliefs to be states of the believer, must we not take it that these
states have an internal structure such that to common elements in the thing
believed correspond common elements in the state which is the belief? [...]
How otherwise could beliefs with different content give rise to different
manifestations or expressions? (Armstrong, 1973, p. 18)
Armstrong’s phrasing relies upon the identity theory, which we have already re-
jected, but it may be re-cast in ontologically neutral terms. Armstrong may demand
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instead that the causal bases bear an ‘internal structure’ that explains the similarity in
their manifestations. Nevertheless, the argument fails. Here is why. First, note that
the passage makes the following three claims:
21. The difference in the relevant manifestations of beliefs that differ in
content can only be explained by differences in the internal structure of
their causal bases.
22. Where beliefs have similar contents, their causal bases must be similar
in some respect.
23. Dispositions like brittleness need not have a certain internal structure.
21 seems plausible enough. But what about 22 and 23? First, it is not obvious
what 23 is supposed to amount to: Does he mean distinct objects that are brittle? To
show there is a genuine difference here, Armstrong needs to give us other dispositions
that have a common element, where those dispositions do not require an ‘internal
structure’.16
But even granted that one can be found, 22 appears straightforwardly false. Put
another way: There is an answer to his rhetorical question. As Hurley puts it, Arm-
strong’s claim rests on something akin to a vehicle/content confusion. Consider:
The assumption that the processes that support true thought must have
a classical architecture (even if they are implemented by a connectionist
network) imposes a requirement of causal systematicity on thought. On its
face, this looks like a vehicle/content confusion. (?, p. 1)
There is no requirement that the structure of the vehicles of content be isomorphic
with the purported structure of the psychological attitudes. Here is an example to
show why. Consider the following case from Dretske:
Basketball Play “Let this dime on the table be Oscar Robertson, let this
nickel (heads uppermost) be Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, and let this nickel (tails
uppermost) be the opposing center. These pieces of popcorn are the other
players, and this glass is the basket. With this bit of stage setting I can now,
by moving coins and popcorn around on the table, represent the positions
and movements of these players. I can use these objects to describe a
basketball play I once witnessed.” (Dretske, 1988, pp. 52-53)
16Incidentally, it is not obvious why Armstrong accepts 23., given his acceptance of a type-type identity
theory.
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Suppose that we design a machine that represents the players in Basketball Play, and
moves pieces of popcorn and dimes to represent the players on court. Does it follow
that each of the movements it represents that are similar must realised similarly in
machine? For instance, let the court’s perimeter be denoted by ABCD, one corner per
letter. Suppose that x moves from A to B, and y from C to D. There are geometrically
similar properties between the movements. But the machine may track movements
from A to C using a distinct mechanism from the way in which it tracks movements
from B to D. And so it seems to follow that there need be no similarity in the structure
between that which represents phenomenon that are similar content-wise. And that
something like this is going on with belief, I contend, is at least conceptually possible.
So it is far from obvious that this supports the view that beliefs differ from standard
cases of dispositions.17
In this section, I took a brief first look at the claim that belief is a dispositional state.
I outlined what I called Simple Behaviourism, and then gave it support. I then outlined
and rejected three purported differences, raised by Armstrong, between beliefs and
other dispositions. That deals with the final aim, [5.3].
Conclusion
In this chapter, I had the following aims:
[5.1] To outline the attitude of belief.
[5.2] To defend the propositional requirement on belief.
[5.3] To outline contemporary theorising on the relationship between dis-
positions and beliefs.
which have now been satisfied. In the first section, I outlined the attitude of belief, and
defended the ‘propositional requirement on belief’ from an argument given by Robert
Audi. In the second section, I provided a preliminary account of the view that belief
is dispositional. Finally, I offered defence of the account, and rejected three differences
between dispositions and beliefs given by Armstrong.




According to what I called Simple Behaviourism, beliefs are behavioural dispositions.
Nowadays, dispositional accounts of belief—at least of that form—are highly unpop-
ular. If beliefs are not behavioural dispositions, what are they? Whilst there is hardly
unanimous agreement, orthodoxy dictates that if we are to be dispositionalist about
states of belief, then we ought to be functionalists. As we shall see, whilst that may
require that beliefs have certain dispositional properties, there is no straightforward
identification between beliefs and those dispositions.
Whilst the doctrine is met with widespread scepticism, there is a sense in which
functionalism has become the default model of mind. And that is bad news, I say.
And I say that is bad news because functionalism in the philosophy of mind is not
just false—it presents a radically inaccurate conception of mental states. My gripe
concerns the functionalist’s commitment to spatiotemporal individuation of mental
phenomena. To be individuated functionally is to be individuated in terms of causal
roles. And that requires spatiotemporal existence. And the very notion that mental
states are spatiotemporal has, I believe, misled many philosophers of mind.
In this chapter I am going to defend a dispositional account of belief. To say
that S believes p, on the view to be developed, is akin to saying S is flammable,
fragile, or (perhaps less surprisingly) irascible. The account will be close, though non-
equivalent, to Simple Behaviourism. I call it Complex Behaviourism. The basic thrust is
as follows: The arguments against a dispositional conception of belief are weaker than
many have assumed, and the arguments against functionalism are stronger than many
have assumed.
Here are the aims of the chapter:
[6.1] To outline two kinds of ‘functional analysis’.
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[6.2] To outline Functionalism in the philosophy of mind, and to argue that
it is more plausible than Simple Behaviourism.
[6.3] To outline and support Complex Behaviourism, and to argue that it is
more plausible than Functionalism.
Here is the structure. There are two sections. In the first, I deal with [6.1] and [6.2]. I
outline two kinds of ‘functional analysis’, and outline functionalism in the philosophy
of mind, showing that it is more plausible than Simple Behaviourism. In the second
section, I deal with [6.3]. I outline an argument given by Helen Steward (1997) against
the spatiotemporality of mental states, and an alternative novel argument that employs
the notion of plural realisation discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, I outline and defend
complex behaviourism.
6.1 Functionalism
In this section, I deal with aims [6.1] and [6.2]. There are two subsections, one for
each respective aim. In the first, I outline and distinguish two kinds of ‘functional
analysis’. I call them F-analysis and D-analysis. In the second, I outline functionalism
in the philosophy of mind, and show that it relies upon the notion that mind can be
F-analysed.
6.1.1 Functional analysis
Suppose you were to stumble upon some mysterious long-lost artefact. You investigate
the artefact, and come to learn that it exhibits some kind of behaviour—perhaps it
glows when the sun strikes its flattest face. An inquisitive mind may ask: How does
it work? And one way of answering that question is to perform what Cummins calls
a ‘functional analysis’. Painted with a broad brush:
Functional analysis consists in analysing a disposition into a number of less
problematic dispositions such that programmed manifestation of these ana-
lyzing dispositions amounts to a manifestation of the analyzed disposition.
(Cummins, 1983, p. 28)
According to Cummins, functional analyses takes two forms. For reasons that
should become obvious, I will reserve the term ‘functional analysis’ (or F-analysis)
for the first. The second, also for reasons that should become obvious, I will call
‘dispositional analysis’ (or D-analysis). Let us take each in turn.
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F-analysis
F-analysis involves a two-step process. The first step Cummins calls ‘system analysis’.
System analyses are mereological: To provide a system analysis of x is to break x down
into its component parts. The second stage involves the determination of dispositions
those parts bear that, when manifesting in unison, give rise to the relevant dispositions
that are to be explained. For instance, if we wanted to know how a has the disposition
to glow once sun strikes its face, one may deconstruct a, and attempt to understand
how its parts work together to give rise to that disposition. He gives another illustrative
case:
Assembly-line production provides a transparent example of what I mean.
Production is broken down into a number of distinct tasks. Each point
on the line is responsible for a certain task, and it is the function of the
workers/machines at that point to complete that task. If the line has the
capacity to produce the product, it has it in virtue of the fact that the work-
ers/machines have the capacities to perform their designated tasks, and in
virtue of the fact that when these tasks are performed in a certain orga-
nized way—according to a certain program—the finished product results.
(Cummins, 1975, p. 760)
It is worth noting that it is not only entities naturally construed as systems that
admit of functional analysis. A glass’ fragility is functionally analysable, but a glass
is not naturally construed as a complex system. Suppose we take a particular glass
that is fragile; it will be fragile in virtue of its molecules being bonded in a certain
fashion. Now, when the disposition manifests (i.e., the glass smashes) the molecules,
given their bonding, are disposed to behave in certain ways. When the bonds break
a chain reaction is set off which results in the breaking of further molecular bonds. It
is this manifestation which is causally responsible for the shattering of the glass. So
we can explain the fragility of the glass by breaking down the glass into its molecular
components, and citing the dispositions of those components.
Once the relevant parts have been isolated, and their dispositional properties have
been determined, the functional analysis is complete. Now, as presented, functional
analysis is just a method of explaining how an individual entity has certain disposi-
tional properties, but we may classify entities in functional terms also. For instance,
we could take two production lines, and classify any part that bears a certain kind of
dispositional property in terms of its role in the production line taken as a whole. For
example, we could classify all entities that take a specific task on the production line
as ‘labellers’. The membership of such classifications is determined by occupation—or
in some cases the possible occupation—of causal roles.
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Whilst functional analyses are in principle possible, and do occur in the sciences and
elsewhere, in the next chapter I am going to argue that many of the purported functional
classifications typically do not proceed in terms of the actual or possible occupation of
causal roles, but rather in terms of ‘functions’ read teleologically. Membership of the
class of hearts, for instance, or of the classifications relevant to schematic diagrams in
electronics are not individuated in purely causal terms, but in terms of purposes.
D-analysis
To constitute an F-analysans, x must constitute a spatiotemporal part. And that is be-
cause of the first step: Mereological analyses of systems are spatiotemporal analyses.
D-analysis differs from F-analysis in that regard: it involves no system analysis. Nev-
ertheless, there is a sense in which D-analysis bears a mereological component. To
perform a D-analysis of x, one simply explains a complex disposition in terms of the
possession of two or more simpler dispositions of x. Cummins mentions as examples
a cook’s disposition to bake cakes being ‘broken down’ into the other dispositions of
the ‘whole cook’, and the dispositions relevant to the multiplication of 27 and 32 into
the dispositions to multiply 2 and 7, and to add 5 and 1. Similar point may apply to
elasticity. To be elastic, perhaps, is to deform reversibly under stress: This requires
both the disposition to deform, and the disposition to reverse its deformation. In that
sense, elasticity may be thought to be a complex disposition.
As we shall see, it appears to have been almost univocally assumed that functional-
ism in the philosophy of mind involves F-analysis. But as I shall argue, it is D-analysis
that is relevant to the theory of mind, if either at all. And that is no trivial difference:
The two kinds of analysis differ radically in kind. One difference that will become
important in what follows concerns the entities such analyses attribute dispositional
properties to. In an F-analysis, the dispositions are attributed to parts of the analysed
entity. In a D-analysis, in contrast, the dispositions are possessed by the functionally
analysed entity taken as a whole.
So far, I have dealt with [6.1]. I now turn to [6.2], namely to outline functionalism in
the philosophy of mind, and to show that it is a better theory than Simple Behaviourism.
6.1.2 Functionalism
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind subsumes the mental under a more general
theoretical kind. Crudely put, functionalism characterises the mind as a kind of com-
plex system, wherein beliefs, desires, and rest of the attitudes occupy functional roles
that, taken together, result in the myriads of observable human behaviours. In that
sense, functionalism is starkly contrasted with substance dualism. Mental states are
not mental in virtue of their being composed from ‘mental stuff’, they are mental in
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virtue of their having certain causes and effects. Because the occupation of causal roles
is often enough substance-neutral, so too is functionalism. Mental states are mental in
virtue of what they do, not what they are.
Nevertheless, the term ‘functionalism’ when used in the philosophy of mind is
somewhat of a family resemblance term; it denotes a range of theories that are similar
in certain respects, disparate in others. As Block (1978) notes, this is primarily because
such theories are:
the products of a number of rather different projects: attempts to refor-
mulate logical behaviourism to avoid objections, attempts to exploit mind-
machine analogies, attempts to apply empirical psychology to philosophy
of mind, and attempts to argue for—or against—mental-neurological iden-
tity theses. (Block, 1978, p. 261)
We can distinguish those functionalist theories that concern mental state concepts,
and those that concern mental states themselves. The former we call analytic function-
alism, the latter we may call ontological functionalism. The difference is not trivial:
A proponent of the former may reject the advances of the cognitive sciences as an
advancement in our understanding of mental structure. Like Lewis, we may simply
take the concept of mind to be a folk hypothesis, like so many other folk hypotheses,
irredeemably useful, but nonetheless false. In what follows, I will be concerned with
analytic functionalism. I will not be primarily concerned with the relationship of the
concepts of folk psychology to those of the cognitive sciences.1 From now on, the term
‘functionalism’ should be read as ‘analytic functionalism’.
Proponents include Lewis (1966). Armstrong (1968, 1980), Putnam (1960, 1967),
Fodor (1968), and Block and Fodor (1972). Central to the view is that mental concepts
are causal concepts. Armstrong puts it well:
The concept of a mental state is something that is, characteristically, the
cause of certain effects and the effect of certain causes. What sort of effects
and what sort of causes? The effects [...] will be certain patterns of behaviour
of the person in that state [...] The causes of mental states will be objects
and events in the person’s environment. (Armstrong, 1981, p. 22)
Why should we think that mental concepts are causal? I will provide three moti-
vational reasons in favour of the view. Here they are.
1. Causal Ascriptions First of all, we often speak as though mental phenomena
cause behavioural events, and as though non-mental events cause mental events. I’ll
leave the examples to Rundle:
1For interesting discussion, see (Wedgwood, 2006).
136 CHAPTER 6. BELIEF AS DISPOSITIONAL
Much of what we say about the mental appears to be shot through with
causal idioms. Bad news is said to disappoint or depress, a person’s face
to remind us of another, an unusual happening to intrigue or excite us; a
chance remark may make us think of something we were meant to do, and
a thought may set someone off smiling or chuckling; a sudden realization
that a person means ill may send a chill of fear up the spine, and fear may
in turn cause us to tremble or stammer. (Rundle, 1997, p. 1)
It seems to follow that mental concepts are causal concepts.
2. Explanatory Legitimacy On a similar note, further motivation may be found by
considering the fact that mental states often enter (apparently irreplaceably) into the
explanations of events. For example, to the explanation-seeking question:
Q Why did Jones shoot Smith?
we may offer the following explanans:
E Because Jones desired to obtain enough money to pay for his daughter’s
operation, and believed both that Smith was a millionaire and that he was
set to inherit Smith’s fortune.
If mental explanation is a species of causal explanation, then the explanatory force
of E relative to Q is legitimised.2 Beliefs and desires on this view explain behaviour
because they are responsible for that behaviour, in the same way that lower level dis-
positions, or disposition-laden parts may explain the possession of more complex, or
otherwise higher-order dispositional properties.
3. Distal Causation Finally, support may be found through consideration of cases
involving the discovery of distal causes of behaviour. You observe S φ-ing, and
naturally explain S’s φ-ing with reference to S’s believing that p, desiring that q, and
so on. But then you somehow discover that the causal source of S’s φ-ing was in fact
S*, who had cruelly wired S up to a radio-controlled device. Now, in such a case we
would cease to attribute the relevant mental states to S, and attribute them to S*, albeit
with slight variation in content to allow for indexicals and so on. Put another way:
When we discover the causation to be distal, we also take the mental states to be distal.
That would be explained if mental state concepts were a kind of causal concept.
That concludes my defence. Now, it is important to note that whilst functionalists
will agree that mental state concepts are causal concepts, they may disagree on their
extension. We can distinguish at least two positions that may be held on what mental
states are. There are role functionalists, and realiser functionalists. One is a realiser
2This is particularly true if, like Lewis, we hold that all explanations of events are a matter of
providing information about the event’s causal antecedents. See (Lewis, 1986a).
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functionalist just in case one holds that mental states are identical to the occupiers of
some specified causal role. One is a role functionalist, in contrast, if one identifies the
mental state with some second-order property: being such that one has a part that
occupies that causal role.3
For familiar reasons,4 the role functionalist cannot help herself to the considerations
above, as the relevant higher-order properties are relational, and thus causally ineffi-
cacious. In what follows, I am going to argue against functionalism, but my gripe—or
at least not my present gripe—is not with the role-functionalist. Thus, from now on,
when I say ‘functionalism’, I mean not only analytic functionalism, but analytic realiser
functionalism.
If functionalism in the philosophy of mind is true, and mental states are causal
concepts, then mind would more likely be the product of F-analyses rather than D-
analyses. Why so? Well, because dispositions are not causes. Causal bases are causes,
and causal bases are non identical to dispositions.5 And certainly, this fits best with
how philosophers have described functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Fodor will
serve as a vivid example:
What came of it was a new account of the type/token relation for psycho-
logical states: psychological-state tokens were to be assigned to psycho-
logical-state types solely by reference to their causal relations to proximal
stimuli (‘inputs’), to proximal responses (‘outputs’), and to one another.
The advertising claimed two notable virtues for this theory: first, it was
compatible with physicalism in that it permitted tokenings of psychological
states to be identical to tokenings of physical states (and thus to enjoy
whatever causal properties physical states are supposed to have). (Fodor,
1985, p. 82)
On this view, mental states are parts of agents, parts that bear certain dispositional
properties, which when manifesting together give rise to the higher-level behaviour of
agents. Beliefs and desires are the spatiotemporal occupants of causal roles: Parts of a
cognitive system, parts which, when causally interacting, given rise to the plethora of
behaviour human beings exhibit.6
Now, in the second half of this chapter, I am going to argue that this is radically
mistaken, at least with respect to states of belief. I will leave open whether sensational
states—pains, emotions, and so on—are F-analysed. But at best it is D-analysis not
3In fact, this is only a first approximation. For the canonical version, see (Shoemaker, 1981).
4See (Kim, 1989, 1998).
5Some do hold that dispositions are causes, though those who do are typically identity theorists. For
interesting discussion, see (Squires, 1970), (Stevenson, 1969), and (Armstrong, 1969).
6It should be noted that the relevant notion of ‘system’ need not be construed in purely mechanistic
terms. Mental parts may be analogue, like pulleys and levers, but if Fodor is correct, then mental states
are most likely realised computationally.
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F-analysis that is relevant to belief. And the upshot is that beliefs and desires are
dispositions not disposition-laden parts. But for now, I want to briefly show why it is
tempting to suppose that mind admits of an F-analysis.
For a working definition, let us define functionalism about belief. As before, we
will give both possession and individuation conditions:
Functionalism
1. Possession Condition
For all propositions p, there exists a unique functional role R such
that for all agents S, S believes that p if and only if S has a part X
that occupies R.
2. Individuation Conditions
2.1 Sameness Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the same content just in
case they occupy the same causal role.
2.2 Difference Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the distinct content just
in case they occupy distinct causal roles.
In what remains of this section, I am going to argue that Functionalism is more
plausible that Simple Behaviourism which, recall, was defined as follows:
Simple Behaviourism
1. Possession Condition
For all propositions p, there exists a unique behavioural disposi-
tional property D, such that for all agents S, S believes that p iff.
DS.
2. Individuation Conditions
2.1 Sameness Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the same content just in
case they bestow the same behavioural dispositional properties
on their bearers.
2.2 Difference Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have distinct content just in case
they bestow the distinct behavioural dispositional properties on
their bearers.
Now then, wherein lies Functionalism’s theoretical advantage? I will offer two
reasons to accept Functionalism over Simple Behaviourism. Here they are:
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A. Inter-Mental Causation Functionalism is a better theory than Simple Behaviourism
because it is able to accommodate the phenomenon of inter-mental causation. Accord-
ing to Simple Behaviourism, the dispositional properties are behavioural. I was rather
liberal on what ‘behavioural’ meant—verbal and non-verbal behaviour was to be
counted. Now, the problem is that the characteristic effects/causes of mental states are
often enough the entering and/or exiting of other mental states. Inference provides a
transparent example. To believe that no prime number greater than 5 ends in a 5 is, in
part, to infer that n is not prime, upon discovering that n is both greater than and ends
in a 5. Similarly, the belief that wealthy people have more satisfying lives may result
in the desire to be wealthy.
Simple Behaviourism cannot obviously accommodate this insight, as the entering
and/or exiting of mental states are not behavioural events. In contrast, Functionalism
can. Mental parts may cause and/or be caused by the creation and/or destruction
of other mental parts. Moreover, Functionalism provides an excellent account of
inferences. Inference is a kind of causal process, where mental parts engage in the
reconstruction of one’s cognitive architecture.
B. Dispositional Holism Functionalism is also a better theory than Simple Be-
haviourism because it is able to account for the holistic nature of mental dispositions,
and of the holistic nature of mental explanation. To make the idea clear, consider again
the following two reasons offered in support of Simple Behaviourism in the previous
chapter:
B-Reason 1 If S believes p, then S will typically be disposed to behave in
certain ways. For example, if Billie believes that there are bad men out to get
him, then Billie will typically be disposed, under certain circumstances, to
draw the blinds, to check electrical devices for bugs, and to monitor phone
conversations with care.
B-Reason 2 If S and S* have the same beliefs, then they will typically be
disposed to behave in the same way. If Billie and Willie believe that there
are bad men out to get them, then Billie and Willie will typically both be
disposed to, under similar circumstances, draw the blinds, check for bugs,
and so on.
Both of these are false. To show that, it is sufficient to establish:
Dispositional Distinctness Possibly, there exist two agents S and S*, such
that S and S* both believe that p, and S’s belief that p disposes S to φ, and
S*’s belief that p disposes S to ψ, where φ 󲧰 ψ.
140 CHAPTER 6. BELIEF AS DISPOSITIONAL
If Dispositional Distinctness is true, Simple Behaviourism is false. And Disposi-
tional Distinctness is true because mental dispositions are holistic in the following
sense:
Holistic Thesis Where S believes that p, the behavioural dispositions S bears
are determined, in part, by S’s other mental states.
To see, all we must do it consider cases in which agents both believe p, but differ
with respect to their other mental states. For instance, suppose that Willie believes
there are bad men out to get him, but also believes that they are deaf. Well, Willie
may be disposed to draw the blinds, but not to check the phone for taps. Now, if Billie
believes that there are bad men out to get him, but also believes that they are blind, then
he will be disposed to check the phone for taps, but not to draw the blinds. Similarly,
if Willie desires to be caught, but Billie does not, then only Billy will be disposed to
take precautions.7
It follows that for any given belief-content pair there is not a unique dispositional
property an agent must bear to hold that belief, for the dispositions an agent bears is
determined by an agent’s total mental state, not their mental states taken alone. Similar points
may be found in the following passages:
A belief is not a simple behavioral disposition. At best, it is a disposition to
behave in certain ways given certain desires. On the other hand, a desire is
at best a disposition to act in certain ways given certain beliefs. This means
that there can be no noncircular way to give a purely behavioristic analysis
of belief or desire. There is no way to translate a simple statement about
belief or desire, without loss of meaning, into a statement that speaks only
of purely behavioral dispositions. (Harman, 1973, p. 11)
To appreciate the virtues of this procedure one should recall the circularities
that have plagued attempts to give behavioural definitions of mental states.
Someone who believes that it is raining may be disposed to take an um-
brella when he goes out—but only if he wants to keep dry. And someone
who wants to keep dry may be disposed to take an umbrella—but only if
he believes it is raining. It appears that to give a behavioural definition of
either of these mental states (the belief, or the want), one would have to
mention the other; so there appears to be no way of formulating a noncir-
cular dispositional definition of both, or a purely behavioural definition of
either. (Shoemaker, 1981, p. 93)
7For the famous cases, see (Putnam, 1963). For discussion see (Gibbs, 1969).
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Pains are responsible for certain kinds of behavior—but only in the context
of our beliefs, desires, ideological attitudes, and so forth. From the state-
ment ‘X has a pain’ by itself no behavioral statement follows—not even a
behavioral statement with a ’normally’ or a ’probably’ in it. (Putnam, 1963,
p. 30)
[T]he corresponding concepts must be introduced together or not at all. What
falls under mental concepts will be a complex and interlocking set of causal
factors, which together are responsible for the “minded” behaviour of men
and the higher animals. (Armstrong, 1981, p. 24)
For Armstrong, there is nothing particularly surprising about the holistic character
of mental concepts. He writes:
Correlative or mutually implicated concepts are common enough: for in-
stance, the concepts of husband and wife or the concepts of soldier and
army. No husbands without wives or wives without husbands. No sol-
diers without an army, no army without soldiers. (Armstrong, 1981, p.
24)
However, it is not obvious that the functionalist should take the concepts of mind
to be correlative or implicative, in the way that the concepts of husband and wife, or
soldier and army may be. Rather, they should be taken to be ‘correlative’ in the way
that parts of functionally classified systems are. Belief stands to desire as brakes stand
to engine, not as husband stands to wife.
Functionalism is able to accommodate the holistic thesis. For functional classifica-
tion just is a way of explaining the complex behaviour of a system, through determining
the causal interactions of the system’s parts. Change the parts, and the behaviours are
liable to change. This is nothing mysterious: All it tells us is that the higher-level causal
powers of our beliefs and desires are dependent upon the other beliefs and desires (i.e.,
parts with distinct causal properties) that the system bears. Analogously, I can explain
how the production line creates its produce, but in doing so I must explain how the
parts of the production line interact to bring about the disposition to, say, produce an
item once an order is placed.
Similarly, to explain the behaviour of an agent one must break the agent down
into their ‘mental parts’—the interaction of those parts gives rise to items of practical
reasoning, which in turn give rise to behaviour. To explain why Jones went to the
cupboard by citing his desire for coffee and belief that there is coffee in the cupboard,
then, is explanatorily analogous to explaining why the blood flows by citing the pres-
ence of the heart and the veins, or to explain the production of an object by citing the
presence of certain machines on the assembly line. Just as by knowing the make-up of
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someone’s circulatory system one can predict and explain its behaviour, by knowing
what S believes, desires, or intends one can predict and explain S’s acts.
That deals with [6.2]. I turn now to the second section of this chapter, in which I
will deal with [6.3].
6.2 Complex Behaviourism
Functionalism may be a better theory than Simple Behaviourism, but there exists a
dispositional account of belief that is better yet. The purpose of this section is to
outline and defend that account. I call it Complex Behaviourism.
There are three subsections. In the first, I follow Helen Steward in criticising the
coherence of the notion of a spatiotemporal state of belief. In the second, employing
the argument against token-token identification of dispositions and their causal bases
developed in Chapter 2, I argue that functionalism in the philosophy of mind is false. In
the third, I argue that a purely dispositional account of mind, contra the argument given
in the last section, is perfectly able to accommodate both inter-mental causation, and
the holistic character of mental dispositions. I then argue that Complex Behaviourism
is a better theory than Functionalism.
6.2.1 Token states
As outlined above, on a functionalist account, at least insofar as mental states are
the occupants of causal roles, mental states are spatiotemporal parts. Now, amongst
the guiding assumptions of functionalist theorising on the nature of mind is the view
that mental states are essentially causal entities. And the reason why mental states
were supposed to be essentially causal lies in their featuring in apparently causal
explanations of action. In what follows, I am going to outline two reasons to be
sceptical of the view that mental states are the occupants of causal roles. The first
concerns the use of the term ‘because’ in mental explanation. The second concerns the
notion of a token state.
A causal because?
A strong motivation for taking mental states to be causally efficacious is that mental
explanations of action typically use the ‘because x’ locution, and it is typically assumed
that this must denote some kind of causal ‘because’. For instance, Rundle writes:
Such a conception is the starting-point for much contemporary philosophy
of mind and action, and it is a starting-point that to many appears unques-
tionable: if ’because’ is not self-evidently causal in this use, at least there
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appear to be no alternative readings clamouring for our attention. (Rundle,
1997, p. vii)
Rundle is certainly correct that this assumption is taken as a starting point in the
philosophy of mind. Just consider the following passages from Millikan and Dretske:
For beliefs, normally a prominent part of one’s reasons for acting (desire
being another prominent part), are special kinds of representations. Beliefs
are those representations whose causal role in the production of output is
determined by their meaning or content—by the way they represent what
they represent. (Dretske, 1988, p. 53)
In the peculiar case of human belief and desire, part of the functional role
concerns use of these representations in inference, prior to their eventual
effects on action. (Millikan, 2004, p. 79)
Nevertheless, it is in fact quite odd to speak of mental states causing events. State-
ments of the form ‘my belief that p caused me to φ’ are awkwardly phrased. Rather,
we would typically say that one φ-ed because one believed that p. There are exceptions.
It is more natural to say: ‘A horrible pain caused me to flinch’. But in general, even in
the case of desire, it is less awkward to use the ‘because x’, rather than the ‘caused by
x’ locution.
Moreover, Steward has argued that there is an alternative available. For it is not
only causally efficacious spatiotemporal entities that enter into causal explanations that
involve the ‘because of...’ locution. The ball fell, smashing a glass. Why did the ball
fall? That it was close to the edge has explanatory force, but that it was close to the
edge does not denote a causally efficacious individual that moved the ball. Or suppose
Sally failed to win the competition: That there were many talented applicants may
constitute an explanans, though there being many talented applicants is not a causal
efficacious individual. Put in Steward’s terms: It is not only causally efficacious entities
that causally explain. Conditions—which for present purposes we may construe as sets
of cases or centred worlds8—causally explain too. No doubt, there is some connection
between causation and conditions. That the ball was close to the edge tells us that
more cases of pushing cause the ball’s falling. Lewis, for instance, would no doubt
say that they point to possible causal chains—they give information about the various
possible causal chains that could have occurred, conditional on the cited explanans.9
Importantly, dispositional properties can enter into causal explanations as con-
ditions.10 The ball fell and smashed the glass. Why did the glass smash? That it
8See ‘Reply to Jackson’ in (Williamson, 2009).
9See (Lewis, 1986a). Of course, we can bicker about the extension of ‘causal explanation’. If your net
is not cast as wide, just replace terms where required.
10Cf. (Rundle, 1997, p. 230).
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was fragile helps us to understand how. Or take another case: A fire rages all night
long, burning the building to its foundations. The fire’s raging all night long may be
explained by its parts being highly flammable. The flammability does not cause the
building to burn. The cause would be the ill-stubbed cigarette, or whatever else caused
the fire. The flammability is a condition, not a causally efficacious spatiotemporal en-
tity. The upshot is that Rundle’s question has an answer: an alternative reading of
‘because’ is available. And so the fact that we use the ‘because x’ locution is no evi-
dence that mental states are causally efficacious entities. And the oddity of explicitly
employing causal language in mental explanations is evidence that they are not.
Stative tokens
According to Steward, another reason that philosophers of mind have been seduced
into mistakingly believing that mental states are causally efficacious spatiotemporal
entities revolves around the dual imposition of (1) the type/token distinction and (2)
the ‘state of...’ locution. Now, it may be thought that this is none other than bad
philosophy—mistaking linguistic for metaphysical considerations. But hold tight. For
Steward is well worth her salt. After all—Williamson’s (2000) theory of knowledge
takes Steward’s insight part of its foundation. Put in his terms: Agents are in mental
states, not vice versa.
Think about it like this: Stative ascriptions typically make use of phrases of the
form ‘state of x’. As Steward notes, this locution has two uses: (1) where x takes as its
possible values the entity in the state. Examples include: The state of Jones, the state of
play, the state of affairs, the state of the water molecules, and so on. But sometimes the
ascription involves a use (2) where x takes as its possible values state kinds. Examples
include the state of coldness, the state of orbit, the state of disrepair, and so on. So
far so good. However, close reflection reveals that the ‘state of’ locution has a wide
application. We speak of states of green, states of play, states of affairs, states of the
brain, and of course states of mind. As Robinson has pointed out, it appears probable
the locution is but a ‘stylistic variant’ on predication.11 Put another way, we can use
stative terminology to simply state how things are. If I say the room is in a red state,
I am in some sense saying ‘how the room is’. In a sense, this is merely equivalent to
saying ‘the room is red’.
Steward’s contention is that the term ‘state’ has had misleading consequences in
the philosophy of mind. She writes:
[T]he ‘state of...’ form of expression has nevertheless been very powerful,
as stylistic variants go. For it has several features which have enabled
philosophers to formulate various theses concerning states which might
11Cf. (Robinson, 1990).
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not have seemed nearly so attractive had they had to restrict themselves to
other modes of expression. (Steward, 1997, p. 117)
‘Objection, objection!’
‘Pray tell.’
‘Well, Steward has assumed that authors are using the term ‘state’ in some spe-
cific way. But we should not worry about stative terminology: It only serves as a
placeholder. Just look here at what Armstrong says:
I attach no special importance to the word ‘state’ . For instance, it is not
meant to rule out ‘process’ or ‘event’. (Armstrong, 1968, p. 82)
So isn’t all of this missing the point?’
It is not. Firstly, the term ‘state’ is used in a specific way by authors, even Armstrong.
He may claim otherwise, but consider the following passage from the very same book:
When I have a desire to go out for a drink, I am in a certain mental state (as
distinct from a process or event)... (Armstrong, 1968, p. 152)
But secondly, and more importantly, the problem concerns the application of the
type/token distinction to stative ascriptions, not the use of stative terminology more
generally. Here is the rub. Steward contends that when we use the ‘state of...’ locution,
we are liable to distinguish token states from types of state. But in fact, whilst there is
nothing wrong with the notion of a token state, there are no entities that are both token
states and spatiotemporal particulars.
It will be helpful to consider what I take to be a fairly paradigmatic stative ascription:
States of orbit. You and I can both be in orbit at the same time. We can be both in the
same orbit at the same time, and in different orbits at the same or different times, though
of course at no time could we be in the same place in the same orbit. We can count
token orbits. Your orbit may be further away, it may be on a different axis. But none of
these orbits is a spatiotemporal entity.
Now, it is tempting to attempt to identify the state of orbit with an event—say
the event that starts upon your entering the relevant belt, and that ends upon your
exiting that belt. But this would be a mistake. To see why, suppose Armstrong (Neil,
not David) is propelled in a rocket at t1 and enters an orbit O around Earth. At t2,
Armstrong exits orbit, and lands on Earth. At t3, Armstrong is propelled identically
to before, and ends up in O. Let me ask: Is Armstrong in the same orbit? I say he is!
Notice also what Armstrong would likely report: He would say that he had been in
the same orbit twice, not that he had been in two of the same orbit.
For another example, consider a pump-action shotgun’s ‘loaded’ state. That state
can be shared: Other pump-action shotguns can be in the same loaded state. But there
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are no token ‘loadeds’. There are token loadings and token events during which a gun
is loaded. But these are not tokens of the loaded state. None of this is to say that there
are no token spatiotemporal beliefs, just that we should not be seduced into thinking
they are in virtue of the fact that we can speak of token states of mind.
Nevertheless, as I shall now argue, there is at least one compelling reason for
supposing that there are no spatiotemporal beliefs. And that reason is as follows:
Mental types are more akin to types with no spatiotemporal tokens than to types with
spatiotemporal tokens. More precisely, when a type has spatiotemporal tokens, and
can be attributed to agents, where those agents do not overlap in their parts, there will
exist at least two tokens. In contrast, when a type has no spatiotemporal tokens and
can be attributed to agents, where those agents do not overlap in parts, there will not
exist at least two tokens. And belief is more akin to the latter kind than it is to the
former.
Take the type ‘pimple’. There are spatiotemporal pimples. Pimples can be counted:
I may say ‘there are four pimples in the room’. Alas, one can possess pimple-parts.
Because token pimples are spatiotemporal, if you and I have a pimple, there must
be at least two token pimples: Your pimple and my pimple. Similar points apply to
‘heart’. So long as we share no parts, then if you have a heart and I have a heart, then
there are two hearts. Compare ‘pimple’ and ‘heart’ to the type ‘red’. Ferraris are not
tokens of the type red. Ferraris are tokens of the type ‘red object’. Red does not have
spatiotemporal tokens: Token ‘reds’ include crimsons, burgundies, scarlets, and so on.
Suppose you and I are both red. Does it follow that there exist two token reds? The
answer is ‘no’. You and I may be both the same shade, even if we have no parts in
common. Or consider ‘states of orbit’. You and I are in orbit and share not parts: Does
it follow that there is more than one orbit? Again, not at all: We may both be in the
same orbit, perhaps at different points on its trajectory.12
Now, ‘belief’ is unlike ‘pimple’ and ‘heart’, and more like ‘orbit’ and ‘red’. And the
reason is that ‘token’ beliefs are not spatiotemporal entities that ‘lie in our head’, just
as ‘being red’ or ‘being in orbit’ are not entities that count amongst our spatiotemporal
parts. Rather, ‘tokens’ of the type belief are typically beliefs that p or that q. If you and
I share belief, then we both believe that p. The similarity relation concerns content,
not the possession of spatiotemporal particulars. You and I both believe that p—how
many beliefs do we know are in the room? This is a strange question, and it is a strange
question because we do not typically count beliefs spatiotemporally. If you believe
that p and q we can say you hold two beliefs. But the ‘two’ quantifies contents, not
attitudes.
12Of course, terms can be ambiguous between distinct types. Consider the type ‘animal’. A token
animal may be a species of animal, i.e., ‘lion’, ‘tiger’, or ‘bear’. In contrast, a token of the type ‘animal’
may be a spatiotemporal organism. If I say ‘get that animal out of my house’ I would typically have a
spatiotemporal token in mind, though I may have in mind all animals of a certain species.
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The upshot of all of this is that speaking of ‘token beliefs’ is highly misleading,
because the mere fact that we can apply the type/token distinction does not imply—
although tempts us to suppose—that there must be spatiotemporal entities that con-
stitute the ‘tokens’ of certain ‘types’. Not all type/token relations are abstracta/concreta
relations. And reflection on the ascription of belief—in particular ascriptions that make
use of ‘belief’ as a count noun—suggests that there are no spatiotemporal token beliefs.
These considerations are far from decisive. But they give strong reason to suppose that
mental states cannot occupy causal roles as functionalists require.
6.2.2 Back to plural realisation
Above I argued that the notion of a spatiotemporal token state of mind is of doubtful
coherence. I will now provide an alternative argument for the view that mental states
are not identical to the physical occupants of causal roles. It may be thought that much
has already been shown. After all, have I not already shown that the identity theory is
false? And does it not, then, follow that mental states cannot be identical to states of
the brain?
It does not. Whilst some functionalists, such as Armstrong (1968), endorse a three
place identity relation between disposition, causal basis, and state of mind, the realiser
functionalist may merely token-identify the mental state and the occupant, whilst
allowing the disposition to be non-identical to both. All I have shown is that dispositions
are non-identical to their causal bases, not that mental states are non-identical to
their putative realisers. Nevertheless, as I shall now show, the argument may be
straightforwardly re-deployed.
Here we go. If functionalism holds true, then there must exist some unique spa-
tiotemporal part x, such that x occupies some specific causal role R. But it is conceptually
possible that there exists an agent in some mental state M, where there is no unique
token property that occupies R. And that is because mental states, even if they are not
dispositions, can be plurally realised. Here is an example:
Amphibian An amphibious creature x has two systems that regulate its
behaviour. The first system, ‘SYSTEM-1’, operates when x is on land, and
the second, ‘SYSTEM-2’, operates when x is in the depths. But in shallow
waters, both systems operate, which results in identical behaviour to when
only one system is operating.
The reader should anticipate the reductio to be run. First, we consider a case in
which x is on land:
Land Itch The creature x believes that it has an itchy chin, and as a result
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scratches its own chin. Because x is on land, the realiser of the relevant
causal chain is ‘SYSTEM-2’.
In Land Itch, x’s itch is realised by ‘SYSTEM-2’. On a functionalist account of mind,
it follows that x’s belief that x has an itchy chin is identical to ‘SYSTEM-1’. Yet again,
the problem should now be obvious. We can re-run the argument for another case,
merely switching the location of x. Consider, for instance:
Sea Itch The creature x believes that it has an itchy chin, and as a result
scratches its own chin. Because x is on land, the realiser of the relevant
causal chain is ‘SYSTEM-1’.
In Sea Itch, x’s itch is realised by ‘SYSTEM-2’. On a functionalist account of mind,
it follows that x’s belief that x has an itchy chin is identical to ‘SYSTEM-2’. By the
transitivity of identity, ‘SYSTEM-1’ = ‘SYSTEM-2’. But ex hypothesi, ‘SYSTEM-1’ 󲧰
‘SYSTEM-2’. We have generated a contradiction. Functionalism in the philosophy of
mind is false.
6.2.3 Accommodating holism
In what remains, I will support a dispositional account of belief. A dispositional
account is consistent with belief’s featuring in mental explanations. As was argued
above, dispositions enter into explanations as conditions.
Here is the account:
Complex Behaviourism
1. Possession Condition For all propositions p there exists a unique
dispositional property D, such that for all agents S, S believes that
p iff. DS.
2. Individuation Conditions
2.1 Sameness Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the same content just
in case they bestow the same dispositional properties on their
bearers.
2.2 Difference Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have distinct content just in case
they bestow the distinct dispositional properties on their bearers.
Complex Behaviourism differs from Simple Behaviourism only insofar as it does
not require that the relevant dispositional properties are behavioural. As such, it
allows the entering and exiting of mental states to count. And as has already been
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noted, there is nothing inconsistent about the notion of a dispositional manifestation
amounting to the entering into/exiting of another dispositional state. When we looked
at the distinction between believing and being disposed to believe, we considered
the example of darkening glasses which have the disposition to enter into a kind
of dispositional state; upon being hit by sunlight, they are disposed to alter their
properties in such a way as to be disposed to reflect light differently. Mutatis mutandis
for belief.
Unlike the functionalist, the complex behaviourist does not conceive of mental
states as spatiotemporal particulars. But complex behaviourism then has an onerous
burden: To account for the Holistic Thesis. Functionalists have a story to tell as to why
the relevant dispositions are determined holistically. Surely, it may be thought, the
Complex Behaviourist is at a loss in that respect?
Nevertheless, as I shall now argue, Complex Behaviourism is perfectly able to ac-
commodate the Holistic Thesis. How so? The argument does not attempt to account
for the holistic character of psychological explanation by appeal to a single considera-
tion, but rather by appeal to many. The Holistic Thesis holds for several reasons—any
search for a panacea will be stillborn. In what remains I offer two ways in which
Complex Behaviourism can accommodate the holistic thesis. Here they are.
1. Masking and Mimicking Many of the cases employed to vindicate Holistic Thesis
can, I contend, be dealt with by the dual notions of masking and mimicking. And this
is because sometimes an agent’s dispositions are masked or mimicked by other mental
states. For example, hope that one wins may mimic the dispositions of a belief that
one has won, a desire that one win may mask dispositions relevant to the belief that
one has not. Similar points apply to desires. A desire for coffee may mask the desire
for getting to work on time: A desire for cigarettes may mask the desire to quit.
This seems relevant to the case given above. If Willie believes there are bad man
out to get him, he will be disposed to draw the blinds. But he will not be so disposed
if he believes them to be blind. And that is because the belief that the men are blind
masks the disposition to draw the blinds. In that sense, certain beliefs can mask the
relevant canonical dispositions of others.
2. Stimulus Conditions Other cases can be explained by noting that manifestations
can constitute, or at least entail the obtaining of stimulus conditions. This is particularly
vivid in cases involving the ‘interaction’ of desire and belief. On a fairly standard
account, to desire that p is to be disposed to act in accord with how one believes that
they can make it the case that p.13 For instance, to desire coffee is to be disposed to
act in the way one believes will make it the case that one has coffee. Now, the basic
thought is that desires are dispositional, and their manifestations may partly constitute
the stimulus conditions of states of belief. To believe that the ice is dangerously thin is
13An articulation of this view may be found in (Smith, 1987, 1994).
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to be disposed to tread with care, but only if one desires to live. And that is because
without desires, beliefs cannot manifest in action.
For all that has been said, there may be reasons to accept a functionalist, as opposed
to a purely dispositional conception of mind. I am not at present concerned with
offering a full defence of Complex Behaviourism, but I will briefly finish this chapter
with two ways in which it is theoretically preferable to Functionalism.
First, the theory is more parsimonious. According to a functionalist account, mental
states are (1) spatiotemporal entities that (2) occupy a certain causal role (i.e., bear
certain dispositional and integrational properties). But on the complex account, mental
states are simply dispositions of agents. There is no need to permit spatiotemporal
mental entities into our ontology. No doubt, behaviour will be the result of the causal
interaction of causally efficacious entities. But those will be physical states—states
already permitted into our ontology.
Secondly—and this is important—we avoid the overdetermination issues that
vexed materialist theories of mind. If the physical determines behaviour, and so
too does the mental, then we appear to have causal overdetermination. Now, on an
identity theory this is no problem, for the overdetermination is illusory (the physical
determination is the mental determination). But we have seen that the identity theory
is no good. Of course, there are other approaches one may take. But if we are pre-
pared to accept that mental states are dispositions—as opposed to causally efficacious
spatiotemporal entities—then the problem of causal overdetermination fades away.
Finally, a dispositional account seems to give a better fit for linguistic reasons. As
we saw above, we typically do not count beliefs as we count spatiotemporal parts.
That would be explained if beliefs were dispositions, as opposed to disposition-laden
parts. And that is because dispositions in general do not admit of token counting in
this sense. It would sound odd to hear ‘there are three fragilities/flammabilities in the
room’. Rather, one would say ‘there are three fragile/flammable objects’. Analogously:
‘there are thee beliefs that p’ in the room sounds off. ‘There are three believers that p’
is more appropriate.
In this section, I supported a dispositional account of belief over a functional ac-
count. That deals with [6.3].
Conclusion
This chapter had the following aims:
[6.1] To outline two kinds of ‘functional analysis’.
[6.2] To outline functionalism in the philosophy of mind, and to argue that
it is more plausible than Simple Behaviourism.
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[6.3] To outline and support Complex Behaviourism, and to argue that it is
more plausible than functionalism.
which have now been satisfied. The upshot of the above is that a purely dispositional
account of belief is at least a serious contender with functionalist analogous, and in at
least some respects yields a better account.




In the last chapter, I argued that a purely dispositional theory of belief is preferable
to a view on which beliefs are functionally individuated. On what I called Complex
Behaviourism, belief-content pairs are individuated in solely dispositional terms. To
share belief is to share dispositional properties. To bear distinct beliefs is to bear
distinct dispositional properties. This all sounds hunky-dory: Distinct belief-content
pairs enter into distinct psychological explanations, and that would be accounted for
by their constituting distinct dispositional properties. The belief that spiders are out to
get you will result in different behaviour, given different causes, from the belief that
mafiosi are out to get you. In the latter case, one may be caused to enter a state of fear
and run for the hills upon seeing men dressed in expensive Italian suits. One will do
no such thing in the case of the belief about spiders.
But even if Complex Behaviourism is preferable to a functional account of belief, it
does not avoid a functionalism’s greatest challenge, which may be put thus: Content
Externalism is both true, and inconsistent with a purely dispositional individuation of
belief-content pairs. I call this the externalist challenge. Not all are convinced that the
challenge is legitimate. Lucky for them! They may rest with a dispositional account.
But for those of us who feel its force, content externalism cannot be shirked: Solace
must be found. This final chapter aims to seek recourse from the externalist challenge.
As we shall see, there is no way out: to survive, Complex Behaviourism must be
modified. Nevertheless, the modification I will suggest retains its spirit. My modi-
ficatory approach involves a broader methodological claim about the purpose of the
concepts of folk psychology. It has been presumed that folk psychology is primarily—
like many a theory of the natural sciences—a predictive/explanatory tool. But as I shall
argue, whilst to a large extent that is correct, philosophers have greatly misinterpreted
the way in which the explanatory and predictive power of folk psychology is achieved.
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On the view to be sketched, folk psychology is first and foremost a regulatory theoretical
construct. The purpose of folk psychology is to regulate human conduct: It is not a
hypothetical construct of the inner workings of agents. Folk psychology does have
predictive and explanatory power— but it does so in virtue of its being regulatory.
Here is the plan. There are two sections. In the first, I outline the externalist
challenge, and give the argument for the inconsistency of Complex Behaviourism and
Content Externalism. I then reject three attempts to resolve the inconsistency. In the
second, I outline the view that certain theoretical constructs are regulatory, and outline
and defend a regulatory theory of content.
The aims are as follows:
[7.1] To outline the argument for content externalism, and for its inconsis-
tency with Complex Behaviourism.
[7.2] To reject a number of context-relative responses to the problem.
[7.3] To outline a regulatory theory of belief-content individuation.
Section 1 deals with [7.1] and [7.2]. Section 2 deals with [7.3].
7.1 The Externalist Challenge
Are dispositional and externalist accounts of belief in tension? According to a fairly
standard line of thought, the answer is ‘yes’. The aim of this section is to outline both
externalism and that tension, and to sketch and reject a number of context-relative
reformulations to avoid the problem. Thus, it deals with aims [7.1] and [7.2]. There are
three subsections. In the first, I outline Content Externalism. In the second I outline the
argument for the inconsistency of Content Externalism and Complex Behaviourism. In




Content Externalism Where S believes that p, the value taken by p is deter-
mined by factors external to S.
Put somewhat ambiguously, and employing Putnam’s trademark witticism: ‘Mean-
ing ain’t in the head’. The notion of ‘external’ may be presicified thus: Allowing an
abundant reading, the property ‘being such that one believes that p’, where p denotes
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a unique content is extrinsic. That is to say: Intrinsic duplicates may differ in whether
they bear the property of believing that p. I call this the externalist challenge.
The arguments in its favour are compelling. They employ the case method. In order
to work, the following features must obtain: There must be two cases, both involving
intrinsic duplicates, but in which intuitively those duplicates differ with respect to the
content of their beliefs. We change just the external world, and the contents change
themselves.
The first cases were given by Putnam (1975). No need to re-invent the wheel. They
are, pretty much in their original form, as follows:
Earthy Earthy lives on planet Earth. On Earth, ‘water’ refers to the natural
kind substance ‘H20’. A waiter pours a glass of H20 into Earthy’s glass.
Earthy subsequently forms the belief ‘there is water in my glass’.
Twinny Twinny lives on Twin-Earth, which is identical to Earth except that
every molecule of ‘H20’ on Earth is replaced with a molecule of ‘XYZ’,
a distinct natural kind substance. The residents of Twin-Earth call XYZ
‘water’. XYZ behaves exactly how water behaves with respect to human
usage, i.e., it flows, quenches thirst, dissolves salt, and so on. A waiter
pours a glass of XYZ into Twinny’s glass. Twinny subsequently forms the
belief ‘there is water in my glass’.
The basic thought runs as follows. Both Earthy and Twinny are (1) intrinsic dupli-
cates but (2) form beliefs that differ in content. This may be seen with reference to the
relevant transparent belief ascriptions: Whilst Earthy believes that H20 is in his glass,
Twinny believes that XYZ is in his glass. Of course, neither agent conceptualises their
belief under those presentational modes. Nonetheless, so long as we construe concepts
as the constituents of propositions, the presentational modes that they conceptualise
under do differ. If asked what they are drinking, they may utter the same words. But
the concepts they express will be distinct. Why so? The answer is straightforward: The
truth conditions of the propositions they express are distinct. Earthy’s utterance will
be true only if there is H20 in the glass, Twinny’s true only if there is XYZ in the glass.
Even those sceptical of truth conditional semantics must concede the point—Difference
in meaning does not entail difference in extension, but difference in extension entails
difference in meaning.1 The propositional contents of their mental attitudes differ;
their intrinsic properties are identical. Content Externalism straightforwardly follows.
It should be briefly noted that, strictly speaking, these original cases fail, as they rely
on an implausible conjecture: That two agents could be intrinsic duplicates across the
cited worlds. After all, we humans are partly composed of H20. In the world of XYZ,
1Cf. (Armstrong, 2004, p. 31)
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our intrinsic properties must be distinct, thus the agents are not bona fide duplicates.
But similar cases may be constructed involving kinds of which we are not composed.
In a world in which there are no tigers but ‘schmigers’, similar arguments may be run.2
Moreover, whilst Putnam’s view is often dubbed ‘natural kind externalism’, the
point need make no essential reference to natural kinds. Non-natural kinds may be
employed to yield similar cases. For example, we could let there be a world in which
teddy bears are filled with some non-natural substance ‘fluff’, and a distinct world
in which everything is identical bar ‘fluff’ being macro-identical, but compositionally
distinct. Believers that ‘fluff’ is soft could constitute twin-earth agents, despite the
referents of their beliefs being non-natural kinds. In fact, all that is required is that
there are two kinds k1 and k2, such that for all relevant purposes k1 and k2 cannot be
discriminated by the agent given their intrinsic properties.
The second set of cases were given by Tyler Burge. In contrast to Putnam’s, in
Burge’s we alter not ontological features, but rather semantic features. More precisely,
the cases contrast with respect to the socially determined meaning of lexical items.
Consider:
Arty Arty has developed a pain in his thigh. Arty thus believes that he has
‘arthritis’. In Arty’s world, the word ‘arthritis’ means ‘inflammation of the
joints’.
Schmarty Schmarty has developed a pain in his thigh. Schmarty thus
believes that he has ‘arthritis’. In Schmarty’s world, the word ‘arthritis’
means ‘inflammation of the joints or pain in the thigh’.
The thought runs thus: Arty and Schmarty are intrinsic duplicates, but they differ
with respect to what they mean when they express propositions with the term ‘arthritis’.
Arty means what we mean by Arthritis, Schmarty expresses the disjunctive concept.
Again, difference in semantic value is raised to prove difference in meaning: Arty’s
belief expressed by an utterance such as ‘I have developed arthritis’ is true, Schmarty’s
false. From difference in truth-conditions follows difference in meaning.
On closer reflection, however, Burge’s cases are not obviously problematic. Why
might they be thought to fail? Well, we may reject that the truth values of the expressed
propositions differ. For instance, it may be argued that the difference concerns whether
they express the proposition with those lexical items that society has deemed correct.3
Put another way: there is difference in sentence meaning, but no difference in speaker
meaning. One can express a proposition using the wrong terms, though one may fail
to convey information by doing so. Nevertheless, to those who do hold that the cases
are effective, analogous remarks to those that follow will hold.
2See also Burge’s ‘aluminium’ case. (Burge, 2007).
3Cf. (Crane, 2001, Ch. 4) and (Segal, 2004).
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I have now outlined content externalism and the arguments for the view. That deals
with [6.1]. I now turn to the second task of this section: To outline the argument for the
inconsistency of Complex Behaviourism and Content Externalism in the philosophy
of mind.
7.1.2 The externalist challenge
If Content Externalism is true, then Complex Behaviourism is false. Contrapositively,
if Complex Behaviourism is true, then Content Externalism is false. In non-conditional
terms: Complex Behaviourism and Content Externalism are inconsistent positions in
the philosophy of mind. At best, one may be upheld. At least, one must be revoked.
Call this
The Inconsistency Thesis Content Externalism and Complex Behaviourism
are inconsistent.
Should we accept the thesis? We should. Here is the argument. The first premise
is as follows:
Premise 1 Two agents are intrinsic duplicates only if they are causal dupli-
cates.
It may be denied that our twins are genuinely causal duplicates. After all—one may
contend—given the environment in which they find themselves, their causal powers
are distinct. Given where Twinny is, he cannot, say, cause H20 to flow from the taps,
whilst Earthy can. But that is not the relevant notion of ‘causal duplicates’. Rather,
causal duplicates enter into the same causal relations in all cases. As Fodor puts it:
Roughly, our biceps have the same causal powers if the following is true:
For any thing x and any context C, if you can lift x in C, then so can I; and
if I can lift x in C, then so can you. (Fodor, 1987, p. 35)
Generalised to agents, and construing contexts as cases, we might say that two
agents S and S* are causal duplicates just in case: for all cases c in which S can enter
into some causal relation R, S* can enter into R in c, and vice versa.4
Here is the second premise:
Premise 2 Two agents are causal duplicates only if they are dispositional
duplicates.
4If we accept transworld identity, then a more precise formulation would restrict the accessible
worlds to those in which both agents are not present.
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I leave it open whether dispositional duplicates must be causal duplicates. On
my view, the entailment fails to hold: Two entities may have the same dispositional
properties, despite those properties being realised by causally efficacious properties
that are causally distinct. But the converse (which we require) holds true: Where two
agents are causal duplicates, they must be dispositional duplicates. Why so? Well,
suppose that it were false: There can be causal duplicates that are not dispositional
duplicates. Then ask yourself: In virtue of what would the entities be dispositionally
distinct? To count as dispositionally distinct, there must be some difference in the
causal properties of the bases of the relevant dispositions. But if there are differences
of that sort, the two entities must be causally distinct. But ex hypothesi, they are not
causally distinct. Assuming the second premise’s negation permits derivation of a
contradiction. So we should accept the second premise.
Now, given transitivity, we may derive from the first two premises:
Premise 3 (from 1, 2) Two agents are intrinsic duplicates only if they are
dispositional duplicates.
We then need just two more premises:
Premise 4 If Content Externalism is true, then intrinsic duplicates can be in
distinct mental states.
Premise 5 If Complex Behaviourism is true, then intrinsic duplicates must
be in identical mental states.
Premise 4 is supported with the contrast cases discussed in the previous section,
and premise 5 follows from premise 3 and the definition of Complex Behaviourism,
which, recall, was:
Complex Behaviourism
1. Possession Condition For all propositions p there exists a unique disposi-
tional property D, such that for all agents S, S believes that p iff. DS.
2. Individuation Conditions
2.1 Sameness Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the same content just
in case they bestow the same dispositional properties on their
bearers.
2.2 Difference Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have distinct content just in case
they bestow distinct dispositional properties on their bearers.
We now merely need to assume that both Complex Behaviourism and Content
Externalism are true:
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Assumption 1 (for reductio) Content Externalism is true.
Assumption 2 (for reductio) Complex Behaviourism is true.
and we are in a position to generate a contradiction: The antecedents of premise 4
and premise 5 will be true, and thus the consequents follow. Applying conjunction
introduction, we may generate a contradiction:
Conclusion Intrinsic duplicates must be in identical mental states, and
intrinsic duplicates can be in distinct mental states.
Content Externalism or Complex Behaviourism must be denied.
So far, I have outlined the argument for the inconsistency of Complex Behaviourism
and Content Externalism in the philosophy of mind. That deals with [7.1]. I now turn
to the final aim of this section: To outline and reject attempts to avoid the conclusion
by appeal to context-relativity.
7.1.3 Context relativity
If folk psychology does not individuate belief-content pairs in dispositional terms,
where does that leave Complex Behaviourism? Defunct, no doubt.5 In this section, I will
consider and reject three alternative approaches. They are united by a common theme:
they adopt what we may call a half-blooded account, on which attitudes are individuated
functionally/dispositionally, but on which attitude-content pairs are not, or at least not
wholly. Beliefs are all beliefs and not desires in virtue of their dispositional/functional
properties. But the same cannot be said for beliefs that p and beliefs that q. Here are two
endorsements:
If, however, that’s what you want Pyschofunctionalism for, then all you need
is the claim that being a belief is a matter of having the right connections to
inputs, outputs, and other mental states. What you don’t need — and
what the philosophical motivations for Pychofunctionalism therefore do
not underwrite — is the much stronger claim that being the belief that P,
being a belief that has a certain content, is a matter of having the right
connections to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. (Fodor, 1987, p. 69)
Functionalists think of mental states in terms of their causal roles. So
presumably they have in mind some set of generalizations linking mental
states to other mental states and to cognitive inputs and outputs. But if there
are such generalizations, surely they will ‘quantify over contents’. [...] The
5To deny that attitude-content pairs are individuated in dispositional terms should not be confused
with a rejection of dispositional theories of conceptual grasp, such as that advocated by Peacocke (1992).
Conceptual grasp may be the disposition to enter certain dispositional states, for instance.
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key here is to recognise that functionalists needn’t think of ‘content clauses’
like ‘that the earth is round’, ‘that p’, ‘that q’, etc., as doing anything more
than labelling causal roles. [...] That is, instead of thinking of content clauses
as picking out beliefs as the beliefs-that-represent-such-and-such, they can
think of them as picking out beliefs directly as beliefs-with-such-and-such-
causal-roles. (Papineau, 1987, pp. 48-49)
But such a move leaves a hole that must be patched: What if not dispositions
individuate belief-content pairs? A tempting line of thought makes use of the notion
of semantic evaluation. To be semantically evaluable is to take a semantic value, to take
a semantic value—at least on a Fodorian view—is to bear a certain kind of relational
property. The relational property is both binary and exclusive in the following sense:
There are two such values a given content may bear, and for each content, that content
takes at least and most one at any given time.
Semantic values themselves do not individuate contents, at most it is the conditions
under which the semantic values hold on a given content. In the case of belief, these
are truth conditions. A belief that p is not a belief that q, because the conditions under
which p is true/false are distinct from those conditions under which q is true/false. What
distinguishes, say, a belief that a tiger growls, from a belief that a schmiger growls, are
not the dispositions of agents that are in those states, but rather the conditions under
which the attitudes are true.
However, semantic individuation faces well-known objections. For one, it struggles
with distinct contents that take their semantic values necessarily.6 Two tautologies may
be reasonably taken to be semantically distinct, despite being identical with respect to
their semantic values in any possible case. Mathematical truths may differ in content,
but mathematical contents are either necessarily true or necessarily false. Some may
follow Dummett in individuating semantic values in terms of proof or Peacocke in
terms of acceptability, rather than truth; others may follow Chalmers in taking the
hyper-intensional turn.7 But even if we can avoid this semantic swamp, a more
worrying issue remains: The account gets things back-to-front. A content takes its
semantic value in virtue of its being the very content that it is, not vice versa.
The standard approach to wriggle free from the externalist challenge is to invoke
some kind of context-relativity. In what follows, I will outline and reject three attempts
to avoid the externalist challenge via appeal to context relativity.
The first is given by Tyler Burge. He tells us unabashedly that from the point of
view of physics, twin-earth counterparts are causal duplicates:
I assume with Fodor that individuals with the same brain states will make
6Cf. (Soames, 1992, p. 23).
7See (Chalmers, 2002) and (Chalmers, 2011).
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the same movements. I also assume that there are no gaps (into which
mental events might swoop) among the events described by the physical
sciences. I further assume that if causal chains as described in the physical
sciences (‘physical causation’) did not occur, causal chains as described by
psychology (‘psychological causation’) would not occur. (Burge, 2007, p.
319)
But crucially, the causal powers of agents in identical brain states are not identical
from the point of view of psychology. For psychology individuates its entities in terms
of possessed causal powers within a given context. This should not surprise us, he
contends. For context-relative causal individuation is business as usual, naturalistically
speaking. For analogy, he gives two examples. I will briefly detail the first, for it is
straightforward to see that it fails. The example concerns the kind ‘heart’. He writes:
Similarly in biology, organs in the body are typed because of their function
in the bodily environment that surrounds them. Something is a heart
because its organic function is to pump blood in a circulatory system that
extends beyond the surfaces of the heart. One can imagine an organ in a
different sort of body with a totally different function (it might pump waste
for example). The causal powers attributed to such an organ by biology
would be different from those attributed to a heart. Such an organ would
not be a heart, but it might be chemically and structurally homologous
to a heart. The biological kind heart does not supervene on the chemical
structures of material that constitutes hearts. (Ibid, p. 323)
The thought is that ‘belief’ is like ‘heart’, in that it is individuated in part by its
integration into some environment. What matters are the causal powers the agent
bears in the environment in which they are embedded, not in environments in which they
are not embedded. The first question we should ask, however, is whether the example
given is convincing. One would certainly be excused for supposing that hearts are
causally classified, for we are often sloppy in the definition of categories. For example,
the OED defines the term ‘heart’ as follows:
Heart
A hollow muscular organ that pumps the blood through the circulatory
system by rhythmic contraction and dilation. In vertebrates there may be
up to four chambers (as in humans), with two atria and two ventricles.
But a scrupulous reader will anticipate what follows: Burge has committed the
fallacy of equivocation. Hearts are not classified in terms of their causal powers, but
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in terms of the exercised causal powers of previous tokens of the type that explain the
persistence of the trait. The OED is incorrect—not all hearts pump the blood; some are
diseased. The upshot of all this is that the individuation of biological traits gives us no
reason to suppose that context-relative classification is business as usual.
Nevertheless, he offers a second example, one that will not be so readily dispensed
with. He considers the geological kind ‘plate’. Consider:
If there were no sliding of land masses across the face of the earth, land
masses would not have been typed as plates. Moreover, the causal powers
associated with these land masses would have been differently described
by geology. (Ibid)
Agreed! Where x bears causally relevant relations to y, then holding fixed that
relation the causal powers of x may differ from the causal powers of x when that
relation is not fixed. My brakes cause the vehicle to decelerate once integrated in the
vehicle; but outside the vehicle they have no such power. This leads him to conclude
that:
A land mass with substantially the same non-relational physical features
could—because of its different relations to the environment—be of a differ-
ent geological kind. Thus geological kinds do not supervene on the kinds
of masses that are described by physics and that constitute the geological
entities. (Ibid)
So far so good. When geology classifies entities, it classifies them not just with
respect to their causal powers, but their causal powers within a given context. Something
that is a plate may not have been a plate, and it may not have been so for it could have
failed to bear certain relational causal powers. Drawing on the account of functions
given, we might say that it would not have been a plate had it not functioned as a plate
– i.e., been integrated in a complex in which it would bear a/some complex relative
disposition(s).
But with those remarks in place, it is clear that the case is not sufficiently analogous.
For a plate differs in its classification across contexts because it changes its functional
organisation, which our twin-earth agents’ cases do not. To see that, notice that if one
were to drop a plate into some other context, then it may cease to be a plate. But drop
a believer that p in a different context, and they do not cease to be a believer that p!
The environmental relations are of relevance because the plate is classified as part of
the Earth taken as a whole. But mental states are not parts of their environments in that
sense. So the fact that geology individuates its kinds that way says nothing about the
individuation of mental states. Mental states are not sufficiently similar to plates. The
response fails.
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The second I will consider is found in the rewarding work of John Heil. The response
arises from what he calls the ‘Dart-Tossing’ of mental states, on which believing,
desiring, and so on, are projective states. When one forms a belief, one ‘projects out’
into the world, in a way similar to how a dart thrower projects a dart to the board. This
sounds strange—better to take it from the horse’s mouth:
Suppose the intentional character of states of mind were tied to their dispo-
sitionality: what makes a thought about a tree a thought about a tree is the
difference it makes to the dispositionalities of the thinker [...] The thought’s
dispositionality takes advantage of the built in projective character of dis-
positions. [...] What of an agent’s environment? Return to Twin Earth.
An inhabitant of Twin Earth who entertains thoughts he would express by
uttering sentences containing “water” is entertaining thought about XYZ,
not thoughts about water. [...] What the thought concerns, however can
depend on what context [sic!] in something like the way in which what
“here” or “now” designates depends on the location of the speaker or the
time of utterance. [...] The thoughts “project to” twin-water, not water,
because twin water, is on the scene. (Heil, 2004, pp. 288-289)
Now, part of Heil’s motivation for supposing this will work is his commitment to a
surprisingly popular account of intentionality (in Brentano’s sense). Other proponents
include Armstrong (1968), Martin and Pfeifer (1986), Molnar (2003) and Molnar and
Place (1996). The basic thought runs as follows: Mental states are about the world
in that sense, they ‘point out into’ the world. Dispositions also ‘point out into’ the
world, in particular towards their manifestations. So intentionality just is a feature of
dispositional states: The ‘aboutness’ of mental states is the ‘aboutness’ of dispositions.
The basic thought is that what determines the content of a thought is what is ‘out there’
in the world. He writes:
On a dispositional account of intentionality, the projective character of
thought—its ofness, or forness, or aboutness—stems from its dispositional
nature. [...] The thought “projects to” twin-water, not water, because twin
water, and not water, is on the scene. (Heil, 2004, p. 289)
as does Molnar:
Powers, or dispositions, are properties for some behaviour, usually of their
bearers. These properties have an object towards which they are oriented or
directed. The objects of powers are usually called ‘manifestations’, a name
that carries an epistemological loading. (Molnar, 2003, p. 61)
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On this view, then, the context is determined by the projective character of thought.
Now, the notion that the projective character of thought is in some sense a dispositional
feature is at best confused, at worst false. If you are itching to know why, I defer to the
powerful arguments to be found in Bird (Ch 5., 2007). But even granted that implausible
assumption, a major problem instantly re-arises: How do we determine the scope of
the throw? How far must water be to be outside one’s ‘mental range’? A dart travels
some distance: What it hits and what it can hit is determined by the force exerted by
the tosser. But evidently when we form beliefs we do not send out ‘mental rays’ into
the environment. So, we need to answer: How do we determine the ‘projective range’
of mental states? Perhaps Heil will reply that the scope is determined, in some sense,
by the manifestations of the relevant dispositions. Perhaps, for instance, Earthy will
be disposed to search for water on Earth, but not on Twin-Earth. But could Earthy
not search for water on a long-lost planet? And if so, would the range not then be
extended to planets that contain XYZ? Without a suitable account of the nature of the
mysterious notion of mental projection, Heil’s view should be revoked.
The final view I will reject has been developed by Jerry Fodor. It makes use of
the notorious notion of ‘broad content’, which should be contrasted with ‘narrow
content’. Narrow contents are individuated in terms of their causal powers alone.
Broad contents, in contrast, are functions (read mathematically) from narrow contents
to contexts. As he tells us:
The ‘broad content’ of a thought, by contrast, is what you can semantically
evaluate; it’s what you get when you specify a narrow content and fix a
context. (Fodor, 1987, p. 48)
Earthy and Twinny differ in their broad content, but they do not differ in their
narrow content. So functionalism is inconsistent with externalism only insofar as we
classify states broadly, but it is in the broad classification that lies the rot. A legitimate
classification of mental states would not classify this way, and thus a legitimate theory
of mind would not be inconsistent with content externalism.
The appeal to narrow content, however, does not come without strife. The most
obvious question that we may raise is: How are the functional relata determined? If a
mental state is a function between attitude-content pairs and contexts, what determines
the values of the relevant outputs? Put another way, what anchors the content to a
context? Fodor has a better answer than Heil. He writes:
I don’t want to worry, just now, about the problem of how to articulate
[context]. Some story about constraints on the causal relations between H2O
tokenings and water-thought tokenings (and between XYZ tokenings and
‘water’-thought tokenings ) would be the obvious proposal; but it doesn’t
7.2. DISPOSITIONAL IDEALS 165
matter much for the purposes now at hand . Because we do know this : Short
of a miracle, it must be true that if an organism shares the neurophysical
constitution of my Twin and [is in the same context], it follows that its
thoughts and my Twin’s thoughts share their truth conditions. (Fodor,
1987, p. 48)
Nevertheless, even setting that aside, Fodor’s account comes with several worries.
First, it is notoriously difficult to specify what ‘narrow content’ is. Fodor claims that we
should not expect to be able to individuate narrow contents. But secondly, and more
problematically, it simply cannot be the case that beliefs about water and beliefs about
twin-water are identical in their causal properties. For it is possible—as we now do—
to have beliefs about both water and twin-water. And they can, in some individuals,
yield distinct manifestations. For instance, I am disposed to say that Twinny, but not
Earthy, believes that twin-water is wet. So belief-content pairs cannot be functions
from narrow contents to contexts, if we are to take the narrow content of the two
beliefs to be identical, for one may hold both beliefs in virtue of bearing what appears
to be two distinct narrow contents. I cannot have two of the same narrow contents, at least
on a Fodorian view, where those two contents are realised by entities with distinct
causal properties. So narrow content, even setting aside the troubles concerning its
individuation, fails to overcome the externalist challenge.
That deals with the final aim of this section, [7.2]. I now turn to the final aim of the
thesis, [7.3], namely to outline a regulatory theory of content.
7.2 Dispositional Ideals
In what remains, I sketch a novel account of the individuation of belief-content pairs. I
use the term ‘sketch’ with care: The account is rough around the edges. This is an idea
to be developed. It does not constitute a finished model. The basic line of thought is
to some extent in keeping with the following remark made by John McDowell:
To make sense of the idea of a mental state’s or episode’s being directed
towards the world, in the way in which, say, a belief or judgement is,
we need to put the state or episode in a normative context. A belief or
judgement whose content (as we say) is that things are thus and so—must
be a posture or stance that is correctly or incorrectly adopted according to
whether or not things are indeed thus and so. [...] The relation between
mind and world is normative, then, in this sense: thinking that aims at
judgement, or at the fixation of belief, is answerable to the world—to how
things are—for whether or not it is correctly executed. (McDowell, 1994,
pp. xi-xii)
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I do not know what McDowell’s overall view amounts to, so I don’t know how
similar our views are. Nonetheless, the theory to be sketched does take the individ-
uation of belief-content pairs to be a distinctively normative enterprise, permitting a
wide reading of ‘normative’. But certainly unlike McDowell, the normativity I am
concerned with does not concern the fact that one’s belief ought to correspond to how
the world is. Rather, it concerns what one ought to be disposed to do, given that one
believes.
What remains is composed of two subsections. In the first, I argue that certain classi-
fications, in particular ‘proper functional’ classifications are what I shall call regulatory.
In the second, I argue that folk psychology employs regulatory classifications.
7.2.1 Classification and regulation
In Knowledge and the State of Nature, Edward Craig attempted to illuminate the concept
of knowledge by asking what the concept is for, that is—what the purpose of ascribing
knowledge is. Unlike Craig, I will refrain from employing an explicative approach.
But I will ask a similar question: What is the purpose of folk psychology? Why do we
ascribe beliefs, desires, pains, memories, and so on?
It has been univocally assumed that belief/desire psychology is primarily a tool
used to predict and explain behaviour. For some, it does so by providing an accurate
theoretical reconstruction of our cognitive apparatus. For instance, Fodor writes:
Here are some things it seems safe to assume about science: We want
science to give causal explanations of such things (events, whatever) in
nature as can be causally explained. Giving such explanations essentially
involves projecting and confirming causal generalizations. And causal
generalizations subsume the things they apply to in virtue of the causal
properties of the things they apply to. Of course, in short, what you need
in order to do science is a taxonomic apparatus that distinguishes between
things insofar as they have different causal powers, and that groups things
together insofar as they have the same causal properties [...] [I]f you’re
interested in causal explanation, it would be mad to distinguish between
[Earthy’s] mental states and [Twinny’s]; their mental states have identical
causal powers. (Fodor, 1987, pp. 33-34)
Let us draw out the general thrust of this passage. He makes the following claims:
(1) naturalistic taxonomy is distinctively causal, and (2) folk psychology taxonomises
in accord with the natural sciences. That seems reasonably innocuous, right?
Wrong. I won’t engage in bickering over the extension of ‘naturalistic taxonomy’,
all I will claim is that either (1) or (2) is false. Either not all naturalistic taxonomy
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classifies in terms of causal powers, or else folk psychology does not taxonomise in
accord with the natural sciences. The basic thought is that folk psychology is more
akin to certain classificatory schemes that do not carve along causal joints. My guiding
examples will be frameworks that classify entities teleologically.
Proper functional classification serves as the prototype and norm. As I shall now
argue, where entities are classified in teleological terms, the primary purpose of that
classification is often regulatory. What do I mean ‘regulatory’? Regulation, as I am
using the term, is a normative phenomenon. To regulate x is to uphold x against a
standard—to assess it relative to that standard, and importantly to be guided by that
standard. To regulate, in short, is to control by rules. For example, to regulate a clock
is to uphold it to a standard—the agreed upon time—and to control the clock in order
to make it accord with that standard, i.e., to make it tell the correct time.
Consider the classifications of biological traits. No doubt, in the biological sciences
these classifications are intimately connected to explanation. But such classifications
have distinct purposes in distinct disciplines. In the medical sciences the purpose
of proper functional classification is regulatory—medical doctors are not typically
interested in the origins of your heart, rather they are concerned with maintaining the
functioning of your body, and in doing so preserving life. Analogous points apply to
proper functional classifications in the objects of artifice. The mechanic typically wants
to know how the car is supposed to work, in order to diagnose malfunction. Schematic
diagrams in electronics are not descriptions of systems—they are prescriptions: They tell
one how one ought to build an item of electronic equipment.
In a sense, proper functional classification may be seen as a form of idealisation,
though it differs radically from the standardly discussed cases of idealisation in the
sciences. Idealisation typically serves the purpose of noise elimination, of ‘honing
focus’ onto those salient features that a theorist is concerned with. This kind of
idealisation, in contrast, is normative. ‘Heart’ is an idealised category, for to be a heart
is to be regulated against an ideal. To be a bicycle is not to operate in a certain way—
broken bicycles are bicycles. Rather, to be a bicycle is to be upheld to a dispositional
standard.
To classify against an ideal is not to assume that anything could act in accord with
that ideal, not perfectly at least. Of course, an idealisation that is impossible to achieve
on at least some occasions, or to come close to achieving on some occasions, would be
a useless ideal. As Kornblith writes:
An appropriate human ideal must in some ways be responsive to human
capacities. Ideals are meant to play some role in guiding action, and an ideal
that took no account of human limitations would thereby lose its capacity
to play a constructive action-guiding role. At the same time, our ideals
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cannot be so closely tied to what particular individuals are capable of that
we fail to recognize that some individuals at some times are incapable of
performing in ideal ways. There is a large middle ground here, and it is
here that reasonable ideals are to be found. (Kornblith, 2001, p. 238)
A set of brakes may be upheld to an ideal—the functional ideal of stopping the
vehicle upon being activated. But they may not be capable of doing so across all
environments. In fact, one of the primary uses of upholding to teleological ideals is
precisely to attune an entity to its environment. Move to Russia, and one may wish to
invest in snow-tyres, as they will function better than other kinds of tyre.
So far, I have argued that some classificatory schemes—in particular proper func-
tional schemes—serve a regulatory, rather than a predictive/explanatory purpose. In
what remains of this thesis, I am going to argue that folk psychology is regulatory in
this sense.
7.2.2 Dispositional ideals
I will now support
The Methodological Claim Folk psychology is a regulatory conceptual scheme.
I will then argue that this allows for a dispositional individuation of belief.
According to the methodological claim, folk psychology is a regulatory theoretical
construct. Why so? Here is my support: Sometimes, our beliefs and actions come
apart. And when they come apart, we criticise and ascribe obligations. And when we
are criticised for behaving as we ought not, we modify our behaviour. Jimmy asserts
his belief that there is water south of the village. Upon becoming thirsty he wanders
north, returning empty handed. One would expect, if they were to be informed,
that the other members of Jimmy’s community would criticise his behaviour. If you
believed there was water to the south—why didn’t you walk south? That’s what
believers that water is south are supposed to do! Similar points apply to the regulation
of children’s behaviour. You say you love your parents—act like it. Or consider the
literature surrounding implicit bias. We may believe that men and women are equal,
but our actions do not conform to the relevant norms—we treat them as though we
did not. This does not tell us that we harbour sexist beliefs. It tells us at most that
we do not act in accord with our feminist beliefs. You believe that men and women
are equal—act like it. Prescriptions of this sort would be senseless if belief just were a
behavioural disposition. One need not act in accord with one’s beliefs to believe. But
one will be criticised if one fails to do so. And that is, I suggest, good evidence that
folk psychology is regulatory.
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Before we turn to the second claim, I wish to consider a potential objection: If
folk psychology is not primarily an explanatory/predictive theory, why have so many
brilliant individuals thought that it is? The following passage from Craig comes to
mind:
To illustrate the point with an example of one which cannot without qualms
be thought of in this way, we might suggest the wish to explain, in some
fashion, the behaviour of one’s fellows, or the wish to understand them in
a way which makes them the same sort of being as oneself. (It might be
thought, and has been suggested to me, that this idea could help us to see
the concept of knowledge as some sort of theoretical construct, useful for
explaining why other members of our community behave as they do.) But
just how widespread this concern with explanation is, in particular whether
it is widespread enough to fit our present bill, is very hard to say—thinking
in these terms might just be a reflection of our contemporary obsession with
the methods of the natural sciences. (Craig, 1990, p. 4)
Nevertheless, the question may be pushed further. It would be highly surprising,
one may claim, if folk psychology were not primarily an explanatory/predictive theory.
‘After all’, it may be contended, ‘that is what folk psychology does best!’ At least, so
says Jerry Fodor:
Commonsense psychology works so well it disappears. It’s like those myth-
ical Rolls Royce cars whose engines are sealed when they leave the factory;
only it’s better because it isn’t mythical. (Fodor, 1987, p. 3)
But Fodor is radically mistaken: Commonsense psychology works so well it disap-
pears, only in the cases in which it works. And the cases in which it works are ones in which
everything is ‘as it ought to be’. To those who do not bear the relevant capacities—for
those who are, for instance, suffering from certain psychological conditions—folk psy-
chology is about as useful as guesswork. But when everything is going as it should,
the conceptual scheme has predictive and explanatory power. Put another way—folk
psychological explanation and prediction is predicated on an overarching assumption:
That the relevant case is as it ought to be. Where the case is as it ought to be, where
agents are able to regulate their behaviour according to the relevant norms, common-
sense psychology may be employed to predict and explain their behaviour. But in lieu
of those conditions holding, folk psychology is so useless it fades away.
Similar points apply to other regulatory schemes. I can explain how Harry got to
Sally so quickly by citing that he rode a bicycle. But the given explanation relies on the
bicycle operating properly. Similarly, I might explain how a digestive system works,
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and in doing so I would assume it is not operating deviantly. It should be noted,
however, that ‘as it ought to be’ is not solely an intrinsic matter. To explain that Harry
got to Sally so quickly by citing his riding a bicycle has less force during a snowstorm
than a summer’s day. To operate properly, bicycles require certain conditions to obtain,
just as biological traits do. The haemoglobin enter into an explanation of how oxygen
is transported throughout the body, but not when the altitude is sufficiently high.
Similarly, perceptual capacities cannot enter into explanations of valid representation
where the environment is overly deceptive.
The upshot is that we need not deny that folk psychology has an important explana-
tory/predictive aspect. But we must accept that the explanatory and predictive force
is predicated on auspicious circumstances obtaining. In fact, we may even tentatively
suggest that the primary function of folk psychological ascriptions is to instantiate con-
formity, so as to allow oneself and others to be predicted and explained. Mind reading is
predicated on a shared behavioural scheme. How else could we predict and explain
the behaviour of complete strangers? How else could strangers predict and explain
our own behaviour? Dispositional rogues and inauspicious circumstances result in a
breakdown of predictive and explanatory success. And that’s bad news, because it is
deeply important that our behaviour can be predicted and explained.
That deals with the methodological claim. We are now in a position to support
The Individuation Claim Belief-content pairs are individuated not by pos-
sessed dispositions, but rather by dispositional ideals.
On this view, belief is individuated dispositionally, but by dispositional ideals rather than
actually possessed dispositions. In some respects, the account bears similarities to Lewis’
account of linguistic convention, on which linguistic convention arises to solve what
he calls decision problems.8 He compares his view to one expressed by Hume in the
following passage:
a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the
society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their
conduct by certain rules. (Hume, 1739, III.ii.2.)
My contention is, in short, as follows: By characterising ourselves and others as
believers, desirers, and so on and so forth, we regulate our conduct by certain rules.
And those rules amounts to idealised dispositions—dispositions an ideal agent would
bear. To believe is in part to bear a dispositional property, but also to be upheld to a
dispositional ideal. Explicitly put:
8See (Lewis, 1969).
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Dispositional Ideals
1. Possession Condition
For all propositions p there exists a unique dispositional ideal Di,
such that for all agents S, S enters a state of belief that p iff. S
enters some dispositional state D, and is thereby upheld to Di.
2. Individuation Conditions
2.1 Sameness Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have the same content just in
case they uphold their bearers to the same dispositional ideal Di.
2.2 Difference Two beliefs, Bp, Bp* have distinct content just in
case they uphold their bearers to distinct dispositional ideals Di,
Di∗.
Here is the view. There are certain conditions under which we enter dispositional
states. For instance, when Doxy undergoes a perceptual experience of a bar of To-
blerone, she is disposed to enter into a kind of dispositional state. Now, for any case c,
if S enters into a novel cognitive disposition in c, then there exists some dispositional
ideal such that S ought to have entered in c. Doxy should have become disposed to
say ‘yes, there is Toblerone there!’ when asked, or to break off and gobble a chunk
if overtaken by desire. It is this dispositional ideal that determines the content of the
state, not the actual dispositional state Doxy enters into. To be upheld to the norm requires
that one has entered a dispositional state, and so to believe that p requires that one is
in some dispositional state or other. The point is that the content of the state is not—or
at least not wholly—determined by the nature of that state, but by the dispositional
standard to which one is upheld in virtue of entering that state.
Now, notice that this amounts to what I have called a property norm, which was
defined as follows
Property Norm
ν is a property norm on F if and only if:
N1*. ✷ (Fx only if ν is a standard on x).
What are the norms of which I speak? Roughly, to bear those dispositions the
ideal agent would bear. Unlike the ideal agent of formal epistemology, however, our
ideal agent is not logically omniscient. Rather, the ideal agent in this context simply
behaves in accordance with the truisms and platitudes of folk psychology: with one
important caveat—the ideal agent has no (or at least very few) inadequate powers
of discrimination. An example may help to clarify. Suppose we take two agents, A
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and B, and place them in a room. A and B are mental duplicates, except that where
A believes orange juice (but not apple juice) is sweet, B believes apple juice (but not
orange juice) is sweet. In the room there is a freshly squeezed glass of each. Next,
they are asked to point to a glass that contains sweet liquid. What will our agents
do? Obvious: A will point to the orange juice, B to the apple juice. That’s what
folk psychology predicts, but of course they may not. Rather, they should, given their
beliefs. B may mistake orange juice for apple juice, or A vice versa, as they may lack the
appropriate powers to discriminate the juice of oranges from the juice of apples.9 But
the dispositions relevant to the individuation of their beliefs are not those that arise
under cases involving inadequate capacities of discrimination. An agent that accords
with the ideal—ideal as that agent may be—is not hindered by such worries: they see
oranges where there are oranges, apples where there are apples.
On the present view, the norms hold on S in virtue of S’s entering into a dispositional
state in a certain context. It may be argued that these are property norms, but not
functional norms. For recall that, on the view sketched, a functional norm is property
norm set by etiological features of the relevant entity. It may be thought: surely S’s
origins have nothing to do with what they believe? And if so, dispositional ideals of
the relevant sort cannot be functional norms.
There are two replies that I can think of. The first would be to deny the objection.
It may just be that, given your being the sort of entity that you are, you ought to enter
into certain kinds of dispositional states in certain contexts. Similarly, ants given the
kind of entity they are, should, upon finding a morsel of food, be disposed to leave
scent trails. This is not, however, altogether satisfying. For it does not seem to be the
agent’s origins that matter, but rather the context in which the belief is formed, and whilst
that does include backwards-reaching features, in particular in the case of historical
reference, it is not the case that it is S’s origins that do the explanatory work.
The second, then, which if forced I would accept, would be to say that the dispo-
sitional ideal holds on the property itself. Thus, the property-norm would be higher
order. The dispositional state ought to be a certain way. On this view, then, to say that S
is upheld to an ideal is at best elliptical: to be precise we should say that S’s disposition
is upheld to the relevant ideal. At first blush, that is dissatisfying, for the notion of
a second-order norm seems dubious. But reflection reveals that it is perhaps more
plausible than one may initially suppose. For analogy, consider an insect that enters a
certain ‘stance’ when it detects a nearby predator, which puts it in some dispositional
state (perhaps it becomes disposed to release venom when approached). We could
perhaps call this the insect’s ‘offensive’ stance. Now, it may be that not all of that kind
of insect, when they enter into the offensive stance, end up bearing the disposition at
issue. Perhaps, for instance, the venom does not release in certain individuals. Now,
9They may, for example, have achromatopsia (total colour blindness).
7.2. DISPOSITIONAL IDEALS 173
we can still identify ‘the offensive’ stance, and say that the stance ought to be a certain
way. I.e., the dispositional state ought to have a certain character. So it doesn’t seem
implausible that property norms can hold on states. Moreover, what determines the
way the state ought to be is historical, and can enter into etiological explanations of the
state’s formation. If I know that Jones believes water is wet, then I come to know about
the causal origins of the relevant dispositional state. I am told that S believes that water
is wet: by learning the standard to which S’s dispositional property is upheld, I learn
about how S came to bear that property.
It may be wondered: is this not proper functionalism in disguise? After all, if I
am appealing to functional norms, have I not essentially individuated belief in terms
of its proper function? Not obviously. For even proper functionalists endorse that
commitment I have eschewed: for x to have a proper function, x must be able to
function in such-and-such a way, and that requires that x be a spatiotemporal part.
Consider Millikan:
To take human beliefs to be intentional icons is to postulate that beliefs
(explicit occurrent ones, at least) correspond to something physiological—
neural structures, energy-transfer patterns, or whatever—these psycholog-
ical devices having their own jobs to do. The performance of these jobs,
when coupled with the performance of other jobs by devices that cooperate
with beliefs, leads to the performance of further jobs... to be a belief involves
having certain kinds of proper functions, and it is physiological structures
or activities that have these proper functions. (Millikan, 1984, p. 138)
On my view, the proper functions are not purposes of agents’ parts, but are rather
ideals that hold on agents’ dispositions. So if proper functionalism is committed to the
possession of entities that occupy causal roles, then the account is not proper functional.
S believes that p only if S bears a dispositional property that is upheld to the
relevant dispositional ideal. Why should we accept the view? I will offer two reasons
for accepting the account. They are as follows. Firstly, it accounts for the difference in
content between Twin-Earth counterparts. Secondly, it accounts for the force of folk
psychological predictions and explanations. I will take each in turn.
The account yields the correct verdict across twin-earth cases. Both Earthy and
Twinny are dispositional duplicates: They are in distinct mental states not because
of their dispositions differing, but because they are upheld to distinct dispositional ideals.
And the reason is that the states are formed in distinct contexts. Put another way:
dispositional ideals account for both the difference, and the sameness of belief-content
pairs. If the account yields the correct verdict in twin-earth cases, then such agents are
upheld to distinct dispositional ideals. That raises the question: in what way do the
dispositional ideals of our troublesome duo differ?
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Well, suppose that both Earthy and Twinny are transported to a planet foreign to
both. We place Earthy at the North pole, and Twinny at the South pole, and for purposes
of idealisation assume that the environments are identical in all relevant regards. Now,
let us suppose that the rivers are filled with XYZ. In this case, the manifestations of
Twinny’s dispositions will accord with her ideal: Upon desiring XYZ, she will move to
XYZ and quench her thirst. But Earthy’s manifestations will not—upon experiencing
desire for H20, Earthy will be taken to some other substance—XYZ. We could put this
in alternative terms. Whilst it will be entirely accidental that Earthy’s intention to quench
her thirst is satisfied, it will be entirely non-accidental that Twinny’s intention is satisfied.
And that is because to be non-accidental in the relevant sense requires satisfying one’s
dispositional ideals. And the dispositional ideals of our agents differ. Analogously, it
will be entirely accidental if a waste disposal unit functions as a heart, though it may
well do so. What determines whether one believes is not what dispositions one holds,
but rather the conditions under which the manifestations of one’s dispositions will
result in the accidental and/or nonaccidental achievement of one’s aims. And that is
determined by the ideals to which one is upheld. This is good news, not only because
we get the right verdict, but because we avoid the problem raised against Fodor: We
no longer require that all believers that p are, ceteris paribus, identical with respect to
their dispositional properties. To believe is to be in some dispositional state or other,
but it need not have some unique causal basis, as Fodor requires. Thus, one can bear
water and twin-water beliefs without the pains of contradiction. One can believe that
women are equal to men without acting like it, just as, most unfortunately, we should
expect.
That deals with the first motivation. What about the second? How does the view
account for the force of folk psychological explanation and prediction? Mental states
can enter into psychological explanations, for to be in a certain state requires being
upheld to a certain kind of ideal, and to be upheld to that kind of ideal implies that
one entered a dispositional state in some case c, such that c is a member of the set of
cases in which agents are upheld to the relevant norm. To be counted as a believer
is to be counted amongst a wide range of agents who enter into states in similar
circumstances. And typically, agents in those circumstances—or at least the subset in
which everything is ‘as it ought to be’—are disposed to behave in accord with those
norms. Thus, in virtue of the regulatory practice occurring, the behaviour of agents can be
predicted and explained.
This kind of explanation differs dramatically from the type functionalists are liable
to give. On a functionalist account, to explain with folk psychological concepts is to
provide details about the spatiotemporal causes of the relevant event’s occurrence. But
on the present view—on which mental states are conditions, not the occupants of causal
roles—the explanations hold due to probabilistic relations that hold between being in
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that condition and the event’s occurrence. To the explanation seeking question:
Q. Why did Jones shoot Smith?
The explanatory force of
E. Jones believed that Smith was trying to kill him.
derives not from the fact that Jones’ belief caused his finger to pull the trigger, but from
the fact that agents who enter dispositional states that are upheld to the same norms
are more likely to behave in that way, so long as everything is ‘as it ought to be’. In
that sense, folk psychological explanations and predictions are more general and more
idealised than functionalists have supposed.
A lingering worry remains, though. What anchors the norms, i.e., dispositional
ideals to agents? Evidently, we will need some account to hold, if the view is to bear
up to scrutiny. But like Fodor, I answer: The context, and determining the nature
of that is not my problem. We know, by reflection on cases, what an agent ought to
believe. If in doubt, just take an agent in a case and ask: What do they believe? Your
folk intuitions will do the work for you.
Folk psychology is not a purely descriptive theoretical construct—it is a prescriptive
tool. To count as a believer is not to bear a specific dispositional profile—though
typically one will believe that p only if one does, roughly at least. Rather, to count as
a believer is to be upheld against a certain kind of dispositional ideal. Those dispositional
ideals are a kind of functional norm. Belief is a dispositional state. But the content of
that belief does not hinge on the dispositional nature of that state. These remarks as
mentioned before, do not constitute a finished model, nor have I shown they are true.
Rather, they form but a sketch of how one might individuate belief in dispositional
terms. Whether this is viable remains to be seen. The devil will be, no doubt, in the
details. But that is a task for another time.
In this section, I outlined and defended a regulatory theory of belief-content indi-
viduation. That deals with [7.3]. The account is admittedly sketchy. But if true, we can
individuate belief in dispositional terms. The lesson is: To do so, we must make use of
dispositional ideals, not actually possessed dispositional properties.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I had the following aims:
[7.1] To outline the argument for content externalism, and for its inconsis-
tency with Complex Behaviourism.
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[7.2] To reject a number of context-relative responses to the problem.
[7.3] To outline a regulatory theory of belief-content individuation.
which have now been satisfied.
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Fine, Kit. 1994. Senses of Essence. In: Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Raffman, Diana, &
Asher, Nicholas (eds), Modality, Morality and Belief. Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan
Marcus. Cambridge University Press.
Fine, Kit. 1995. The Logic of Essence. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24(3), 241–273.
Fisher, Justin C. 2013. Dispositions, Conditionals and Auspicious Circumstances. Philo-
sophical Studies, 164(2), 443–464.
Fodor, J. A. 1985. Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s
Vade-Mecum. Mind, 94(373), 76–100.
Fodor, Janet D. 1979. The Linguistic Description of Opaque Contexts. Garland.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1968. Psychological Explanation: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of
Psychology. Ny: Random House.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive
Science. MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.
MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
REFERENCES 181
Fodor, Jerry A., & Pylyshyn, Zenon W. 1988. Connectionism and Cognitive Architec-
ture. Cognition, 28(1-2), 3–71.
Foot, Philippa. 2001. Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press.
Foot, Philippa, & Montefiore, Alan. 1961. Goodness and Choice. Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume, 35(1), 45–80.
Forbes, Graeme. 1985. The Metaphysics of Modality. Mind, 95(377), 135–138.
Forbes, Graeme. 1986. In Defense of Absolute Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philos-
ophy, 11(1), 3–31.
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